

045099

JPRS-SEA-85-157

11 October 1985

Southeast Asia Report

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A

Approved for public release;
Distribution Unlimited

19980501 038

DTIC QUALITY INSPECTED 3

FBIS

FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE

REPRODUCED BY
NATIONAL TECHNICAL
INFORMATION SERVICE
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
SPRINGFIELD, VA. 22161

5
166
A08

NOTE

JPRS publications contain information primarily from foreign newspapers, periodicals and books, but also from news agency transmissions and broadcasts. Materials from foreign-language sources are translated; those from English-language sources are transcribed or reprinted, with the original phrasing and other characteristics retained.

Headlines, editorial reports, and material enclosed in brackets {} are supplied by JPRS. Processing indicators such as [Text] or [Excerpt] in the first line of each item, or following the last line of a brief, indicate how the original information was processed. Where no processing indicator is given, the information was summarized or extracted.

Unfamiliar names rendered phonetically or transliterated are enclosed in parentheses. Words or names preceded by a question mark and enclosed in parentheses were not clear in the original but have been supplied as appropriate in context. Other unattributed parenthetical notes within the body of an item originate with the source. Times within items are as given by source.

The contents of this publication in no way represent the policies, views or attitudes of the U.S. Government.

PROCUREMENT OF PUBLICATIONS

JPRS publications may be ordered from the National Technical Information Service, Springfield, Virginia 22161. In ordering, it is recommended that the JPRS number, title, date and author, if applicable, of publication be cited.

Current JPRS publications are announced in Government Reports Announcements issued semi-monthly by the National Technical Information Service, and are listed in the Monthly Catalog of U.S. Government Publications issued by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

Correspondence pertaining to matters other than procurement may be addressed to Joint Publications Research Service, 1000 North Glebe Road, Arlington, Virginia 22201.

11 October 1985

SOUTHEAST ASIA REPORT

CONTENTS

BURMA

Briefs

Japanese Grant for 1985-86	1
----------------------------	---

INDONESIA

Paper Interviews Mokhtar on Results of Suharto Trip (SINAR HARAPAN, 23 Sep 85)	2
---	---

Briefs

Communists Ineligible for Transmigration	4
--	---

LAOS

Indochina Transport Company Notes Problems (B. Thongkhamhan; PASASON, 5 Aug 85)	5
--	---

USSR Friendship Association Activities Noted (Sinothong; PASASON, 10 Aug 85)	6
---	---

MRP-Aided Sheep Project Described (Oudom; PASASON, 14 Aug 85)	8
--	---

Savannakhet Domestic, Foreign Trade System Described (Phimsai Somsop; PASASON, 6 Aug 85)	9
---	---

Briefs

Houa Phan Bank Deposits	10
USSR Advisor at Justice Ministry	10
Women's Association Membership, Security Role	10
Champassak Forest Production	11
Khammouan Trade	11

PHILIPPINES

VERITAS Concludes Article on Dissidents' Goals, Role Models (Gilda Cordero-Fernando; VERITAS, 25 Aug 85)	12
Moderates Win Struggle for UP Student Council (Belinda Olivares-Cunanan; MR. & MS., 13-19 Sep 85)	20
UP Student Elections Analyzed (Francois Joaquin; MR. & MS., 13-19 Sep 85)	26
Briefs	
Liberal Party, Marcos Dialogue	29
Military Theft Syndicate	29
Customs Firearms Searches	29
Agencies To Improve Image	30

THAILAND

Cartoon Lampoons Thach Talks With Mochtar (LAK THAI, 5 Sep 85)	31
Bangkok Election Prospects Viewed by RTA Officer (MATICHON SUT SAPDA, 11 Aug 85; LAK THAI, 8 Aug 85)	32
Sees Military As No Obstacle, Mana Rattanakoset Interview	32
Comments on Gen Han, Mana Rattanakoset Interview	35
Thienchai on RTA Build-Up, Political Relationships (Thienchai Sirisamphan Interview; WIWAT, 27 Aug-2 Sep 85).	41
Lao Villagers' Conditions on Disputed Border (Kraisi Phuttharaksa; SIAM RAT SAPDA WICHAN, 11 Aug 85)...	53
Academic Faults ASEAN Economic Integration Progress (SIAM RAT SAPDA WICHAN, 18 Aug 85)	56

CAMBODIA

COALITION GOVERNMENT OF DEMOCRATIC KAMPUCHEA

Sihanouk Wins French 'Encouragement' for Meeting (LE MONDE, 25 Sep 85)	58
---	----

PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KAMPUCHEA

Men Chhan Greets Chairman of USSR Amity Union (SPK, 25 Sep 85)	59
Chea Sim Receives French Parliamentarians (SPK, 19 Sep 85)	60

SPK Interviews Visiting French Parliamentarian (SPK, 19 Sep 85)	62
--	----

VIETNAM

MILITARY AFFAIRS AND PUBLIC SECURITY

Ho Chi Minh City Tries 'Speculators, Hoarders' (Hanoi Domestic Service, 24 Sep 85)	64
Swedes in Bai Bang Warned After Explosion in Song Lo (Hakan Bergstrom; SVENSKA DAGBLADET, 9 Aug 85)	65
Border Arrest Exposes Reactionary Plot (Anh Duc; QUAN DOI NHAN DAN, 21 Jul 85)	67
Hoang Truong Minh Article on Nationalities Policy (Hoang Truong Minh; NHAN DAN, 26 Aug 85)	69
Senior General Chu Huy Man on Party-Political Work in Army (Chu Huy Man; TAP CHI QUAN DOI NHAN DAN, Jul 85)	73
Senior General Chu Huy Man Attends Meeting (Hanoi Domestic Service, 27 Sep 85)	90
Hoang Van Thai Article on Army Heroism, Part 1 (Hoang Van Thai; NHAN DAN, 21 Aug 85)	92
Hoang Van Thai on Army Heroism, Part 2 (Hoang Van Thai; NHAN DAN, 22 Aug 85)	96
Briefs	
Kien Giang Troop Recruitment	102
Quang Ninh Militia Forces	102

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, TRADE, AND AID

Hanoi Scores 'Distortion' in Shultz' UN Address (Hanoi Domestic Service, 25 Sep 85)	103
Briefs	
Awards for Hungarians	105
USSR Friendship Order	105
Foreign Medical Aid	105
Delegation to Warsaw Conference	105

PARTY ACTIVITIES AND GOVERNMENT

Vo Chi Cong Opening Speech at Security Meeting (NHAN DAN, 20 Aug 85)	106
---	-----

Nguyen Co Thach Interviewed (VIETNAM COURIER, Jul 85)	108
Directive on Managing Small Industries, Handicrafts (TIEU CONG NGHIEP THU CONG NGHIEP, 12 Jul 85)	113
ECONOMIC PLANNING, TRADE, AND FINANCE	
NHAN DAN Urges Stepping Up of Production (Hanoi Domestic Service, 25 Sep 85)	116
An Giang Province Controls Market, Prices (Hanoi Domestic Service, 27 Sep 85)	118
Irregularities in Dong Thap Retail Sector (Hanoi Domestic Service, 26 Sep 85)	119
Initial Results of Price Subsidies to Wages in Cuu Long (Tran Hoang; QUAN DOI NHAN DAN, 29 Jul 85)	120
Real Reasons Behind Increases of Rice Prices Discussed (Hong Khanh, Bang Chau; NHAN DAN, 7 Aug 85)	122
Briefs National Savings Rise	126
AGRICULTURE	
Pay Raise for Agricultural Management Cadres (Editorial; NHAN DAN, 25 Jul 85)	127
Rubber Planting Expanded by 50,000 Hectares (QUAN DOI NHAN DAN, 21 Jul 85)	130
Intensive Antidrought Campaign in Northern Provinces (QUAN DOI NHAN DAN, 25 Jul 85)	132
Problems About Import, Use of Insecticides Discussed (Nguyen Phuong Chi, Vuong Phuong Linh; NHAN DAN, 7 Aug 85)	134
Agriculture Ministry Adopts Seeds Securing Policy (Hanoi Domestic Service, 27 Sep 85)	137
People Urged To Strive for Winter Crop Cultivation (Hanoi Domestic Service, 27 Sep 85)	138
Briefs Flood Control Measures	140
HEAVY INDUSTRY AND CONSTRUCTION	
Coal Shortage in Heart of Coal Land (Trinh Ngoc Bao; NHAN DAN, 19 Jul 85)	141

End to Coal Price Subsidy Sought (Pham Thanh, Tran Kham; NHAN DAN, 8 Jul 85)	142
---	-----

Stricter Brick, Tile Production Management Sought (Xuan Thuy; NHAN DAN, 2 Jul 85)	144
--	-----

LIGHT INDUSTRY

Problems in Training Handicraft Workers in Ha Son Binh (Hoang Trong Dang; TIEU CONG NGHIEP THU CONG NGHIEP, 28 Jun 85)	147
--	-----

LABOR

Defects in Former Labor, Compensation Policies (Hoa Ngan, Phu Khanh; NHAN DAN, 25 Jul 85)	149
--	-----

Main Points of Regulations on Forced Labor Published (HAI PHONG, 31 May 85)	151
--	-----

Union Directive on Implementing CPV Central Committee Resolution (LAO DONG, 25 Jul 85)	154
---	-----

CHRONOLOGY

Hanoi's Chronology of Events From 15 May-15 Jun 1985 (VIETNAM COURIER, Jul 85)	158
---	-----

BURMA

BRIEFS

JAPANESE GRANT FOR 1985-86--Dr Maung Shein, deputy minister of planning and finance, and Mr Masao Tsukamoto, Japanese ambassador to Burma, signed two memoranda of understanding at a ceremony held at the conference hall of the ministry of planning and finance this morning. Under the agreements, the Japanese government will provide the Burmese government with a grant of 2.541 billion yen for 1985-86 fiscal year, which is equivalent to about 88 million kyat. Of the total grant, 2.5 billion yen--about 86.7 million kyat--will be utilized for the procurement of fertilizer, agrochemicals, and farm equipment for the rice and agricultural crops development project, while 41 million yen--about 1.4 million kyat--will be for obtaining sound and lighting equipment for cultural programs. [Excerpt] [Rangoon Domestic Service in Burmese 1330 GMT 17 Sep 85]

CSO: 4211/2

11 October 1985

INDONESIA

PAPER INTERVIEWS MOKHTAR ON RESULTS OF SUHARTO TRIP

BK280944 Jakarta SINAR HARAPAN in Indonesian 23 Sep 85 pp 1, 12

[Excerpt] Geneva, 22 Sep--The substance and implementation of Indonesia's foreign policy remains unchanged with President Suharto's first visits to socialist countries. The nonaligned nature of Indonesia's foreign policy has already existed since the tenure of the late Adam Malik as foreign minister. Such a nonaligned posture has for the last few years been reinforced.

In an exclusive interview with SINAR HARAPAN correspondent, Annie Bertha Simamora, before arriving in Romania--the first socialist country visited by President Suharto last week--Foreign Minister Mokhtar Kusumaatmaja said that the visit was not intended to draw hostile reactions from anywhere. In addition to being a return visit to the past visits of the Romanian and Hungarian heads of state to Indonesia, President Suharto's state visits to these countries are meant as good-will visits. What is more important, they are aimed at demonstrating to the world that Indonesia pursues a nonaligned foreign policy.

Drawing a conclusion to the visits to the two socialist countries, Minister Mokhtar said they amounted to a good beginning. The contents of the talks as well as the attitudes of the delegation members during the talks with the host countries showed to the world that Indonesia is truly a nonaligned country. Minister Mokhtar also attached great importance to the Indonesian president's visits--they have profound political significance and attract global attention.

According to Mokhtar, despite their apparent similarity, the visits to Romania and Hungary were distinctly different in nature. For example, the minister cited the Indonesian-Romanian joint communique issued at the end of the visit to that country, which sees its image as an independent socialist country strengthened by the Indonesian president's visit. Mokhtar then pointed out several interesting clauses in the joint communique on international tension, nuclear war threat, and disarmament. Mokhtar considered them to be interesting because they reflect the different policy line pursued by Romania from that of the Soviet Union.

Another example is the Cambodian problem--one of the regional problems considered to be important by Indonesia. While both Indonesia and Romania share similar views about the problem, things are different with Hungary, which obviously follows Soviet policy line as far as the issues of the arms race and the threat of nuclear war are concerned. As for the Cambodian problem, Hungary supports Vietnam's stand and even recognizes the Heng Samrin regime in Phnom Penh.

Minister Mokhtar pointed out, however, that the two socialist countries, for their own different reasons, have both supported Indonesia's efforts to seek a political solution to the Cambodian conflict. It can be said that Indonesia, Romania, and Hungary want to see a similar end to the Cambodian conflict, but their starting points for reaching such an end are different. [passage omitted on President Suharto's itinerary]

CSO: 4213/1

INDONESIA

BRIEFS

COMMUNISTS INELIGIBLE FOR TRANSMIGRATION--At a hearing with Parliament's Commission IV, Transmigration Minister Martono said that the government has decided to discontinue the participation of those involved in the 30 September Movement/Indonesian Communist Party [G-30-S/PKI] in transmigration programs. According to the transmigration minister, President Suharto made the decision. It is the duty of the regional special executive officers to supervise intensively and continuously former G-30-S/PKI members who have been resettled at transmigration locations in their regions. He added that former G-30-S/PKI members' participation in development programs must still be discussed with the Armed Forces commander. As for the participation of civil servants in transmigration programs, the minister said they will retain their status and are expected to become leaders at transmigration settlements. [Text] [Jakarta Domestic Service in Indonesian 0600 GMT 30 Sep 85]

CSO: 4213/1

LAOS

INDOCHINA TRANSPORT COMPANY NOTES PROBLEMS

Vientiane PASASON in Lao 5 Aug 85 p 2

[Article by B Thongkhamhan: "New Success for Transport Company"]

[Text] Comrade Bounhom, chief of the board of directors of the transport company, told us that in the first 6 months of this year the cadres and workers throughout the transport company were able to exceed the primary work by over 20 tons, or 49 percent of that in 1982.

The company is under the Ministry of Transportation and Posts. It has 7 sections, 8 production locations, and a total of over 400 workers of whom 85 are repair workers. There are 222 transport vehicles. The company was set up in 1979. In the beginning it was called the Private Sector Transport Company, and it has only 76 cadres and 60 transport vehicles. In 1981 the Transport Company No 1 was changed to International Transport Company No 1 which consisted of a total of over 200 people, 26 of them women, and the number of vehicles was increased to 150. At that time transportation was not extensive. The emphasis was on accelerating domestic transportation, especially the transportation network with socialist countries such as the People's Republic of Kampuchea (PRK) and the SRV, which was irregular. At best it was only twice a month on the average and it carried only 17 to 18 tons, and as a result the circulation, distribution, and transport of goods failed to meet the demand in a timely manner. The cause for this was nowhere else.

First, it was the responsibility of the cadres and workers, and second, the communications routes were difficult. An important consideration was that the wages were still average. To help out in this the board of directors along with experts who are assisting the company have studied and discussed the situation with the cadres, and their earnings have been changed to reflect their ability and amount of work. Those who work more get more, and those who work little get little. There were other new changes. For example, previously there were only one or two transport trips per month. They are now able to have three transport trips per month with over 560 tons per trip. As a result, their work in the first 6 months of this year surpassed the quota by 3.8 percent or 60 percent of the year plan. This achievement will certainly become a deciding factor in their new victory in the glorious work of the last half of this year.

9884

CSO: 4206/176

LAOS

USSR FRIENDSHIP ASSOCIATION ACTIVITIES NOTED

Vientiane PASASON in Lao 10 Aug 85 p 2

[Article by Sinothong: "The Friendship That Remains In Our Hearts"]

[Text] The revelation of the strength and prosperity of the USSR, the promotion of relationships with socialist countries, and their strengths in every area have been extensively carried out in Savannakhet Province in order to score new achievements for the 25th anniversary of Lao-Soviet Diplomatic Relations Day this year.

For Savannakhet Province this will be the third year for the establishment of the Savannakhet Provincial Branch of the Lao-Soviet Friendship Association, on 28 June 1985. There are now almost 4,000 members of whom 890 are women in eight Lao-Soviet friendship associations in the province: a vocational school, Senior High School No 1, mid-level teacher-training school No 5, the water transportation sector, the land transportation sector, the national construction company in Savannakhet, transport company No 2, and the [Savannakhet Provincial Branch of the Lao-Soviet Friendship] Center.

Since the day it was established they have carried out many outstanding activities, e.g., they showed movies at gatherings, meetings, and on important [commemoration] days for collective members, military and police cadres, and the people around the province 236 times, and there were 47,850 viewers out of over 54,000 people in Savannakhet Province.

There are 135 students of whom 31 are women and 4 are monks and novices in the Russian school of the Friendship Association. There are five teachers, and one is a woman who graduated in the USSR.

The library has a total of 778 books in Lao, Russian, French, and English. In 1 year they receive 824 books, pictorial magazines, and political theory books. They distributed 239 books, 187 issues of newspapers, 215 magazines, etc. to the members of the provincial party committee, the administrative committee, and teachers. The chairman and the regular committee members of the association gave talks on the 30-year heritage of the LPRP and the 40th anniversary of the victory against fascists and Hitlerian and Japanese warlords 9 times to a total of 3,674 people. They also organized a photography exhibition and gatherings between the regular committee members

and the Soviet experts in order to exchange overall experiences in various work aspects 365 times in which 491,548 people participated. In all activities there are always Soviet experts who participate with special and deep friendship.

Now and in the future the Lao-Soviet Friendship Association of Savannakhet Province has plans for the extensive dissemination of various aspects of detail around the province and to the masses.

What has been mentioned here is only a small part of the close Lao-Soviet relations in Savannakhet Province. They are now strengthening relations and extensively helping in constructing all work areas even more.

9884

CSO: 4206/176

LAOS

MRP-AIDED SHEEP PROJECT DESCRIBED

Vientiane PASASON in Lao 14 Aug 85 pp 1, 3

[Article by Oudom: "New Success for the Khangsi Experimental Sheep-Raising Station"]

[Text] The Khangsi Station was set up with the assistance of the Mongolian People's Republic, whose government later sent us some (Hansa) sheep at no charge for the experiment. These animals had travelled up to 20,000 km from Ulan Bator, having passed through Moscow, Bombay, Hanoi, and Vientiane, and it was the first time that these animals had been transported by a long plane trip. (Hansa) sheep live in the MPR where the temperature goes as low as -20 to -30 degrees. No one believed that these animals could live and thrive where the temperature is as high as 30 to 40 degrees. However, this is not a problem or obstacle for the Mongolian and Lao experts in carrying out their duty. They have all clearly shown mutual cooperation in order to gradually raise the standard of living for the Lao people. All this was the result of the good cooperation between knowledgeable people, our Lao specialized task cadres and the Mongolian experts. The task was then satisfactorily achieved. As in 1982 they began to bring in (Hansa) rams for crossbreeding. In 1984 they began crossbreeding at the Khangsi station where they were able to produce a number of Mongolian crossbreeds. They have 10 crossbred sheep that have become good breeding ewes, and over 20 small lambs. The total is thus over 200 sheep. It is expected that by the end of this year there will be a total of over 400 sheep. The experimental sheep-raising station has had satisfactory and significant success, and the crossbred animals will weigh more than the domestic ones. They will weigh 2.2 to 4 kg, as opposed to the domestic ones which weigh only 0.6 to 1.8 kg. When a crossbred lamb is 3 months old it will weigh from 6 to 12 kg while the domestic ones weigh 2 to 6 kg. In terms of wool production, a crossbred lamb will give 600 to 1,000 grams of wool, while the domestic one gives only 100 to 400 grams. Generally speaking, the plan for expanding sheep-raising succeeded by 104 percent, and it was a 100 percent success in 1985. All of this resulted from the cooperation and mutual assistance between Mongolian experts and the specialized task cadres, and also the Lao government employees and Lao workers at the Khangsi station, who have together carried out their duty in every aspect.

9884

CSO: 4206/176

LAOS

SAVANNAKHET DOMESTIC, FOREIGN TRADE SYSTEM DESCRIBED

Vientiane PASASON in Lao 6 Aug 85 p 2

[Article by Phimsai Somsop: "Expanding Position of the Savannakhet Provincial Trade Company"]

[Excerpt] The Savannakhet Provincial Trade Company has been carefully promoted by administrative committees at all levels. Its strength comes from its support from various branches, especially the SRV abroad, where its twin province of Binh Tri Thien is important. Also, there are provinces in the country that are nearby, e.g., Khammouan, Saravane, and Champassak, where it is convenient to have an effective exchange of various goods. This company also trades extensively between the government and the people throughout its own province, and has also organized trade co-ops in various villages and cantons. This is to make it convenient to purchase forest and ricefield products from the people.

The provincial trade company committee told us that since 1984 the Savannakhet Provincial Trade Company has improved its efficiency and economic management one step further. In other words, they have selected cadres with outstanding ability to manage different work areas, e.g., there is the company board of directors, the executive committee, accounting and finance [section], transportation system, equipment storage, and an office for statistics, planning and prices.

The stores in the production bases have also been improved, e.g., the agricultural co-op stores and the stores in each canton in each district within the nine districts of Khanthaboury, Champhon, Songkhon, Tha Pang Thong, Outhoumphon, Atsaphangthong, Phin, Sepone, and Samouai Districts where there is a total of over 150 village, canton, and district stores. They have also combined hotels of various branches under one place, the company. After purchasing, exchanging, etc. in 1984 the company's income and expenses for various kinds of goods totalled 326,795,000 kip.

9884
CSO: 4206/176

LAOS

BRIEFS

HOUA PHAN BANK DEPOSITS--In the first 6 months of 1985 cadres, workers, soldiers, police, and the people of ethnic groups in Houa Phan Province, in particular the cadres in various work sections around the province, all gradually and intensively deposited the savings from the sale of their production totalling 403,977 kip in provincial branches of the state bank. [Text] [Vientiane PASASON in Lao 6 Aug 85 p 1] 9884

USSR ADVISOR AT JUSTICE MINISTRY--On the morning of 13 August a talk about law was held in the Ministry of Justice, Vientiane Capital, on the topic, "Extending Socialist Legal Principles and Socialist Order." Ministers, deputy ministers, the chairman and deputy chairman of the state committee, the chairman and deputy chairman and the central mass organization, the chairman and administrative committee of Vientiane Capital, department chiefs and assistants, and technical cadres totalling over 200 people attended. The honored speaker at the ceremony was Mr Romanov, a Soviet legal advisor who had come to help the Lao Ministry of Justice. He spoke about the significance and differences of legal principles for socialism and capitalism, and the understanding and necessary conditions for this work as a general principle for organizing and running the machinery of socialist government. He also spoke about the principles of Lenin in applying socialist legal principles and techniques to the conditions and actual situations in localities, and to the understanding of order in a socialist society. After the talk the cadres of different levels understood the important role of law in organizing and running the machinery for socioeconomic management, in understanding what was needed to create and adopt laws to provide the basis for improvement in various work sections in order to extend and improve socialist legal principles step by step. [Text] [Vientiane PASASON in Lao 14 Aug 85 pp 1, 3] 9884

WOMEN'S ASSOCIATION MEMBERSHIP, SECURITY ROLE--Luang Prabang Province now has 28,520 members in the Lao women's association which is broken down into 4,880 units. There are 9,820 unit [committees], 15 provincial level women's associations, 24 district level associations, and 141 canton and 749 village-level women's associations. There are 45 child care units, 126 baby sitters, and 776 children. There are 21 kindergartens and 74 teachers, of which 37 are mid-level. These women mobilized 1,551 youth to become soldiers, including 119 women. In 1984, 10 women volunteered to work in the three villages in Pak Lai District, wrote 222 letters to the front line, and reported enemy situations to the authorities 3,225 times. [Excerpts] [Vientiane PASASON in Lao 13 Aug 85 p 2] 9884

CHAMPASSAK FOREST PRODUCTION--KPL --In the first 6 months of this year the cadres and workers of the forestry section under the industrial, handicrafts, and forestry section of Champassak Province effectively carried out their assigned tasks. For example, they inspected, measured, and stamped over 4,150 logs with over 12,840 cubic meters. They exported over 2,060 logs with over 830 cubic meters, and over 100,740 pieces of lumber. [Excerpt] [Vientiane KHAOSAN PATHET LAO in Lao 3 Aug 85 p A7] 9884

KHAMMOUAN TRADE--KPL --In the first 6 months of this year the cadres and workers of the Khammouan Province trade company brought with them assorted goods, e.g., tools for production and consumer products to distribute to stores around the province and various districts whose value totalled 31,177,363 kip. [Excerpt] [Vientiane KHAOSAN PATHET LAO in Lao 6 Aug 85 p A3] 9884

CSO: 4206/176

PHILIPPINES

VERITAS CONCLUDES ARTICLE ON DISSIDENTS' GOALS, ROLE MODELS

Quezon City VERITAS in English 25 Aug 85 pp 21, 22

[Article by Gilda Cordero-Fernando in the "Tempest in a Teapot" column:
"Reds-3--Conclusion"]

[Text] JVA: Reeducation also means a change in perspective. We are used to judging everything by Western parameters. We can't do this or do that because it's unprofitable. We can't put this thing up ourselves because of economics of scale. We keep comparing what our capital would earn if we were to put our thousands or millions in the money market instead. Profitability is the thing--not the merits of producing our own to be able to supply our own needs.

GB: Look at the leghom chicken which is dependent on foreign feed. It eased out our native chicken because it's a faster grower and "profitable" to have. We never even thought of developing our own native chicken. So now we eat this big white tasteless foreign chicken and worry about how to buy the feed.

MGB: It's the same with rice--we plant only the varieties developed by the IRRI which are dependent on US pesticides. We are not open to alternative sources of fuel produced in different countries because we're controlled by the US multinational companies who supply oil.

The Philippines has the most expensive drugs in the world. But you suggest an extensive use of herbal medicine and everybody puts up his hands and cries. Uneconomical! Even if you plant a whole hectare, they say, it will still be unprofitable. Why go through all that trouble when you can buy a pill?

JVA: Sa akin, kung kailangan mo, itanim mo. [In my view, if you need it, plant it.] When we were organizing in Isabela we made it a rule that each household in a barrio had to plant four of one kind of medicinal herb. So if there were 400 roofs there would be 160 medicinal plants. We had a whole pharmacopoeia in one barrio. We didn't have to plant hectares and hectares. Kung itutok mo sa gamit wala kang talo. [If you aim at use (of plants), there is no loss.]

MF: It is easier to buy US paper but the Vietnamese, in their struggle, insisted on making their own handmade paper on local presses using indigenous inks. They wanted to prove a point. In Western eyes it was so inefficient,

the cost was tremendous, and a businessman always asks, Magkano ang tubo? [How much is the profit?] Why did our forefathers make jusi and pia? [2 types of Philippine fabrics] Because they never asked then, is it profitable? They needed cloth to wear so they went ahead and made it.

JVA: The gain is in having it, in having something your own. Meron ka na. [You have it already.] Hindi, [Not,] the Americans have already made it so let's just buy from them.

GB: But Rissia is so dismal. And China is so terribly poor, It's depressing.

FA: What's more depressing than the Philippines being the most malnourished country in the world not barring Bangladesh? It's really a matter of setting the standards of what's a good life. The US standard of life that has been absorbed by the Filipino is that you must have three cars, your children must be studying in Ateneo or La Salle, some rooms of your house must be air-conditioned, you must own at least one Betamax, and you should be a member of a sports club so that your children can swim in a dirty over-chlorinated pool and sign for French fries. And if you don't own a TV set you must be the pits, kawawa ka naman. [how pitiful you are!]. Yet we're all secretly hoping the TV breaks down so that we can talk to each other again. We're really not all that convinced that making a lot of money is the most important, that "a high standard of living" according to the Americans is what we really want.

Sure we'll be poor, but what's poor? Me, I just want a simple life where there aren't so many cars to pollute the landscape. Not this fighting for "status" and at the same time letting the garbage inundate the land and dirt clog the rivers. If we did not allow all of Laguna de Bay to be fenced off maybe there would still be good swimming without having to be a member of some club.

GB: What is your model for the Philippine struggle? The examples around the world don't seem very encouraging.

FA: The original communism is of course Russia's. It started in the cities and Lenin organized the workers. In China it started in the countryside so Mao organized peasants. The Philippines being agricultural, the struggle here seemed more like China's. Anyway that's what the first quarter stormers called themselves in the 50s--Maoist.

MA: The revolution led by Mao started out democratic but ended up hard line. It was always a peasant who had to lead even if there was someone else more ready. The peasant had to be developed. They lost a lot of time. There was a cultural revolution during which the professors were made to till the fields and artists took care of the stables. Those who couldn't take it were banished to Siberia. So we learn from the excesses of others. We'll not make the same mistakes. We're not, as in Stalin's time, going to bury the peasant in potatoes because he overproduced.

FA: Others say the Philippine struggle is more like Nicaragua's and to therefore label it Maoist-Leninist is a misnomer. Nicaragua had no alignment. They

won the revolution by themselves. In fact in the beginning they said they'd even borrow from the World Bank, import what they wanted but not be import-oriented, not foreign investment-oriented. They'd develop an internal market as well. But they'd focus on their priorities like reducing the distance between the rich and the poor. Generally they'd do things on their own.

But the superpowers won't leave you alone and now the US is arming the contras. And the Sandinistas are talking to the Soviets and all of Europe to help them get the pressure of the US off. Yong, puede ba, huwag lang ninyo kaming pakialaman! [Don't meddle in our affairs!]

Vietnam, on the other hand, is sort of turning revisionist because the Soviet is at its borders. To a certain extent Vietnam is turning to the West. When you get down to it actually the war is just these two big bullies. If one of them gives aid to your enemy, you are pushed to ask for aid from the other bully. All the revolutions going on in the world are either against the Soviets or against the Americans.

JVA: So wala tayong model. [So we have no model.] The models we must build on are the givens in Russia and China and Vietnam. We remember the good points and learn from the mistakes. For instance we're not going to have anything like the cultural revolution. When they destroyed art in China the old masters were really disgusted...some of them are still abroad and the government is trying to bribe them back with pensions or beautiful confiscated warlord mansions to live in...

JM: Just because other revolutions have failed doesn't mean I'm not going to try mine.

GB: That's right. We are entitled to our own unique type of palpak.

MO: I've observed, by the way, that there are hardliners as well as moderates among the Reds. Is it because the first ones, some of whom are now calling the shots, are still hewing to a hard line? Because Mao was their model when they went up to the hills? Others on the other hand, are inclined to be more liberal, to want to bring more people into the ranks, including the middle forces. So they are split between being moderate or hardline.

FA: The development in the past few years has been so fast that all the changes in the last century are nothing compared to what's happening now. So the Left is still in some kind of future shock. Never in their wildest dreams did they imagine the middle forces joining in what was originally a purely proletarian struggle.

MO: Much less the possibility of being voted into power!

GB: And they don't seem to know how to handle such riches!

GB: I think there is a very real fear among the cause-oriented group who are not Reds but are sympathetic to the NDF that they will wake up one day and say, Hey, this isn't what I had in mind! I don't mean the no-car and no-big salaries bit--alturistic people are usually able to get over that hump, but that the

leadership could just turn out to be repressive. Because as individuals Reds are very inspiring, very idealistic, but as a group, nakaka-nerbiyos! Masyadong mataray! [Frightening! Too overbearing!]

MO: Like when it's "the party talking" who is it ba? Someone in the mountains? Someone in the city? We find out the identity of a leader only when he's arrested.

GB: I think Jovito Salonga put it very well when he said that Communists are Filipinos who love their country very much, just like other Filipinos. But that everyone could work together only "if the excesses of communism can be tamed, the totalitarian temptation, the adversity to dissent, the habit of savagely assaulting the moderate leadership..."

BZ: I'm really afraid of any one party monopolizing power. Because no matter how well intentioned the party is, if there's no pluralism of decision, pluralism of power, there will be no checks and balances. I don't know how much dissent the state they want will allow. But there are always two ways of looking at things.

It may be a bogey of the petty burgis but I was thinking of the human rights violations documented by Amnesty International even in communist countries—like the complaint of the Czech Evangelists that dissent always led to arrest or at least to surveillance; of Umberto Padilla of Cuba who for 30 years was on and off confinement for criticizing Castro, and of how dissidents are confined in insane asylums in Russia and Cuba.

If there were a divergence of opinion would it not be possible not to put the dissenter to death or in jail? Because it appears now that might is right. Like Deng is up there now and Chiang Ching is under house arrest. If the other got into power the other would be in jail. If the Reds in the Philippines come into power will they still be democratic? They have the guns. If there are no checks and balances the factions that monopolizes power easily becomes corrupt, becomes tyrannical.

JVA: I don't know the background of these cases you're talking about and it would take just too much time to research on it. We're having a hard time just trying to understand the Philippine condition so I would rather concentrate here, on what's happening to us, what we could do together.

MO: I think the impression that communists are fanatically obedient to directives comes from the fact that we don't know that these things are discussed a lot in all the levels of the party. They become the subject of heated debate before coming out in the form agreed on. So when it comes out it is already planchado.[ironed out]. It's the decision already, everybody accepts it. So to us it sounds like one line.

MK: Right now (in our organization) I'm just accepting everything on good faith and believing the Reds when they say they're giving us the real score and do not have a secret agenda. That they're not going to chop our heads off or shoot us all.

OT: I guess that goes for most of us. The communist party in the Philippines, by the way, is the only one in the world that is without foreign funding. And that says a lot.

MDJ: But how long do you think they can hold out when they're being strafed in Davao and massacred everywhere? And if they should come into power, how can they hold out against the pressures of outside powers who have been known to use such take-overs to their advantage?

GB: Well, anyway one real contribution of the Left, as far as I'm concerned, is the politicization of the populace. They are not only able to analyze the situation and trace its roots without being beholden for their earthly goods to anybody, but they are able to transfer such knowledge to others. The "moderates" too talk about change in society, but these are mostly paper reforms, I don't see any big hunks of their social class getting conscientized beyond wanting Marcos out. If you change only the top you still have a society of unreformed scallawags.

MF: But reeducation would take ages! Centuries!

GB: Definitely! It can't happen in our lifetime. That's why it needs conviction, sacrifice. It's something we start for the generations after us who will still be paying for the debts of our generation. Because we were not watchful enough, not aware. You and I will reap nothing from what we sow today. We are the sacrifice generation. Right now it's really only the Reds I can see who have the vision and dedication and are doing something about re-education towards a better deal for the common man. Even their enemies acknowledge that.

I was very hurt when my driver who was with me for twelve years, with an executive driver's pay, whose family I treated like my own, resigned to go to Saudi. But now I realize he was intelligent, 32, had reached peak salary and had nothing more to look forward to. He couldn't even afford to buy a house, not even meat every Sunday. So he just couldn't see himself driving me around the rest of his life. Ganoon din siguro ang maid ko. [Perhaps my maid will also do like that.] I used to wonder why she was so unhappy. I give her money to go to the movies every Sunday, she goes to charismatic. But then I realize she's third year high school, the only reason she can't go home is her family is starving in Leyte. So how can she be happy running after my chinelas [slippers] and feeding my police dog?

MJ: I have to grant that the lessons the Reds teach about justice for the common man should get into the stream of national consciousness. They're very good at that sort of thing. Name me another group that does this and I'll immediately sign up!

MK: I think the job of a non-communist in a mixed group is to constantly evaluate the moves and statements of his organization--just like you're doing now. No matter what regime it is it's really up to us to be heard or we won't get what we want. One must therefore learn more about them, find out what the

NDF program is all about, see if they're the type of people one would like to work with. Are your goals the same? Do you think you can grow together as human beings in a system that will see your principles come alive?

MG: Even if there's a Red take-over I don't think I'd give up my present role as someone who asks questions, of being the checks and balance.

MF: But sooner or later the undecided like you will have to make a choice. I don't think there are shades of Red. Pink is red.

MG: Huwag mo naman akong takutin! [Don't be afraid of me!]

WLD: Just remember, the Left doesn't promise to bring you to heaven, only to save you from hell. It is just an alternative form of government that eliminates hunger. Everything else will still have to be worked out. There will be many kinds. There will be a lot of mistakes. Things will be much, much worse before they get any better.

GB: Will there really be a take-over by the Reds? And when?

FA: Manila is isolated. You don't get a true picture. In the provinces it's really war. Even in Bataan which is only three hours away, the teachers are being taxed P50 a month by the NPA and the professionals P100. I came back from a town in Capiz where the NPA had sent the mayor a barong. In the town right next to ours 200 NPA marched all over the town, long arms and all. Nobody stopped them. It's closer than we think.

FA: The Philippines is an archipelago so every province is an independent front. Things don't develop all at the same time that's why tapos na sa Mindanao, sumabog na ang Bataan [it has been completed in Mindanao, Bataan has exploded], and Negros is about to explode. And there's not a single NPA in Palawan.

JVA: They say in three years there'll be a stalemate—that means equal forces. Like in Davao. You can't go after them and they can't go after you. But the political feeling will be overwhelming. In five years they say a strategic offensive will begin.

MO: I think they said that in 1965. That's twenty years ago.

GB: How many NPA regulars did you say there are?

JVA: 30,000 armed.

GB: I thought the papers said 10,000.

MO: Against a military force of 350,000?

JVA: They say that every NPA is equivalent to 10, because he is fighting for a purpose. And for each one there are at least 20 citizen rebels--farmers and fishermen by day, guerrillas by night... They're armed with old Springfields, home-made shotguns, 45s.

GB: And the rest--kailangan agaw armas [arms grabbing is necessary].
Ang hirap naman! [How difficult!]

MO: Where's the safest place to run to?

MO: If you can still run.

JVA: The red zones or the occupied territories.

MF: That's strange. My daddy's friend who's a colonel says you must evacuate to the military zones.

MO: I guess it depends on who's talking.

JVA: Anyway Manila will be a white zone, highly militarized. Like Corregidor, or Malate and Ermita during World War II, the last stand, really bloody, a salvage center.

GB: Parang [like during] liberation...

FA: The NPA won't be like a conquering army though, riding on tanks and jeeps. If the people are politicized, if it's a popular struggle, then it will be that much easier--they'll be part of the populace--underground personalities who are in Manila, actually in disguises--a government employee, a newspaperman, a labor leader, a waiter...who knows? Like during World War II, kunyari mongo con yello operator yon pala G-2 [that G-2 pretended to be a vendor of mongo beans and ice], on the other hand, the ice cream vendor is a guerrilla spy. So these people will just surface and say, Kami yoj, Tapos na, Arin na ang bayan. [We are the ones. It's all over. The country is ours.]

GB: Unless of course the US decides to put its finger into our war.

MO: Then it will be an endless war. Like Vietnam. Unless the US fights to win.

GB: And they never do. They just want to get the wind out of you. Because unlike the 1898 Phil-Am war where they killed numberless Filipinos and the rest of the world did not know about it, today you kill 10,000 people and world opinion will be against you. You can't wipe out whole peoples anymore.

JVA: And by that time siguro star wars na.@perhaps there will be star wars by then]. Even as we are talking here we could be photographed from a satellite. Right now a satellite has a delivery only of large weapons but in five years, it could have a selective delivery of small weapons. It can destroy all the camps in the mountains.

Right now, there's a US cobra helicopter not yet released on the Third World. It's said to be bullet-proof and able to fly over a jungle at night without being detected. Even though thick foliage is infra-red system can detect more than two people talking. And they could be destroyed on the spot.

And the development of technology is geometric, not logarithmic. If it took 20 years to invent this it will not take 20 years to refine. They just need to play with the computer to come up with new combinations in a matter of months.

GB: By that time anyway nuclear war na [already]. You just stand where you are and cover your head with your hands.

CSO: 4200/2

PHILIPPINES

MODERATES WIN STRUGGLE FOR UP STUDENT COUNCIL

Makati MR. & MS. in English 13-19 Sep 85 pp 10, 11, 12, 14

[Article by Belinda Olivares-Cunanan]

[Text]

NOT since the U.P. Student Council elections in the late '50s, when the legendary Jesuits John P. Delaney and Pacifico A. Ortiz figured prominently in the success of certain student leaders, have the Diliman elections captivated the national imagination as those of last week.

A spectacular sweep of majority of the seats in the U.P. student council in Diliman was scored by a group of moderate militants who call themselves the Nagkaisang Tugon sa Ugnayang Tawag ng Panahon, or Nagkaisang Tugon (United Response) for short, or TUGON for shorter.

TUGON has edged out a radically militant group called Sandigan ng mga Mag-aaral at Sambayanan (SAMASA) and broke its five-year dominance over U.P. campus politics. TUGON campaigned on the four pillars of: *DemokratiKo* (Democratic), *Makatao* (Pro-people), *Makabayan* (Pro-country) and *Maka-Diyos* (Pro-God).

The sweep of the moderates was not confined to Diliman alone. In the largest college at the U.P.

Extension in Manila, the College of Arts and Sciences, it was a similar victory: a group akin to TUGON swept nearly all the seats, besting a radical group patterned after SAMASA.

In Diliman, TUGON won the posts of chairman and vice-chairman of the student council, ten out of 12 councilors and seven out of 12 college representatives. Its rival, SAMASA, on the other hand, won two councilors and eight college representatives. But the election was close: TUGON's candidate for chairman, 21-year-old philosophy senior Jose Luis Martin "Chito" Gascon won a total of 3,863 votes, against law student Marichu Lambino of SAMASA, who garnered 3,730 votes.

On the surface, the victory of TUGON over SAMASA may appear as a triumph of moderatism in what has traditionally been the bastion of radicalism among the campuses, the U.P. campus. In recent years, student radicalism has smoldered to new fever pitch, following a relative lull in the wake of the First Quarter Storm of the early '70s. So that the triumph of moderatism in the U.P. may be viewed as a

freak phenomenon, an isolated case. But TUGON's leaders would dispute this tendency to view their victory as freakish.

As Chito Gascon puts it: "I notice in the student movement that the National Democratic Front-inspired student groups are scattered throughout almost all the campuses; but there always emerges an alternative group from the students themselves, as a reaction to the existing order, spontaneously, and without any conscious effort at all. This is in contrast to the other group, which has been making a concerted effort to enter all the campuses."

Gaston, who is contemplating on becoming a Jesuit, quite simply explains this "phenomenon" as "the spirit of God working".

But aside from what it may augur for the student movement all over the country, the victory of the moderately militant group in the U.P. is being interpreted with deeper significance by the outside world. For one thing, the recent election has been held up as a microcosm of the national situation, because of the presence of candidates affiliated with the two potent cause-oriented groups at tandem ideologically, the National Democrat — dominated BAYAN and the Social Democrat — oriented BANDILA.

SAMASA's Marichu Lambino is a member of the national committee of BAYAN, as have been a number of SAMASA student leaders in the past, such as Lean Alejandro, student council president in 1983, and Elmer Mercado, president of the militant League of Filipino Students. On the other hand, TUGON's Chito Gascon is a member of the national executive committee of BANDILA, while two other TUGON officials,

J.J. Soriano and Gil de los Reyes, were delegates to BANDILA's founding Congress last August.

Ever since the walkout of the moderate elements from BAYAN's founding congress last May, many observers have watched closely, some not without skepticism, as these elements gravitated together to form a new alliance, called BANDILA. Just how much muscle can BANDILA flex within the limited time constraint dictated by fast political developments, when viewed against the vaunted political body-building of BAYAN all these years? If the success of the Aug. 21 march and rally at Ayala Avenue was BANDILA's debut, the U.P. election has come to be regarded, rightly or wrongly, as its maiden victory.

This picture is not all that accurate, however, for as TUGON chairman Gascon points out, "SAMASA and TUGON have antedated BAYAN and BANDILA by at least five years." But the fact remains that each campus party is identified with the bigger national group; because many of its people are drawn from the BANDILA crowd (not to mention the fact that two of the most active TUGON people are sons of BANDILA stalwart and ex-U. P. President Emanuel V. Soriano), the conclusion is that BANDILA was squarely behind TUGON during the campaign.

Just as, by contrast, because of the alignment of a number of SAMASA candidates with BAYAN, the radical militant organization's link with the student party has been established in the minds of people. In fact, many would go one step further and link up SAMASA with the National Democratic Front, the political arm of the Communist Party of the Philippines.

The victory of TUGON, then, is held up by some people as a lesson to many moderates who feel disheartened at the disorganization of the moderates and would all but relinquish the political arena to the radical left because they deserve it. TUGON's victory, says Makati lawyer Eliseo Alampay, father of a TUGON stalwart, Gigo Alampay, is "instructive for the national leadership", as well as for the largely apathetic majority of our people. "The youngsters have demonstrated that if the moderates can get their act together, they can make things happen."

Moreover, says Alampay, the TUGON victory points out that the people be they adults or students, still opt "instinctively for the Christian culture that obliges the citizenry to exhaust all peaceful means before turning to violence".

As BANDILA stalwart and former U.P. President Emanuel Soriano looks at it, TUGON's victory provided the U.P. students "an ideological as well as an organizational alternative" after four years of straight SAMASA dominance. To him the reason why student voting rose by 14 points from last year is because the middle forces came out to vote; and they did because they saw an alternative to student ultra-radicalism.

Other observers cannot help but draw a parallelism between TUGON's victory and the U.P. Student Catholic Action (UPSCA) victory in the late '50s, when the Catholic group under student leaders like Fernando Laguna, Homobono Adaza (now Assemblyman from Misamis Oriental) and Emanuel V. Soriano swept the seats in the student council, defeating candidates of the powerful allied fraternities. TUGON's link with UPSCA, which has inspired

criticism such as its being "clerico-fascist", has come up because UPSCAs spearheaded the separation from SAMASA of TUGON in 1981. That year, TUGON and a number of other organizations that had seceded from SAMASA formed the Nagkaisang TUGON because they felt that the original vision of the alliance was no longer being carried out; for them things had become untenable because of SAMASA's ideological drift.

In TUGON are three past presidents of UPSCA, namely, Gascon, J.J. Soriano and Gil de los Reyes. But despite this identification, says J.J. Soriano, UPSCA is not TUGON and TUGON is not UPSCA, for the political party has grown beyond its original UPSCA roots now. But while UPSCA as an organization did not support TUGON officially this election, its over a hundred active members worked hard for TUGON's victory.

The University administration, needless to say, felt jubilant over the election of a moderate faction, as it believes that such a group would be more prone to reason and reasonableness than the previous council had been. But capital is being made by TUGON critics of the fact that the Sigma Rho fraternity, one of two major fraternities in the U.P., worked for TUGON's victory (while rival Upsilon, a member of SAMASA, worked for its own umbrella group); critics say that U.P. President Edgardo J. Angara, being a Sigma Rhoan, might be prone to give concessions to the new student council in exchange for guarantees of "good behavior".

For the young political party of TUGON, victory this year is the culmination of four long years

of waiting in the wings, and being content with little unspectacular successes, such as having only one councilor elected in 1981, one representative in 1982, etc. Little triumphs that paled, naturally, in comparison with SAMASA's spectacular gains over the years and the student luminaries it has produced, such as Elmer Mercado, Lean Alejandro, Loudette Almazan, Lisa Pulgado and J. V. Bautista.

But spectacular though its victory this year is, it was completely unexpected even by TUGON's people themselves. "There were so many miracles this year," says Gascon. "For one thing, we didn't even have a complete slate until the last day of filing of candidacy." It seems people were hesitant to run in anticipation of another SAMASA landslide. "A magical slate" is what Gascon calls his team. Then, too, so many students later came to offer help. But the biggest miracle, it seems, was getting enough majority fired up among the nearly 15,000 students in Diliman to get out and vote. From an apathetic 39% turnout last year, it was 53% this year. But TUGON realizes that a lot of work still has to be done to stimulate the 47% others to get involved in campus affairs.

Actually Gascon and his colleagues are being very modest, for their victory could be ascribed in large part to their excellent organization. Several weeks before election their group ran a survey of the studentry; they found out that a large portion of the students were indifferent because the student council preferred to cater more to national issues than to the students' own needs. In addition, the survey also revealed that the level of political consciousness of most of the

students had not risen beyond the political innocence of their freshman year.

Once the TUGON leaders had the students' problems sized up, they adjusted their campaign accordingly. Among the tacticians for TUGON was former councilor Gigo Alampay. But their work among the first-rung-of-consciousness students met with criticism from SAMASA leaders who claim that TUGON won because it appealed to the "politically backward". To which Gascon retorts: "Such claim, if made, is insulting to the studentry, who had all the chances to compare the programs and principles of both camps."

Part of TUGON's strategy was to field relatively older students in the slate, such as juniors, seniors, law students and fifth-year engineering students, in contrast to SAMASA's line-up, which consisted of younger students. The experience of older students seemed to appeal particularly to the freshmen. Then, too, the small band of TUGON candidates left nothing to chance, in contrast, it is said, to the SAMASA candidates who had become smug about the sweet smell of victory. Gascon himself did not go home for three weeks, as he campaigned from dormitory to dormitory.

The two-week campaign period had all the excitement and color of a national one, including the typical name-calling and smear tactics. SAMASA called TUGON's platform "poetic and obscure" while TUGON termed SAMASA's emphasis on national issues "robbing the focus off the immediate needs of the students". As the campaign degenerated into mud-slinging in the homestretch, observers were moved to remark

that the present crop of national leaders, many of them U.P. graduates, must indeed have learned all their colorful lingo and tactics from the U.P. campus.

But perhaps the biggest factor that contributed to the victory of the TUGON faction was the backlash of radicalism in the university over the last several years. It is said that a lot of the students reacted adversely to the arrogance and coercive methods of SAMASA leaders; particularly the freshmen, who resented their being forcibly stamped with "payment under pressure" on the arm during the tuition fee barricades early last schoolyear. Parents of the students, moreover, are said to have worried for their children in a campus dominated by the radical militants.

By contrast, most TUGON candidates, a number of whom are identified with the UPSCA, appeared less rabble-rousing (although Gascon himself could be just as demagogic as the next SAMASA personality when delivering a speech), more clean-cut and "preppy".

But the TUGON winners like to point out that more than just a difference of style, their major difference with SAMASA lies in their methodology. The element of militancy, they insist, is the same in both parties, and this will be proved in the way they will confront the continuing problems of the students, such as increased tuition fees, the National Service Law, academic freedom and the inert state of education in the Marcos regime.

TUGON's aim is to make education "more relevant, meaningful and liberating" and to raise the political consciousness of the studentry to levels where they will mobilize and get involved. But

before the students could get involved, they would have to enunciate and express their needs, values and aspirations first; this is where the concept of a Students' Legislative Body (SLB) comes in. In this concept of a student congress lies the difference of their methodology with that of SAMASA, for a congress implies, as Gascon puts it, the principle of "participative democracy".

As conceptualized, the SLB will be composed of duly-elected representatives from the various courses on a year-level basis; as in the national parliament, this student parliament will be the repository of the needs, values and aspirations of the student population and is conceived to remedy the present concentration of powers in the student council. Under the proposed setup the SLB will lay out policies which the USC would have to conform with in the formulation and execution of its activities.

TUGON likes to point out that its concept of SLB is far more democratic than SAMASA's counter-concept of a "Student Union", which proposes to gather together heads of organizations for policy-making. The difficulty with this concept, says 23-year-old TUGON vice-chairman J.J. Soriano, is that 70% of the U.P. students are unaligned with any organization. The SLB concept admittedly is more difficult and may take longer to implement, says Gascon, but then, "democracy has never been easy to achieve".

Gascon does sound far wiser than his 21 years when he speaks of accentuating more the things that unite the students, specially with TUGON's rival organization, SAMASA, rather than the differences. He and his other teammates

in the council look forward to working with various groups of all shades of ideology, on an issue-to-issue and project-to-project basis, and based on principle. For after all, they stress, the basic goal of all progressive forces is the same: the dismantling of the Marcos dictatorship.

The politicians on the national scene would do well to listen to the wisdom of the young.

CSO: 4200/2

PHILIPPINES

UP STUDENT ELECTIONS ANALYZED

Makati MR. & MS. in English 13-19 Sep 85 pp 12, 13

[Article by Francois Joaquin: "Students Saw Performance of SAMASA More Than Non-Performance of TUGON"]

[Text]

WHEN you have many underestimations and overestimations," concedes Marichu Lambino, student leader and SAMASA's bet for University Student Council (USC) chairperson, "and when you misread the situation, you're shocked."

What happened was counted by TUGON, the winning party, as a point scored for participative democracy; for SAMASA, it was, among other things, a failure to consolidate gains made during the upsurge of nationalism in the wake of the Aquino killing. SAMASA's USC had, to a great extent, addressed itself to the more politically advanced among the students, alienating itself from the non-conscienticized majority for whom politics was merely another subject to be passed and otherwise ignored. Student composition was altered as a result of rapid tuition fee hikes. Less high school students could afford to pursue higher studies, and many, claims Marichu, were "very sheltered", with a large segment concerned with academic rather than national issues. When TUGON, then, called for greater participation at the polls, the

conservative majority voted SAMASA out for the first time in five long years.

Not even TUGON expected the landslide, according to Chito Gascon, the new USC chairman. But several factors had set the day's mood, and the first of these was simple enough: SAMASA had monopolized the USC chairs for half a decade. In Marichu's words, "the students felt it was time for a change-of-guard".

There was also the feeling that SAMASA had few concrete and substantial gains to show for its period in office. "SAMASA," Marichu points out, "has no monopoly of correctness... along the way, we made some mistakes." Major among these, perhaps, was the group's focus on mobilization in an effort to set a pace of militancy in the youth and student sector. In the process, while thousands would rally against imperialism, the move to comprehensively organize the middle sector, the less politicized of the students, was sacrificed.

And yet, as Marichu indicates, SAMASA was "not only there during election time, but fighting

continuously". The party had placed itself in a position where standards were high and expectations, great; every flaw was subject to microscopic scrutiny.

"TUGON," Marichu indicates, "capitalized on our weaknesses without contextualizing them along the way. The students saw the performance of SAMASA more than the non-performance of TUGON."

Some observers opine that the election votes were more anti-SAMASA than pro-TUGON in nature. The TUGON campaign concentrated, according to several viewpoints, on SAMASA's sins rather than on what TUGON had to offer in terms of actual platform. And TUGON itself was guilty of the occasional blunder, as when it accused SAMASA of a ₱30,000 deficit in USC funds. It had gotten the information from a faculty member, whom it declined to name. Later, a financial statement would prove the opposite: the outgoing USC would be leaving its successors not a deficit, but a ₱30,000 surplus.

There is also the view that, because a SAMASA victory was expected, many students voted the TUGON slate in, assuming that the chairs would still fall to SAMASA. Marichu, it should be noted, lost by a mere 133 votes and one former councilor speaks of students trickling in and out of Vinzon's Hall, where the USC holds court, to offer consolation to the losers. But post-election sympathy is of little real comfort, and the vote for the underdog showed itself disastrous for the party. "A close fight would have taught us a lesson," one former SAMASA councilor exclaims, "but this!"

Marichu also lists TUGON's superiority in finances and campaign machinery as among the

reasons behind SAMASA's defeat. Glossy TUGON posters were plastered on university billboards during the two-and-a-half week campaign period; and while SAMASA distributed crudely printed or mimeographed pamphlets, their rivals flooded classrooms with shiny primers and campaign paraphernalia. Certain political figures within the social democratic spectrum rumoredly donated money to the TUGON campaign, leading to further speculation on TUGON's BANDILA links.

Despite the attention that the USC election has commandeered from observers speculating on the political categories of the two student parties, Marichu maintains that, as far as issues are concerned, SAMASA and TUGON possess nearly identical stands. "I refuse to accept the nat dem label," she declares, questioned as to whether the defeat was a reaction against SAMASA's political orientation. TUGON, she holds, will continue to fight for the common cause. "I'm sure they'll be doing the same things we did," she feels, "and we're willing to help them, like with the implementation of mass campaigns. They still lack experience."

At the same time, SAMASA's new general program of action focuses on harnessing collective strength through the organization of student groups. With that in mind, it plans to continue the campaign for student rights, as well as launch counter-venues to the new USC.

The defeat forces SAMASA to take a long hard look at itself, and at the studentry in whose name it has bannered its struggle. The questions that are being asked will begin to find answers in the next year, when Vinzon's Hall is overrun by a preppier, socks-and-loafers,

Maka-Dios population. What implications does the TUGON take-over have at the protest movement's national level? What does the situation say of the average student and the political mood of the university as a whole? What does it say of the movement itself?

"Everyone who is working with or for the people," says Marichu, "must sum up their experiences periodically and cull lessons regularly, not only when they're feeling the weight of their problems." Though many within SAMASA still reel with disbelief, sobriety has made its entrance, and with it, an honest reassessment. No, SAMASA isn't over the hill quite yet; it may just be eyeing the peak. MM

CSO: 4200/2

11 October 1985

PHILIPPINES

BRIEFS

LIBERAL PARTY, MARCOS DIALOGUE--The Liberal Party plans to discuss holding a dialogue with President Marcos in response to his call for national unity and reconciliation. The party, however, agrees that before such a dialogue can be considered, the president should first release all political detainees. The statement was made by M. P. and Liberal Party co-chairman Eva Estrada Kalaw who said that such a move has been agreed upon by party leaders and members during a recent meeting. Kalaw remarked that Marcos' announcement that local elections will be held in 1986 as originally scheduled points to a political showdown between his administration [and] the communists. [Text] [Manila Far East Broadcasting Company in Tagalog 1000 GMT 16 Sep 85]

MILITARY THEFT SYNDICATE--Military sources yesterday confirmed the existence of a syndicate made up of soldiers, former soldiers, and civilians who have been pilfering military supplies, equipment, uniforms, and guns which eventually end up in the hands of rebels and criminal elements. This has greatly upset acting Armed Forces Chief Lieutenant General Fidel Ramos who has ordered the arrest and punishment of the former soldiers and civilians involved in these operations. In his directive yesterday, Ramos ordered the setting up of a special task force to operate nationwide in tracking down and arresting those involved in the pilferage of army supplies and equipment. He appointed Brigadier General Fidel (Singson), Armed Forces of the Philippines [AFP] deputy chief of intelligence as head of the task force. Reports say the syndicate has been stealing supplies and equipment from the AFP and disposing of these items in public stores in Quiapo, Central Market, Divisoria, Dao, Pampanga, and other places. Items such as army uniforms and insignias have ended up in the hands of subversives who use these to infiltrate military and police detachments and to stage bank robberies. Colonel Reynaldo San Gabriel, an AFP spokesman, said that some members of the syndicate have already been arrested and will soon be charged in court. [Text] [Dagupan City DZDL Radio in Tagalog 0445 GMT 17 Sep 85]

CUSTOMS FIREARMS SEARCHES--There will be stringent inspections of all incoming cargo at Manila's south harbor starting today. Customs authorities say they will be looking out for explosives and weapons being smuggled inside regular cargo. The inspection operations are being carried out in view of the recent proliferation of illegal firearms entering the country at such points as the Manila International Airport. Customs officials [name indistinct] Sebastian said no piece of cargo will be spared inspection. [Text] [Manila Far East Broadcasting Company in Tagalog 1000 GMT 25 Sep 85]

AGENCIES TO IMPROVE IMAGE--First Lady and Minister of Human Settlements Imelda Marcos has called on law enforcement agencies to redouble their efforts and improve their methods of preserving peace and order. She made the appeal at a command conference at Malacanang attended by top officials of the metropolitan police force and civil-military authorities. During the conference Mrs Marcos referred to reports that law enforcers are engaged in the tong [bribery] system which she said is detrimental to the public image of lawmen. The first lady called the meeting as part of her periodic assessment of the peace-and-order situation, urging that better methods in the government's campaign against criminality be employed in Metro Manila's four cities and 13 towns. [Text] [Dagupan City DZDL Radio in Tagalog 0445 GMT 27 Sep 85]


CSO: 4211/3

THAILAND

CARTOON LAMPOONS THACH TALKS WITH MOCHTAR

Bangkok LAK THAI in Thai 5 Sep 85 p 10

[Cartoon]



THAILAND

BANGKOK ELECTION PROSPECTS VIEWED BY RTA OFFICER

Sees Military As No Obstacle

Bangkok MATICHON SUT SAPDA in Thai 11 Aug 85 pp 16, 17

[Interview with Gen Mana Rattanakoset, the assistant RTA CINC; date and place not specified]

[Text] [Question] How sure are you that you will run for the position of governor of Bangkok Metropolitan?

[Answer] Quite sure. Parliament has already passed the law, but it has not yet been announced in the government gazette. When the election date is set, I will resign from government service and from the Senate in order to prepare to run for governor of Bangkok Metropolitan. I am very confident about this.

[Question] If you succeed in becoming the governor of Bangkok Metropolitan, what will your administrative policy be?

[Answer] The previous governor has done a good job. If I become the governor, I will do my best to take over from him. To solve some of the problems that exist today, we must have the cooperation and support of everyone. Take the buses that come here from other provinces, for example. If they do not cooperate, traffic will be terrible. As for the garbage problem, we must all help clean up the city since this is our home. If everyone helps, this will reduce the government's burden. If we all help, I don't think that we will have to spend much money or use much technology.

This is very important. Because if we don't do this, everything will be in disarray. If I become governor, I will give attention to these problems. There are many talented people in Thailand. I will mobilize them to help solve the problems.

[Question] Bangkok has many problems. If you become governor, will you feel discouraged?

[Answer] I think that the problems, such as the garbage problem, can be solved. I can't promise anything about the flood problem because if it rains hard, there will be flooding. But we can take steps to drain the water from

areas as quickly as possible. You have to look at the level of the water, too. If we drain all the water, the flood waters will recede quickly. We have to recognize that the land is low and that there will be flooding. But if we can drain the drainage pipes quickly.... For example, we can clear the pipes that are clogged. Around my house, it floods but the water recedes quickly. In some places, the pipes are clogged and so the water does not recede. It becomes dirty and smells. This causes problems. I think that these problems can be solved if we really try to solve them.

[Question] Have you made any campaign preparations? Has a campaign team been formed?

[Answer] You don't have to worry about that. We have made preparations, including selecting people to run for the four deputy governor positions and for seats on the Bangkok Metropolitan and district councils. But I can't reveal anything at this time since the date of the election has not yet been announced. Those who run for deputy governor may include soldiers. When I announce the names of the candidates, I feel sure that the people will support us. Because all of the candidates are people who are intent on helping the country.

[Question] Several of the large political parties will field candidates, too. Are you worried about winning votes?

[Answer] A little, That's only natural. We can't become overconfident about this. But we have been intent on running in this election since the very beginning. I am not worried because I have many supporters who will provide support. I will probably not do too much campaigning since I am already well known. Everyone, from villager to government official, knows me since I have worked with so many people. They know that I can get the job done.

[Question] In this election, there are several people who are running for the position of governor of Bangkok Metropolitan. Candidates may level criticisms against each other. Are you worried about this?

[Answer] No. I'm not. And even if someone attacks me, I will respond to their attacks. My intention is to serve the people as best I can. Bangkok Metropolitan is their home. If they think that a party can solve the problems, let them vote for that party. That won't bother me. It is not my nature to respond to attacks made in an election campaign.

[Question] What has stimulated you to play politics and run for office in this election?

[Answer] I come from the provinces. When I was a child, I loved military uniforms. I wanted to be a soldier, particularly an artilleryman. Their uniforms were very well-fitting and they wore high boots, which made them look so businesslike. I felt that by becoming a soldier, I could serve the country. After I became a soldier, I devoted myself to working for the country. I am still healthy. I will work until I am no longer able to do so. I want to do something else since I have seen a lot.

Take the problems of Bangkok Metropolitan, for example. I have experienced these problems just like other people. Like other people, I wonder why something has not been done to solve these problems. I wonder whether, if I become governor, I will be able to solve the problems. But I think that I can. I am sure that I can if everyone cooperates. If everyone cooperates, the work will be completed. But alone, there is no way that I can solve the problems. It's like in the home. When a pupil returns home from school, he has to help with the work at home. Each member of the family has their own duties. This is very important. If the people in a society do not know their duties, there is no way that that society can develop.

[Question] In campaigning in this election, how much help will your classmates (Army Preparatory School Class 5) be able to give you?

[Answer] I have good friends. Friends must help each other. If we don't help our friends, whom should we help? My friends all have many acquaintances. I think that I will get many of their votes. That depends on them. But I think that my friends will give me good support.

[Question] Will running in this election form a basis for establishing a military party in order to engage in politics in the future?

[Answer] People can think what they want. But I have not thought about that. I just want to try to solve the problems. In the future, if I have a chance, I will engage in politics. There is nothing strange about that. Many people are doing that. If the opportunity presents itself and if the people of Bangkok Metropolitan think that I am doing a good job and they support me, I will take the next step in politics by running for MP.

But it is difficult to do this alone. You have to have friends who share your ideals. I have to work all year. I am paid a salary. I can't just leave at the end of a session. I don't know where I will find the time to hold meetings since there are many laws. I think that there will be much homework to do.

[Question] As a soldier and a senator, what do you think of the present political situation? Are we a democracy?

[Answer] I think that we now have a good democracy. People are discussing matters together. This is the right way to do things since this benefits them. Take things in Bangkok Metropolitan, for example. They can't hide. Because at election time, they have to take responsibility for what was done. Another thing is that it is the people who elect people to office. You can't blame anyone. It's like Aesop's fable in the past. You can't choose a bird to eat.

Real democracy is not something secretive. It's not something that requires a great deal of study. Each person has moral principles. I think that we have a democratic system since everyone knows his duty and people are ready to listen to the views of others. No one is acting like a dictator. People can't think that only they are right or that only they are good people. In a democracy, people express ideas. Those who are talented should be praised. Thais should praise the good people. There are very few heroes in Thailand today since most people take a negative view of things. This is different from foreigners, who

take a positive view of things. There are many people who are building the country. But where have all these heroes gone? Who can we use to set an example for future generations?

[Question] Before you decided to run for the position of governor of Bangkok Metropolitan, did you discuss this with Gen Athit Kamlangek?

[Answer] Since he is my superior officer, I discussed this decision with him. He agreed with my decision to run for this position. I think that he will vote for me. I don't have to say anything about the other senior officers from his class. They will definitely support me. I have definitely decided to run. I will run in order to give the people of Bangkok Metropolitan more choices. Because only two or three parties may field candidates this time. I decided to run as an independent candidate so that the people of Bangkok would have more candidates to choose from. Also, if I were elected governor and had run as a member of some political party, I would not get good cooperation from the other parties since they would view me as a member of the other party.

[Question] Bangkok Metropolitan is a large area. Will you spend much money campaigning?

[Answer] Those who vote for me will not do so because of money or because I gave them money. They will vote for me because they feel that I can do the job and be of great benefit to them. I don't think it is necessary to spend a lot of money. At most, I will have to spend some money to have posters printed. Those who will vote for me know me already since I carry out tasks every day. I have not yet launched my campaign. But when the election date is announced, I am ready.

[Question] If you should lose this election, will you run again in 1987?

[Answer] Originally, I thought that I would wait until 1987 to run in Nakhon Phanom Province. But then I received encouragement. And I think that I can do a good job. I know what problems Bangkok Metropolitan has. I think that I can be of use. That is why I decided to run now. Don't worry me by trying to predict my future. Politics is very unpredictable. I don't know what will happen in the future. I don't think anyone does. Don't say that I gave any hints.

Comments on Gen Han

Bangkok LAK THAI in Thai 8 Aug 85 pp 21-23

[Interview with Gen Mana Rattanakoset, the assistant RTA CINC; date and place not specified]

[Excerpts] When Gen Mana Rattanakoset, the assistant RTA CINC, announced that he would run for the position of governor of Bangkok Metropolitan, all the political parties that had indicated their intention of fielding candidates for this position became alarmed.

Also, this has made this election, which will be held around October, much more exciting. Gen Mana is not the first soldier to jump into politics. However, he is another important officer who has been enticed by the "smell" of politics. As for how successful he will be, we will have to wait and see. He told LAK THAI that he is very confident since soldiers of the three branches of service and classmates from Army Preparatory School Class 5 are supporting him.

[Question] Why did you decide to run for governor of Bangkok Metropolitan?

[Answer] I decided to run for governor at this time because, like others who live in Bangkok Metropolitan, I have experienced many problems, including flooding, garbage, the traffic and cleanliness. I have experienced these problems just like everyone else who lives here.

Thus, since I have the chance to run for this office, I feel that I should take this chance in order to solve these problems, which are problems that all of us here face. I think that I understand the problems, and I think that I can solve them if I have the cooperation of everyone in Bangkok Metropolitan.

[Question] When did you make this decision?

[Answer] When the House of Representatives passed the Bangkok Metropolitan Administrative Act and sent it to the Senate, I realized that there would be an election for seats in the House and for the position of governor of Bangkok Metropolitan. That is when I began thinking about this.

[Question] Also, you have confidence in mass power groups such as the Village Scouts, isn't that right?

[Answer] I think that they share my views. They would probably like to see me solve the problems.

[Question] Before you made this decision, did you discuss this with classmates from Army Preparatory School Class 5?

[Answer] Yes, I did. I talked with Gen Athit Kamlangek, the RTA CINC, about this. At that time, I was not sure about this. If he had not agreed with this, I probably would have decided not to run since he is the supreme commander.

[Question] Did he approve of this?

[Answer] Yes, he did. After he agreed, I went and talked with associates and subordinates. Most of them agreed with my decision.

[Question] There are reports that the supreme commander told you that if you run for this office, you have to win. Is that true?

[Answer] He just said that I must win. That's quite common. He had to say that. If I told someone else to run, I would certainly tell them to make every effort to win. Otherwise, what's the use of running? This is very common.

[Question] There are reports that certain political parties approached classmates of yours from Army Preparatory School Class 5, such as Gen Thienchai Sirisamphan and Lt Gen Yutthasak Khlongtruat, and asked them to run for governor against you. Do you know anything about this?

[Answer] I think that this is just a rumor. Gen Thienchai would not do that. I talked to him, too. If he had announced his candidacy before me, out of politeness and friendship, I would not have entered the race. He will not do that. What would people in the army think if he did that? They would wonder why we were competing against each other. But we cooperate with each other. He will not do that. Lt Gen Yutthasak has already announced that he will not run.

[Question] Have you talked with him?

[Answer] No. But we know each other. If a friend has a chance, O.K. I will support him. I won't compete against him. I will support him. I think that he will support me.

[Question] In running for election this time, why won't you join a political party?

[Answer] If I joined a political party, that party would control me. It would be more difficult for me to solve the problems. Another thing is that this is like dividing the people in the city into groups. Am I right? Everybody would just hold on to the party's tail. Suppose that a particular party won. The other three parties in the government's coalition would feel stifled. I could never be sure of having the support of the other three parties in solving the problems of Bangkok Metropolitan.

That's what things would be like. And since that is the case, I will run as an independent. If I win, I will work for all the parties, I will try to solve everyone's problems. If there are floods, the floods must affect everyone. We can't just solve the problem for one group of people since they happen to belong to the same party. I won't do things like that.

[Question] But by not having a political party to support you, don't you feel that you are at a disadvantage in seeking votes?

[Answer] Some people view this as a disadvantage. They say that politics requires a system and money. But frankly, I don't think that I will have to spend much money. As for printing posters and that sort of thing, my friends have said that they would be glad to do that for me. Those who have taken security seminars and other seminars under me have all said that they will help.

Money is a secondary factor. I don't think that it is necessary to spend a lot of money. It is the least important factor since everyone has said that they

will be glad to help. And so why should I worry about money? As for the campaign system, we have to study this and learn the tricks that are used. If they try to cheat, we will catch them.

[Question] How much progress has been made in forming an election team?

[Answer] We are forming a team now. We will field a large number of candidates, including candidates for the district and Bangkok Metropolitan councils.

[Question] You have to field more than 200 candidates, isn't that right?

[Answer] They choose them. I can't choose all the candidates. That's impossible. The members of my group have to choose them. They must be able to run on their own. We can't give them money for their campaign.

[Question] Who will run on your ticket?

[Answer] Those who will run for a seat on a district council must come from that district. They must be able to represent the people of that district. Thus, we will let people in the districts select candidates. Those who are running on my ticket have all been well screened. Thus, if they are elected, the council should not have any problems. The same is true for the Bangkok Metropolitan Council. My people in each district must choose one representative for each district. Sometimes, they select three people and have me select one of the three.

[Question] That means that you have supporters in each district.

[Answer] Yes, I do. More than 6,000 businessmen have taken my security seminars. People of all occupations support me, even undertakers.

[Question] How do you feel about the fact that some politicians such as Mr Piyanat Watcharaphon oppose your running for election?

[Answer] I feel that this is just a difference of opinion. He is still very young. I am much older than he is. He probably doesn't think that older people have any value. To him, I am probably worthless.

We hold different views. I would like to give you an example. Would a blind person like to have a mirror? No. Because a mirror is of no value to a blind person. Similarly, he has never had anything to do with me. But in my view, I can still be of great value to people since I had to climb up from cadet to where I am today. I have great value.

I am not angry at him for saying what he did. That is a common matter. That is his right.

[Question] Do you think that Mr Piyanat is unhappy with the military for some reason?

[Answer] I don't think so. If he is prejudiced, it probably has to do with me alone since I was the one who made allegations against him in the name of the army. I did that based on my position.

But if I am elected, I will work for him as well. I will not be prejudiced or hold a grudge. I will definitely make Mr Piyanat see that I can be of value to him.

[Question] Prior to this, there were reports that you would run for parliament. Why did you change your mind?

[Answer] Everyone said that I would run for parliament in Nakhon Phanom. But that election is not until 1987. What would I do in the meantime after I retire this year? I thought about that. If I am elected governor, I will have work to do. I will work for society, not myself. Naturally, everyone is selfish to some extent. But the question is, how selfish? I think that I can work for the general public. That is what I intend to do.

I think that I can do more good serving as governor than being an MP from Nakhon Phanom. I know many people and have many friends. I can get the people of Bangkok Metropolitan to cooperate if they have confidence in me. I will ask people not to throw trash into the streets. The streets will become clean. The streets are dirty because the people of the city have made them dirty. We have to talk about this. The people have to know what is going on so that they can cooperate. If they don't cooperate, we can tell them again. We must go from being gentle to using harsher measures. People must have discipline. Changes must be made. The Thai people can do this. It's just a matter of doing it.

[Question] If you are elected, what will your work line be?

[Answer] I will cooperate with everyone. There will not be any groups. I will consider everyone to be a member of my group. I will be the "supreme commander" of Bangkok Metropolitan. I will listen to the views of others. I will delegate authority. Everyone has value. Everyone must make decisions within their sphere of responsibility. All power cannot rest in my hands alone. I won't do things that way. I will monitor things. If they give me four or five options, I will choose one. That is, I will say yes or no. I will monitor things and go to see what they are doing. It's simple.

[Question] Will classmates from Army Preparatory School Class 5 give you good support?

[Answer] I think that they will all support me because they like me and they will expect service from me. For example, if it floods, they will not expect to be troubled too much. I want everyone in Bangkok Metropolitan to feel like that.

[Question] I would like to ask about Army Preparatory School Class 5. Some members of the class, such as Gen Han Linanon, are engaged in politics. There seems to be some differences in political views. How do you feel about this?

[Answer] I don't feel anything. That's natural. As for differences of opinion....

[Question] It seems that Gen Han has separated himself from the group.

[Answer] When we get together, he does not join us. We have not forbidden him from joining us. We have not expelled him. Actually, he and I like each other very much. When we meet each other, we are very glad and talk about various matters. We don't talk about those things on which we disagree. The same is true for Han and the others. But Han is very busy. And so whenever we get together, he does not join us.

[Question] In addition to you, in the next several years, many members of Class 5 will retire. Will any of these people become involved in politics?

[Answer] I don't know what they intend to do. I have urged some of them to run for a seat on the Bangkok Metropolitan Council. But they weren't interested. They said that they were afraid of being criticized. I told them not to worry about that. I told them that that was not important. Being criticized is not painful. Just don't hit someone's head.

If someone criticizes us, we will know what we have to do to improve ourselves. I view criticism as a lesson. This is one of my principles. I would not run for election if I was afraid of being criticized.

11943

CSO: 4207/284

THAILAND

THIENCHAI ON RTA BUILD-UP, POLITICAL RELATIONSHIPS

Bangkok WIWAT in Thai 27 Aug-2 Sep 85 pp 10-17

[Interview with Gen Thienchai Sirisamphan, the deputy RTA CINC, a senator and the chairman of the board of the State Railway of Thailand; date and place not specified]

[Excerpts] [Question] Would you tell us briefly what your duties are as the deputy RTA CINC?

[Answer] I carry out the tasks assigned to me by the RTA CINC. I do whatever job he gives me.

[Question] Everything?

[Answer] Yes. Whatever task he gives me.

[Question] What do you think about the development of the army, particularly present capabilities?

[Answer] We are constantly trying to develop the army in order to keep up with world development. We make use of scientific and technical advances or modify them for use here.

[Question] Is great emphasis placed on technology?

[Answer] We given attention to everything, including the quality of our personnel.

[Question] What is the greatest problem in developing the army?

[Answer] Money. Thailand is a poor country. The government must use its funds to develop other sectors, too. This includes developing the economy so that the people have a good standard of living. What is most important is that if the economy is bad, it will be impossible to have a strong military.

[Question] The economic problem is the most important facing our country today, is that right?

[Answer] Yes, it's the most important.

[Question] Some people have charged that the army is expanding greatly, such as by forming new divisions or expanding units, at a time when the economy is bad. They say that this is not the time to do this. What is your view on this?

[Answer] We are doing things according to plan. We have plans on what will be done when. Our expansion is based on our economic power. If our economic power cannot support the expansion, we can't expand. We are expanding based on the funds available.

[Question] It is said that today, everything is being done based on the RTA CINC's motto "be ready to fight even though there are shortages."

[Answer] There aren't any problems. We have to carry out our mission. As for our combat morale, in fighting for our country, we are sure that no one could defeat us.

[Question] You played an important role in forming the special forces unit. What do you think about the development of this combat unit today?

[Answer] We are developing it constantly. There is constant development in terms of knowledge, combat techniques and equipment. Our special forces unit is the equal of any special forces unit in the world. Our equipment may be inferior, but I can assure you that our troops are the equal of anyone.

[Question] Recently, this unit has expanded greatly. Have the objectives of the special forces unit changed in any way?

[Answer] Having this unit is necessary for national defense. Having this special forces unit means having a top-notch unit. It is not very large. We rely on the quality of our personnel. We accept knowledgeable and capable people who are strong physically and who have patience. We stress solidarity.

[Question] As for the problems along the Cambodian border, which pose a great threat, how can we use political and diplomatic policies to solve these problems?

[Answer] We are trying to use political and diplomatic policies. We don't want to get into a war. We don't want to get into a fight with anyone. But it may be necessary to fight in order to defend our independence and sovereignty from outside aggression. Domestic terrorists no longer pose a problem since the government has suppressed them almost completely.

[Question] Are there are clues or movements that indicate that there is definitely a threat from the outside?

[Answer] There are certain things that indicate that there is still a threat. I am a soldier. I don't want fighting to break out. Fighting is costly. Instead of spending money to fight, it would be better to use this money to develop the country and improve the people's standard of living. That is what I think.

[Question] There has long been widespread criticism about the air force's purchase of the F-16 aircraft. In your view, was purchasing this aircraft the proper thing to do?

[Answer] That is for the branch of service concerned to answer. The air force, which is responsible for defending our air space, has said that it was necessary to purchase the F-16. It knows better than anyone else what is necessary. They are not sitting by idly. They have to do whatever is necessary to generate confidence in their ability to carry out the tasks assigned them. As for the rumors that certain people profited from the purchase of this aircraft, I don't think that that is true. As for purchasing F-16 aircraft, they know what is necessary and what isn't.

[Question] Turning to the problem of the economy. The economy is not very good at present, and things will probably stay like this. Are you worried that military development will come to a halt in the next several years?

[Answer] I am worried about whether we will be able to carry on development as planned. At present, the military is trying to tighten its belt, too.

[Question] To what degree?

[Answer] We got only half of what we asked for.

[Question] Will this affect morale?

[Answer] We have been told not to let this affect morale. We must be able to fight even though there are shortages. If we don't do this, who will? In short, because of the economic situation, we have not received everything that we asked for.

[Question] Does the military feel constricted because of this?

[Answer] We are trying to cut back at all levels. We are cutting costs everywhere possible. There are regulations about this. We are following the regulations.

[Question] Benefits for soldiers are not very good.

[Answer] Everyone admits that. I don't know know to whom we can complain about this. We can't demonstrate. We must abide by the disciplinary regulations. We must serve the nation and put up with this. It is this awareness that has enabled our country to survive.

[Question] Has the government been informed about this, and how can the problems be solved?

[Answer] It isn't necessary to the the government about this. It already knows about this.

[Question] Lt Gen Chawalit Yongchaiyut, the deputy army chief of staff, has stated that we should have a smaller, but highly efficient, military. What is your view on this?

[Answer] I think that our military, which is expanding, is still small.

[Question] What criterion is used to measure the size of the military.

[Answer] The size of the general population. I think that our military is still small.

[Question] What about the military's role in supporting a democratic government?

[Answer] That is our duty. Our duty is to maintain the security of the country.

[Question] During the past several years, the government and the military seem to have had some disagreements....

[Answer] Those were only temporary personal matters. That's normal. People don't have to agree all the time. People turned minor matters into major issues. Those were personal matters.

[Question] But they were matters concerning the basic institutions.

[Answer] No, they weren't. People like to stir up trouble. I don't mean the mass media. I mean ordinary people. When I served in Mukdahan, we had airmen, policemen, sailors and soldiers there. Mr A, who was a soldier, and Mr B, who was an airman, were very good friends. One day, they got into a fight. People said that the army and air force were fighting. Do you see my point. It was actually just a dispute between Mr A and Mr B. But when they were friends, no one said that the army and air force get along well. But when they had a fight, people wanted to turn this into an inter-service conflict. It's a psychological matter, right?

[Question] Do you still maintain that the dispute between the military and the government is an ordinary matter?

[Answer] It's a personal matter. People sometimes like to tie things together like this. It's a personal matter.

[Question] Even the dispute over the devaluation of the baht at the end of last year?

[Answer] That's common. That has been cleared up now.

[Question] In the future, what role should the military play in matters concerning the government?

[Answer] It must provide support. We must fulfill our duty of maintaining national security in order to assure the people and gain the confidence of

other countries. If they are are confident about our security, they will invest here and tourism will increase. This will bring foreign currency into the country. Everything is tied to the security issue. We play a part in maintaining sovereignty and security. If things are secure here, they enemy won't dare invade us. Suppose that Vietnam is thinking about invading us. If our forces are strong, they won't dare invade us. But we are not yet strong enough, and the terrain does not allow us to deploy strong forces all along the line. There may be gaps through which they can enter.

Thus, the security issue is related to everything else. You can't have security in just one sector.

[Question] We need security. But some people feel that they number of professional soldiers has decreased while the number of political soldiers has increased. What is your view on this?

[Answer] This depends on how people view things. Different people have different views. In my view, professional soldiers are responsible for maintaining national security. We must do everything we can to help the country.

In a developing country, it is impossible to keep soldiers from becoming involved in other matters besides military matters. That is true for all such countries. This is how things are. And because Thailand is a poor country with limited resources, this is sometimes necessary in administering the country. Such overlapping is necessary today. We are not like large, secure countries that can keep things separate. We can't apply another country's lessons to Thailand in their entirety. Our lives, customs and traditions are different. That is just the dream of scholars. There are no developing countries in which the military does not play a role in politics. The military must be involved to some extent.

[Question] Do you think that our military is playing a suitable role?

[Answer] It's suited to Thai life.

[Question] What do you think about the development of the political party system based on parliamentary methods?

[Answer] The lack of order and the failure to do things in a democratic way is due to a lack of education. It will take time. The discipline of the people is an important matter and cannot be overlooked. In my view, the people do not have very good discipline. People think and act as if they have special privileges. People drive crazily and park their cars anywhere they want. Their attitude is , me first, it won't bother anyone. People are always infringing on the rights of others. No one is willing to stand in a queue and let those who came first go first. I think that we must respect the rights of others. But Thais have little discipline.

[Question] What does this show?

[Answer] It shows that we are not training people well enough in matters of discipline. The quality of people is not developing. We are engrossed in material development. But psychological development must go hand-in-hand with this. From what I understand, the Sixth Development Plan gives much attention to psychological development.

[Question] What about the social aspect?

[Answer] The social aspect is important, too. Japan almost fell apart after the end of the Second World War. But now, they are far ahead of us. Or take Korea, for example. I went there in 1950-1951 during the Korean War. Korea had great difficulties. But now, it has made great progress and is a serious competitor to Japan. They act resolutely. But we never look at ourselves; we always blame others. We just say that this and that person is corrupt. But we don't look at ourselves. Thus, improving discipline is very important for development on other fronts.

[Question] As for discipline, even though each person must check himself, at the national level, there must be a movement....

[Answer] There must be. There is one now. The National Unity Committee is taking action on this.

[Question] A moment ago, I asked about the political party system....

[Answer] That will take time, too. At present, the system is not yet very satisfactory.

[Question] But we have to have a political party system and a parliamentary system.

[Answer] That's right. There is no question of that. It is the system with the fewest weaknesses. It is not the best system but rather the one with the fewest weaknesses. We have to use this system for the time being.

[Question] The political parties and the military do not have much confidence in each other and frequently blame each other. Don't you agree?

[Answer] They are engrossed in blaming each other. Everyone must have the same target. And the target is the nation. Everyone must be sincere. But in the past, there was always something behind everything that was done.

[Question] Do you think that there have been any good signs as far as our democracy is concerned?

[Answer] Yes, I do. Look at the new MPs. There has been much progress. The number of vicious fights over trivial matters has declined. Things have improved. I have been in parliament since 1959. I know.

[Question] From what you have said, I get the feeling that you do not think that there will be any more coup d'etats.

[Answer] There shouldn't be any more.

[Question] Why?

[Answer] No one is stirring up trouble.

[Question] Is anyone outside the military stirring up trouble about anything?

[Answer] Everything comes from outside the military. No one in the military is doing anything. I can assure you of that.

[Question] If the economy grows worse and the military and the people experience great hardships, won't the military take action?

[Answer] I don't think that it will reach that stage. You don't have to worry. If the economy got that bad, would a coup help improve the economy? If someone took that step, he would have to be sure that he could solve the problems. If he couldn't, the people wouldn't support him. The people are not stupid.

[Question] What do you plan to do after you retire at the end of this year?

[Answer] I don't have any plans at the moment. If there is anything that I can do to serve the country, I will be glad to do that.

[Question] Will you run for political office?

[Answer] I can't answer that now. It's too early.

[Question] You have to look at the situation, is that right?

[Answer] No. I have to see how I can be of use. I would not run for personal gain. I have never thought of that.

[Question] There are rumors that the Social Action Party wants you to be minister of interior or to run for the position of governor of Bangkok Metropolitan. What is the truth?

[Answer] I don't know. They are probably talking about someone else.

[Question] If the Social Action Party approached you about this, would you be willing to run?

[Answer] I don't think that they will.

[Question] But suppose that they did.

[Answer] I don't want to discuss hypothetical situations. We can't predict anything. This is an important matter. It is a major matter. I can't make any suppositions. Wait until the time comes. There is great turmoil in our country because of all these suppositions, isn't that right?

There aren't any problems. I have strength. I have much work experience. I am still physically strong. I can still serve the country. If anybody thinks that I can still serve the country, I would be glad to work with them. We have to work for the country. We can't just do things to benefit a particular group. I don't want any part of that. If I am approached on behalf of a particular group, I would not accept.

I will support anyone who shares my ideals and who wants to serve the country honestly. But I don't want to get involved with anyone who has ulterior motives. I am not involved in any games with anyone. I don't like dishonesty and deceit. I am not good at pretending.

[Question] You will soon be retiring as deputy RTA CINC. What qualifications should the person who replaces you have?

[Answer] He should be the person who is most suited in the view of his superior.

[Question] Which is more important for this position, seniority or ability?

[Answer] The two must go together.

[Question] Who is more suitable, Lt Gen Chawalit Yongchaiyut or Lt Gen Chuthai Saengthawip, both of whom now serve as deputy army chief of staff?

[Answer] I don't know. I don't want to answer that. But the RTA has never lacked a deputy RTA CINC. This is up to the commander. It doesn't concern others. Just as it's up to the prime minister to appoint ministers.

[Question] At present, there seem to be many class divisions in the army. Why is that?

[Answer] This never happened in the past. We have fostered divisions. This now seems to be a major matter. In the past, this was not the case. We never thought about this. We worked together. But now we have fostered divisions. Those who are kept apart feel this. But there are no problems. People still work together. This is true for all classes. Look at those in my outer office. I have people from the academy, from the reserves and the universities working for me. They all work together well. There aren't any problems.

[Question] You might not be aware of this. But this does occur in the army.

[Answer] This might be true to some extent. But people work well together. This is not a major issue. It's an internal matter within the military.

[Question] It seems that many members of the Chulachomklao Royal Military Academy were made divisional commanders as a counterbalance to the commanding general of the 1st Army Area.

[Answer] I don't agree. When they considered people for positions, they didn't look at which class people were in. They looked at the individual.

[Question] It is said that the conflict between Lt Gen Chawalit Yongchaiyut and Lt Gen Phichit Kunlawanit has created problems for the military reshuffle since both of these men have to be promoted to top positions in the army.

[Answer] There aren't any problems. They get along well with each other and work together well. But people are trying to stir up trouble. People are not perfect.

[Question] Which one is more qualified to be the next RTA CINC?

[Answer] Both are qualified. But we can't expect that they will both have the same talents and strong points. They each have their own strengths and weaknesses. But I can assure you that there is no conflict. They work together well.

[Question] They will both retire the same year. Thus, who should be made RTA CINC first?

[Answer] That's not an issue. If one of them is appointed to that position, that will be the end of the matter. There won't be any conflicts. That has never happened. No one will get upset because they were not promoted. In the past when Gen Pamot and Gen Athit were in line for this position, people favored one or the other. But after the appointment was made, there were no problems. Gen Athit was suited to this position and so he was appointed.

[Question] In the future, what type of leader does the RTA need?

[Answer] It needs a knowledgeable and talented person with leadership capabilities. He must be a person of many talents.

[Question] What activities are the members of Army Preparatory School Class 5 engaged in?

[Answer] We get together each month.

[Question] People outside the army have called you the best coordinator in the class. How do you feel about that?

[Answer] Others can think what they want. If we live in a society, we have to try to make that a good society. That is, if a person has good intentions and is sincere, everyone will respect him.

[Question] What is your view on the role now being played by Gen Han Linanon, a classmate of yours?

[Answer] He is just a friend.

[Question] In a recent interview, Gen Han said that he would not be afraid to run against Gen Mana Rattanakoset or you for the position of governor of Bangkok Metropolitan.

[Answer] I have not tried to make anyone afraid. I don't care if anyone is afraid of me or not. This does not bother me.

[Question] Do you think that Gen Athit Kamlangek should be granted another extension next year?

[Answer] That is not my business.

[Question] Was he granted an extension this year because of leadership problems in the army or because of other factors?

[Answer] He wouldn't have been granted an extension unless it had been necessary. This was not done just for the fun of it. This is not a minor matter. It is a matter that affects the entire army. It is not a personal matter. This decision was based on the needs of the army.

[Question] Wasn't he granted an extension because there was no one else suited to be RTA CINC?

[Answer] No. The army does not lack qualified people at any level. We have people who are qualified to serve as RTA CINC or deputy RTA CINC.

[Question] As for the railway strike, some newspapers and groups have commented that the aim was to have you removed from your position as the chairman of the board. What is your view on this matter?

[Answer] I never view anyone in a bad light. But talking about responsibility, it is the minister who is responsible. No one would stir up trouble in an organization for which they are responsible. Those remarks did not show much knowledge.

[Question] Why do you think that this problem arose?

[Answer] Without outside interference, this matter would have died down a long time ago. This was supported by people who wanted to make political gains. Powerful people got involved. And don't forget that Mr Ahmat has frequently had contacts with the Communist Party of Thailand. Mr Thoetphum Chaidi, Mr Prasoet Sapsunthon and Mr Somphong Sarakawi are all busy. They know what things are like now.

[Question] Is the communist party still active?

[Answer] Yes. It has not disbanded.

[Question] But now, Mr Prasoet and Mr Ahmat are clearly on different sides.

[Answer] I don't know about that. But in the past they held the same ideas. But Mr Ahmat's actions were politically motivated. He did not do this on behalf of the railway workers, although that is what he claimed. All that Ahmat did was demand that we act in accord with the decision of the arbitration committee. But that was not up to the State Railway of Thailand. It all depended on whether the ministries of communications and finance would give us

the money. That is what the problem was. But they tried to find other issues in order to stir up trouble. And then they charged that the dismissal of those four people was illegal and that this was an attempt to smash the labor movement.

Gen Thienchai: a Symbol of the Special Forces Unit

"Our special forces unit is not inferior to that of the United States. We began with nothing. This is now a very efficient unit."

Gen Thienchai Sirisamphan, the deputy RTA CINC who will retire this month, responded to a question without much emotion but his eyes glowed with pride.

Gen Thienchai served in the special forces unit at two different times for a total of 20 years. It took 10 years to build this famous unit at Lopburi. It started out as a paratroop battalion commanded by Cpt Thienchai Sirisamphan. Now, this former paratroop battalion has become the Special Warfare Command, which is often referred to as the "5th Army Area." It is now commanded by a lieutenant general. It is considered to be one of our most efficient combat units.

Gen Thienchai is a member of Army Preparatory School Class 5. Fellow classmates include Gen Athit Kamlangek, Gen Chamnan Nilawiset, Gen Han Linanon, and Lt Gen Yutthasak Khlongtruatrok, all of whom are well-known men who have played an important role or who are still doing so. As for his personal life, he has four children, two sons and two daughters. Three of his children are serving in the military.

Gen Thienchai has held the following positions during the course of his military career:

Platoon leader with the 3rd Infantry Battalion, 1st Royal Guards Infantry Regiment.

Interpreter with the 21st Infantry Regiment

Company commander with the 3rd Infantry Battalion, 1st Royal Guards Infantry Regiment.

Operations and training officer with the Pa Wai Paratroop Battalion, Lopburi.

Deputy commander of the Paratroop Battalion.

Commander of the Paratroop Battalion.

Assistant army attache in Jakarta.

Commander of the Special Warfare Center.

Deputy commanding general of the 4th Army Area.

Army advisor attached to the Southern Peacekeeping Command.

Director of the Territorial Defense Department.

Assistant RTA CINC.

Deputy RTA CINC (Will retire in September 1985).

11943

CSO: 4207/290

THAILAND

LAO VILLAGERS' CONDITIONS ON DISPUTED BORDER

Bangkok SIAM RAT SAPDA WICHAN in Thai 11 Aug 85 pp 24, 25

[Article by Kraisi Phuttharaksa: "Huai Yang, the New Village of the People From the Three Villages, A Thai-Lao Problem"]

[Text] Ban Huai Phai, a village near the Thai-Lao border in Uttaradit Province, is located approximately 170 km north of the provincial seat. The road from the village winds through the mountains. The terrain along the road is mostly wild jungle. To the front of the vehicle is a bright picture of wooded mountains while to the rear there is nothing but red dust kicked up by the wheels of the vehicle. This red dust rises high into the air and covers the trees along the road. The road is like this for about 8 km. You then come to a village with approximately 100 houses built above the ground. The roofs are made of tin. There is very little open space between the houses--only enough to walk--since the area is planted in corn, which was then bearing lovely green ears.

In the heart of the village is a four-room school with desks and chairs. The children, most of whom were wearing school uniforms, were sitting listening to their teachers, who were standing in front of the blackboards with chalk in their hands. Some of the teachers spoke in the local dialect; others spoke in Thai. A Thai flag waved from atop the flagpole, a sign of the school.

The name of this village is Ban Huai Yang. This is a new village that was established at the end of 1984. The people here are "new people." They do not yet have identification cards showing that they are Thais.

This village came into being as a result of the conflict between Thailand and Laos over the three border villages in Uttaradit Province in Thailand. There was a fight for control of this area, and it is not clear who was right. Even though Thailand and Laos have had very close relations and can be called fraternal countries, their different systems of government present a problem. This is probably the cause of the problem.

The three villages under dispute are Ban Mai, Ban Klang and Ban Sawang. It probably isn't necessary to say much about this since readers are already familiar with this matter.

As for what happened prior to the establishment of Ban Huai Yang, Lt Col Krairuk Khanthongkham, the commander of a special affairs unit subordinate to a cavalry battalion, 1st Cavalry Division, which is the unit that is responsible for the border area where the three disputed villages are located, said that after Thailand used military force to expel the Lao forces from the three villages, our forces controlled this area during the middle of 1984. But Laos launched attacks in order to regain control of this area. And in October, Thailand withdrew its forces because it wanted to negotiate and solve the problem peacefully.

When Thailand began withdrawing its military forces from Ban Mai, Ban Klang and Ban Sawang, 992 of the approximately 1,000 people who lived in these villages moved away because of fears for their safety. They moved away at the same time as the troops left. The Thai government arranged for them to settle down in an area that had previously been a jungle area. This new village is located approximately 2 km from the three villages. At first, things were difficult because they had to live together in long buildings. But after the area was improved, the villagers were provided with land to work and build on, with the size of the plots depending on the number of people in the family. They were given materials to build houses and clothing. A school was built for the children. This new village was named Ban Huai Yang.

There are now 121 families, with a total of 762 people, living in Ban Huai Yang. The number has declined since some of the people have moved back to their former villages. Most of these returned in November 1984.

I talked with the villagers and found that I could understand most of what they said. They said they life here was comfortable and free. "We are happier here. Things are different from in the other villages controlled by Laos. They oppressed us in many ways. It was difficult to make a living," said Mr Sawai Saengphet, age 42, the village headman who used to live in Ban Sawang.

The school building is a long building with an earthen floor and a roof. The building is divided into four rooms where grades 1 to 4 are taught. There are 149 students ages 7 to 14. There are 12 teachers. Three of the teachers are Thai volunteers from the Provincial Primary Education Office. The other nine are villagers from Ban Huai Yang who were educated in Vientiane. "I volunteered to teach here, and I live here, too," said Mr Rien Chabu, the school principal. He said that at first, the village teachers had to be taught how to speak the Thai language properly. Both the children and the teachers had to be trained.

One group of villagers has settled down at Ban Huai Yang in Thailand. They lead independent lives and are given assistance by the Thai government. Another group continues to live in Ban Mai, Ban Klang and Ban Sawang, which are now under the control of Laos. As for the struggle between Thailand and Laos for control of this area, it can be said that we are now waging a struggle for the hearts of the people. Laos constantly demands that we return its villagers while Thailand says that they are Thai villagers.

Thai officials consider Ban Huai Yang to be a village in Thailand's Uttaradit Province. However, this is not based on law. These villagers lived under the

control of Laos for a long time. The Thai government never interfered or gave assistance to the people living in those three villages before this problem arose. The people living in these three villages did not have Thai identity cards as required by law.

However, the standard of living of the people living in Ban Huai Yang is better than that of many poor people with identity cards who live in poor rural areas in various places throughout the country or who live in slums near developed areas such as the capital. These poor people have to struggle just to survive from day to day.

11943

CSO: 4207/278

THAILAND

ACADEMIC FAULTS ASEAN ECONOMIC INTEGRATION PROGRESS

Bangkok SIAM RAT SAPDA WICHAN in Thai 18 Aug 85 pp 6, 7

[Article: "ASEAN After 18 Years, Like Water Flowing Past"]

[Excerpts] Background

ASEAN was formed on 8 August 1967 in Bangkok. The five members were Thailand, Malaysia, the Philippines, Indonesia and Singapore. The newest member, Brunei, became a member on 7 January 1984.

The Bangkok Declaration, which is considered to be a compass pointing the way for ASEAN, clearly stipulates that the purpose of the association is to promote economic, cultural and technical cooperation. Nothing is said about politics.

Possibilities

Even though the ASEAN countries have formulated joint investment projects, in actual practice, things are not very satisfactory. Projects have encountered internal problems and problems between member countries. Take Singapore's project to produce diesel engines, for example. Indonesia does not agree with the proposal to have Singapore produce low-horsepower diesel engines. It feels that Singapore should produce engines of 500 horsepower or more. If Singapore produces low-horsepower engines, it will now allow the engines to be imported into the country. Because of this, Singapore has had to carry on its project on a national level. This is not a joint ASEAN project as originally intended.

The rock salt and soda ash projects, in which Thailand was to be the principal investor with an investment of approximately 60 percent, have chronic problems, including locations for the projects and the matter of capital recovery. It will be difficult to turn these projects into reality, and in the end, they may be abandoned.

As for the Philippines, it was to be the principal producer of phosphate fertilizer. But this project had to be abandoned after it was determined that profits would not match investments. A new project was proposed instead, copper transformation, which is about to get under way.

Indonesia and Malaysia are to produce urea fertilizer. This joint project seems to have a better chance of succeeding than do the other projects.

"ASEAN is often criticized for its slowness in developing economic cooperation. It has been 18 years since ASEAN was founded, but little progress has been made. It has not even established a free trade zone, which is the first stage of economic cooperation leading to regional cooperation. Thus, cooperation at a higher level, such as that shown by the European Economic Community, is still a long way off," said Dr Kusuma Sanitwong Na Ayuthaya, the director of the Institute for Security and International Studies, Faculty of Political Science, Chulalongkorn University.

Obstacles

Dr Kusuma talked about the obstacles that are making it difficult for the ASEAN countries to cooperate economically. He mentioned the following:

First is economic nationalism. Each country stresses independence and is more concerned about national interests than regional interests.

Second is the different level of economic development. This has led to some countries having the advantage over others. Singapore, which does not have any natural resources but which is the most economically developed country in the group, stressed export and import-substitute industries but is now developing industries that use high-level technology. The other five countries are promoting import-substitute industries. This has created problems.

Third, the agricultural and industrial activities in these countries are not mutually supportive. This is because the countries engage in similar activities. This generates competition rather than cooperation. This is clear from the form of trade and production. It is difficult for these countries to trade with each other. For example, para rubber, tin and palm and coconut oil are usually sold abroad. Thus, the economic system is geared toward exports rather than mutual trade.

As for cooperating in the production of goods to replace imports, there are obstacles concerning the trade deficit and the balance of payments deficit, which stem from the import of capital goods from the developed countries. The ASEAN countries are developing countries that receive aid from the developed countries, with one of the conditions being that goods must be purchased from these countries.

These are important obstacles that the ASEAN countries must try to overcome if there is to be any hope of their joining together to form a trade bloc.

11943

CSO: 4207/278

11 October 1985

COALITION GOVERNMENT OF DEMOCRATIC KAMPUCHEA

SIHANOUK WINS FRENCH 'ENCOURAGEMENT' FOR MEETING

PM261341 Paris LE MONDE in French 25 Sep 85 p 4

[Unattributed report: "Prince Sihanouk Received by Mr Mitterrand"]

[Text] France has pledged to encourage an informal meeting among the different parties involved in the Cambodian conflict, Prince Norodom Sihanouk, leader of the coalition in exile, said on Monday 23 September after a meeting with President Francois Mitterrand.

The prince would like to bring together the representatives of China, the Soviet Union, Vietnam, the ASEAN member countries, and the four Cambodian factions.

"France can persuade those countries to come to Paris to drink a glass of champagne, eat some petits fours, and then see each other and jointly plan... an international conference to peacefully solve" the Cambodian conflict, he told journalists when he left the Elysee. According to the prince his host was much more cooperative than previous contacts with French diplomats had led him to hope.

Questioned on the UN General Assembly, which he is due to attend this week, he was pessimistic: "I do not think we can make much progress toward finding a solution," he said.

CSO: 4219/1

PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KAMPUCHEA

MEN CHHAN GREETES CHAIRMAN OF USSR AMITY UNION

BK250818 Phnom Penh SPK in French 0400 GMT 25 Sep 85

[Text] Phnom Penh, 25 Sep (SPK)--On the occasion of the 60th founding anniversary of the Union of Soviet Societies for Friendship and Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries, Men Chhan, vice chairman of the KUFNCD National Council, sent his warm greetings to Z. M. Kruglova, chairman of the union.

In his message, Men Chhan stresses: "Since the liberation of the country from the Pol Pot genocidal regime, the Cambodian people are very elated at reestablishing their bonds of friendship with the Soviet people. In particular, they are very happy with the founding of the Kampuchea-USSR Friendship Association and the Soviet Cultural Center.

"The Cambodian people are determined to further strengthen these bonds of friendship, solidarity, and cooperation for the victory of socialism, that is for peace--a sacred aspiration of the entire mankind against all attempts to provoke a war to threaten world peace and especially these on a nuclear war initiated by the U.S. imperialists."

The message also expressed profound thanks to the parties, governments, and peoples of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries as well as to progressive peoples throughout the world for their material and moral support for the Cambodian people's just struggle.

CSO: 4219/2

PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KAMPUCHEA

CHEA SIM RECEIVES FRENCH PARLIAMENTARIANS

BK200426 Phnom Penh SPK in French 1148 GMT 19 Sep 85

[Text] Phnom Penh, 19 Sep (SPK)--Chea Sim, member of the KPRP Central Committee Political Bureau and chairman of the National Assembly, received the visiting delegation of the French National Assembly's commission for cultural, family, and social affairs in Phnom Penh this morning.

On this occasion, Chea Sim, also chairman of the KUFNCD National Council, highly appreciated the visit of the delegation which, he said, brought with it a profound sentiment of enriching relations between the Cambodian and French peoples.

Chairman Chea Sim hoped that in the future these relations will bind Cambodia and France not only in the health and cultural fields, but also in the parliamentary field of the two countries.

After briefing his guests on the achievements recorded by the Cambodian revolution during the past 6 years and more, the Cambodian leader expressed his conviction that once back in France the delegation will inform the French parliament and people of the reality in Cambodia.

For his part, delegation head Bernard Bardin warmly thanked the Cambodian people for their warm reception. He expressed high appreciation of the Cambodian people's efforts in national reconstruction, particularly in the health and cultural fields.

Bernard Bardin said he was convinced that, with the development of the political chessboard in the world, the French parliament will establish relations and cooperation with the National Assembly of the PRK.

Also this morning, the French parliamentary delegation left Phnom Penh at the end of its 3-day visit to Cambodia.

It was seen off by Abdul Koyom, acting secretary general of the National Assembly, and Sam Sundoeun, member of the National Assembly's commission for cultural and social affairs.

During its stay, the delegation had talks with a delegation of the PRK National Assembly headed by Hun Sen, member of the KPRP Central Committee Political Bureau, chairman of the Council of Ministers, minister of foreign affairs, and member of parliament. It also met with Kim Yin, member of the KPRP Central Committee and director general of the National Radio and Television Commission; Yit Kimseng, minister of public health; and Hang Chuon, deputy minister of education.

The French guests visited the Tuol Sleng museum of genocide, the school of medicine, the national museum, the former royal palace, and the Angkor Wat temples (Siem Reap-Oddar Meanchey Province).

CSO: 4219/2

PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KAMPUCHEA

SPK INTERVIEWS VISITING FRENCH PARLIAMENTARIAN

BK191037 Phnom Penh SPK in French 0446 GMT 19 Sep 85

[Text] Phnom Penh, 19 Sep (SPK)--"No solution other than a political one can be contemplated to restore stability in Cambodia," said Bernard Bardin (Socialist Party), head of a delegation of the commission for cultural, family, and social affairs of the French National Assembly now on a visit to Cambodia.

During an interview granted to SPK, the French parliamentarian, in response to a question on the possibilities of a political solution for the Cambodian problem, said:

"This negotiated solution constitutes one of the elements essential to the establishment of stability and peace in the whole of Southeast Asia."

Dealing with the total withdrawal of the Vietnamese army volunteers in 1990, Bernard Bardin affirmed:

"The political settlement of the Cambodian problem is, we repeat, the only solution suitable for Cambodia itself and for stability of Southeast Asia.

"It is highly desirable that a state be sovereign and, thereby, ensure its own security and the integrity of its national territory. In this spirit, Vietnam's pledge to carry out gradual troop withdrawals from Cambodia to be completed by 1990, even to unilaterally accelerate this process in case a negotiated solution is reached before this deadline, receives our support," Bernard Bardin said.

Asked about Pol Pot's resignation from the post of commander in chief of the Khmer Rouge army, he said that this development in itself has no substantive meaning.

"Concerning the Khmer Rouge group, he went on, this retirement tends to bring about an improvement of its image which was very badly and irremediably tarnished in the crimes and extortions it committed during Pol Pot's rule in Cambodia."

"They have ensured the best condition for our stay in Phnom Penh and beside these fmcts, we also had with them interesting exchanges of views on the problems of our countries. They frankly answered our questions, and we think that this contact is profitable in that it allows us to have a better idea of the political and economic situation of your country, and it will allow us to assist in a better way the cooperation between Cambodia and France."

CSO: 4219/2

MILITARY AFFAIRS AND PUBLIC SECURITY

HO CHI MINH CITY TRIES 'SPECULATORS, HOARDERS'

BK261318 Hanoi Domestic Service in Vietnamese 2300 GMT 24 Sep 85

[Text] Ho Chi Minh City has adopted many measures to struggle for the control of prices, especially the prices of agricultural food products, to strengthen market management, and to strictly punish speculators and smugglers. All this is aimed at gradually and steadily restoring the new order on the front of distribution and circulation.

Over the past 2 weeks and more, the city has dealt with more than 2,000 violations of price discipline, discovered hundreds of cases of speculation and hoarding, and confiscated large quantities of goods such as fabrics, sugar, tobacco, monosodium glutamate, milk, hardware, electrical equipment, machines, and aloe. More than 50 speculators and hoarders who bought up goods and upset prices were sentenced to 1-12 years imprisonment. All cases of violation of price discipline, speculation, and hoarding were tried openly, a fact warmly welcomed by the people.

Since the beginning of the exchange of banknotes, large quantities of smuggled goods hidden in more than 300 houses have been discovered. In the 6th precinct alone, 53 cases of smuggling involving more than 0.5 million dong worth of new banknotes were brought to light. To buy up goods, dishonest merchants have resorted to a myriad of new tricks. One day, they ordered their henchmen to spread the rumor that the state was going to destroy all old banknotes of 10-dong denomination for the purpose of inciting the gullible to buy up any kinds of goods from state stores. Once these stores had run out of their stocks, the unscrupulous traders would release their own stocks for sale at high prices to rake in cash. They never hid their goods in their own homes but often rented different places for this purpose. The places they leased were normally owned by cadres or poor workers. One (Duong Kim H.) left 363 kg of electronicware in other people's care at a place 4 km from his home with the intention of selling them later. Some cunning traders sent their goods to government offices for safekeeping to avoid detection by city people's cells. One (Vu Cao T.) even went as far as leasing the morgue of a hospital to store contraband. All these crafty tricks, however, have been exposed and duly dealt with by the people of Ho Chi Minh City.

The city's banks have quickly allocated sufficient capital to more than 100 factories, enterprises, and precinct trade services to help them promote production and expand business.

CSO: 4209/3

MILITARY AFFAIRS AND PUBLIC SECURITY

SWEDES IN BAI BANG WARNED AFTER EXPLOSION IN SONG LO

Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET in Swedish 9 Aug 85 p 6

[Article by Hakan Bergstrom]

[Text] The local Swedish management of the paper mill in Bai Bang, Vietnam, has warned the 200 Swedes living near the plant of mysterious bomb explosions on the Song Lo River.

In a memorandum to the Swedes, personnel director Bert Karlheden stated that "a number of explosions, at least one of which had a fatal outcome, have occurred recently among the Vietnamese population in the Bai Bang region."

The explosions are reported to have occurred when foreign objects floating in the Song Lo River were opened. Little information on the explosions is available, however.

Not Just Rumors

"We know for sure, however, that these are not just rumors, since a Swede happened to be an eyewitness when three people injured by a bomb were brought to a hospital," said Bert Karlheden, personnel director at Scanmanagement. He administers Swedish activities at the Bai Bang foreign aid project.

Other information is based on reports from individual Vietnamese. Scanmanagement has not sought an official explanation to the explosions.

"We do not know what is behind the explosions, if they are terrorist acts, for example," Bert Karlheden said.

"For safety's sake, however, we have warned all the Swedes," he added.

Near Swedes

The Song Lo River does not flow past the area where the Swedes live, but it is not uncommon for the Swedes to go out in pleasure boats or spend time near the river in connection with shipments. They have now been asked to exercise the greatest caution.

Another explosion with a fatal outcome occurred recently in Bai Bang. This was the result of an accident at a factory, however, resulting either from mechanical failure or from a lack of supervision of the equipment. This was in late June, when a Vietnamese mechanic was killed in an explosion at the chlorine plant that provides the pulp mill with bleach. The police investigation is not yet complete. The chlorine plant had to be closed temporarily as a result of the accident.

9336

CSO: 3650/320

MILITARY AFFAIRS AND PUBLIC SECURITY

BORDER ARREST EXPOSES REACTIONARY PLOT

Hanoi QUAN DOI NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 21 Jul 85 p 2

[Article by Anh Duc: "'Birds Return to the Nest' Operation"]

[Text] The night was late and the stove was flickering. Seeing this his wife H'Bia had already sunk into profound sleep, Siu Rin briskly got up, took and knife and left the house, jumping into the night just like a prey-hunting fox.

After crossing a small brook Siu Rin proceeded in the direction of an ironwood tree. Then he heard a shout, "Who's there? Password?" "Roc," he promptly snapped back.

Although the correct password was given many black-clad persons surged forward from three sides, punching and kicking Siu Rin with a vengeance. While hitting him, they cursed, "Dammit, you plan to bring border guards here to nab us, do you?"

Siu Rin muttered, "No, 'I'm coming alone."

A portly man rapped out, "Halt! do not assault Mr Siu Rin!" The man helped Siu Rin stand up and said, "Comrade, please pardon the wanton behavior of my men. But let's forget it. Now, tell me about the results of our 'Birds Leaving Nest' Operation."

"Sir, I've converted four people."

"Congratulations! We must promptly send them abroad for training and bring them back here to assist us in controlling these Central Highlands. Do you understand?"

"Yes, I do."

Siu Rin nodded continuously then followed the portly man into a grotto.

H'Bia was aroused from sleep. She was extremely sad, aware of what had just happened to her. She knew that her husband still maintained clandestine ties to bandits in the jungle. She asked Siu Rin many times to give up but to no

avail. She let a female friend of hers in the village in on her worry, hoping that border combatants at Post S (Gia Lai-Kontum) would finally get wind of the story and help save her happiness.

That night, people in P highland village cheerfully held a buffalo-slaughtering festival to welcome the new paddy crop. Border guards were also on hand to share the people's joy. People drank liquor and danced until the wee hours of the morning then went home, or to the communal house, to sleep, leaving behind border guards, awake and busy "tracking down" suspects, many of whom were present at the festival.

A moment later, Siu Rin and three men proceeded toward the brook. It was pitch dark. Walking one behind the other, they arrived at a grotto entrance. Waiting there for them, the portly man scrutinized each face and said in an authoritarian voice, "Hi, comrades! On behalf of the superior echelon, I compliment you on joining the front!"

From the entrance two volleys of shots suddenly rang out. The two guards were promptly tied up. Frontier combatants dived into the grotto. One of them shouted, "Freeze! Surrender and be alive, otherwise you'll be killed!"

A man tried to run away but was stopped by an uppercut. Before he could recover he was handcuffed. That man was Siu Rin. All the bandits--including the portly man, Kapadu, an infamous bandit chief in K District--obeyed the orders of frontier guards and left the grotto with bowed heads. Along with Siu Rin, Kapadu escaped death 2 years ago during a mopping-up operation.

Following the close call--Kapadu confessed--he contacted the Pol Pot army remnants, went to Thailand to undergo commando training then returned home to organize and send Saigon puppet army remnants and former Fulro elements across the border to carry out the reactionaries' plot of "liberating the Central Highlands."

9213

CSO: 4209/643

MILITARY AFFAIRS AND PUBLIC SECURITY

HOANG TRUONG MINH ARTICLE ON NATIONALITIES POLICY

BK281418 Hanoi NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 26 Aug 85 pp 3, 4

[Article by Hoang Truong Minh, head of the Central Committee Nationalities Department, on party policy toward nationalities]

[Text] Owing to the party policy toward the people of all nationalities, in the past 40 years, the society and people in the ethnic minority areas throughout the country have really undergone many major changes.

The ruling, colonialist, and imperialist classes in all time have always taken advantage of the nationalities issue to serve their schemes of aggression and exploitation.

They implement policies of division, oppression, and obscurancy to maintain their cruel ruling machinery and to restrain the ethnic minority people within a backward agriculture of nomadic farming and life, forcing them to live in poverty and illness all year round with a low level of culture and illiterate. Many people are blind, deaf, and dumb, even though they have eyes, ears, and mouth. Their miserable life is indescribable. Under the imperialist and feudalism regime, the people of all nationalities live in discrimination against one another, between the majority and minority peoples, and even among the minority people themselves. Some of the minority people risk to be exterminated.

Our country is originally a unified country of more than 50 ethnic minority and majority people of various nationalities.

In the course of 4,000 years of national construction and defense history, the laboring people of all nationalities in our country have always preserved their traditional solidarity against foreign aggression every time the country was in danger.

Since its founding, our party has considered the issue of nationalities one of the strategic duties of the Vietnamese revolution. The party's political program in 1930 specified: The people of all nationalities must unite on the principle of equality and mutual aid in order to struggle for common independence, freedom and happiness."

Under the leadership of the party and President Ho Chi Minh, the ethnic minority people united with the majority people to build up forces and establish the revolutionary bases in Viet Bac and other places; rose up in August 1945 to overthrow the French and Japanese rulers and win over the administration; and established the first peasant-worker state in Southeast Asia. All the Vietnamese people including the ethnic minority people have become the masters of their own country and are no longer slaves.

During the 9 years of resistance against the French colonialists and 21 years of anti-U.S. struggle for national salvation, the party that implemented President Ho Chi Minh's appeals: "Rather sacrifice everything than lose one's country and be enslaved," "Solidarity, solidarity, great solidarity; Success, success, great success," "Nothing is more precious than independence and freedom," sent thousands of cadres from the lowlands to the remote outlying areas of ethnic minority people to conduct motivation propaganda and establish resistance bases. The various resistance emulation movements for national construction such as the "three readiness" movement of youth, the "three responsibilities" women's movement, and the emulation movement to work twice as hard for the sake of the southern kin penetrated to all the villages from Viet Bac to the central highlands.

The ethnic minority people of all nationalities sent hundreds of thousands of their children to the frontline and gave hundreds of thousands of metric tons of food to the troops so that the latter could be well fed and defeat the enemy.

Countless examples of stalwartness and bravery in combat and of diligence and creativity in labor appeared during the two wars for liberation. During the period of resistance against the French, there were 25 heroes of the people's armed forces among the ethnic minority people. During the anti-U.S. struggle, the ethnic minority people again had 67 heroes in the people's armed forces and tens of thousands of valiant combatants in fighting the Americans.

In the past few years, the Chinese reactionaries in collusion with the U.S. imperialists and other reactionaries, have constantly attacked the solidarity bloc of nationalities and the independence of our country. They have waged a war from their southwestern border against the six northern border provinces of our country, as well as a multifaceted war of sabotage to weaken and subdue our people.

However, led by the party, the people of all nationalities from the southwestern part and central highlands to the six northern border provinces have upheld their vigilance, united as one, and stalwartly fought the enemy while maintaining production, thus frustrating all the enemy plots.

During the fight against the Chinese aggressors in February 1979, 54 units and individuals of ethnic minorities were commended and cited for awards.

The residential areas of ethnic minority people of various nationalities in our country are mostly located in those regions which are important to

national defense and are rich in natural resources. Throughout the 40 years of national construction and defense, the policy toward the people of various nationalities has always promoted solidarity and mutual aid among the people in order to accelerate production, improve their livelihood, vigorously accelerate the three revolutions, strenuously develop the economy, culture and education in the areas of ethnic minorities, and further reduce the differences in economic and cultural development among the various areas which are bequeathed by history.

Besides the exploits on the military and political fronts, the implementation of this policy has also brought about major changes in the material and moral lives of the ethnic minorities. The campaign to settle farming and life and bring peasants into state farms and forests has further resolved the problem of self-sufficiency in food, and stabilized the livelihood of some ethnic minority people in the northern mountainous regions and central highlands such as Dac Lac, Lai Chau, Son La, and Ha Tuyen.

Many of the ethnic minority people's zones have become areas for the relocation of population and the division of labor. Many new economic zones, new agricultural areas and hundreds of state farms and forests, cooperatives for virgin land reclamation, and state factories have been established in the zones of ethnic minorities. These have helped develop production in the mountainous regions.

In the past years, our state has invested much capital in the zones of ethnic minorities. The party committees at all echelons and the local administration have made much effort to promote self-reliance and self support, and have struggled to develop the economy, culture, and education in the zones of ethnic minorities, especially in the border area and the Central Highlands.

Socialism calls for socialist men with high knowledge and noble qualities. As a result, the training of ethnic minority cadres is a decisive factor in mobilizing the ethnic minority people of all nationalities to follow the revolution and achieve the collective mastery and equality among nationalities. After 40 years of combat and production, the contingents of ethnic minority people and cadres have grown up both quantitatively and qualitatively. They have participated in the state management agencies through the system of proletarian dictatorship from the central down to local level, and in the political, military, economic, cultural, artistic, scientific, and technical fields.

Contingents of ethnic minority cadres actually play a decisive role in the organization and implementation of various tasks in the zones of ethnic minorities. This reflects the party's correct policy and manifests the very great revolutionary capability of the people of all nationalities in our country.

The achievements scored by the ethnic minority people of all nationalities in our country over the past 40 years under the party leadership have made worthy contributions to the common cause of the Vietnamese revolution.

The more enthusiastic and proud the ethnic minority people of all nationalities feel, the more profoundly they are grateful to the glorious CPV and respected and beloved President Ho Chi Minh.

Faced with the sinister scheme of the Chinese reactionaries in collusion with the U.S. imperialists and other reactionary forces, the ethnic minority people of all nationalities pledge to heighten their vigilance, develop the sense of national unity and army-people solidarity, enhance the spirit of self-reliance and self-support, resolutely accelerate production, improve their livelihood, be prepared to fight victoriously, satisfactorily implement the resolutions of the party Central Committee Political Bureau and the party Central Committee plenum, and together with all the party members and people, build and firmly defend the socialist Vietnam fatherland.

CSO: 4209/3

MILITARY AFFAIRS AND PUBLIC SECURITY

SENIOR GENERAL CHU HUY MAN ON PARTY-POLITICAL WORK IN ARMY

Hanoi TAP CHI QUAN DOI NHAN DAN in Vietnamese Jul 85 pp 1-15

[Article by Senior General Chu Huy Man: "Some Problems in Party-Political Work in the Buildup, Training and Combat of the Basic Units Along the Border"]

[Text] Editorial Note: Recently, Senior General Chu Huy Man, director of the Political General Department, delivered an address, in which he analyzed the situation, to a number of units directly engaged in the fight against encroachment and occupation by Chinese forces along our country's northern border.

TAP CHI QUAN DOI NHAN DAN has printed the portion of this address that dealt with party-political work in the buildup, training and combat operations of the basic units. Below, we respectfully present it to our readers.

Victory in combat is the most precise measurement of the results and quality of the buildup and training of troops. On the basis of the requirements of combat and victory in combat, we must provide troops with comprehensive training and build basic units that are well developed in every respect and possess high fighting strength. Training that is separated from combat, training subject matter that is not consistent with the realities of combat not only fail to produce useful results, but are also a waste of time and money. Our army has a long history of fighting, has won glorious victories and grown rapidly and has gained a wealth of experience. However, not every basic unit has possessed high fighting strength in every stage of development of the situation and tasks nor been able to win victory over the enemy in every situation.

The present corps of basic level cadres is good in many respects. However, there are still some weaknesses and deficiencies concerning personal qualities and abilities that must be corrected. This is a responsibility of veteran cadres who have many years of combat experience, of high ranking and middle ranking cadres.

Therefore, several years ago, the Military Commission of the Party Central Committee and the Ministry of National Defense established as a central task of the entire army the task of building basic units that are solid and strong

in every respect and possess high fighting strength, the nucleus of which is building basic organizations of the party that are pure, solid and strong.

Building and training basic units in order to fight and win victory with high efficiency are the results of combined political, ideological and organizational strengths. These are wide-ranging matters. Here, I shall only discuss a number of necessary points that pertain to the basic unit.

1. Of basic and utmost importance is the need to provide good tactical and technical training in accordance with the combat mission of the basic unit and do so on the basis of a thorough understanding of the political line and task and the military line, task, views and thinking of the party. The political and military lines and tasks of the party determine the basic tasks, the organizational structure and the guidelines for the buildup and training of the armed forces in every area. You all know full well that defending the socialist fatherland is the work of the entire party, the entire army and all the people. However, the armed forces must be the nucleus of the fight waged by all the people against the enemy to defend the country, must win victory over aggressor forces of any size, at any time or place and in every situation. The specific nature of a war, the specific characteristics of each battlefield and the combat mission assigned to each unit, service and branch face the corps of cadres with a strict requirement: fully adhering to the lines, tasks and views of the party in the buildup and training of troops, beginning with the basic units.

Military strategy, campaign art and tactics (fighting methods) are an integrated system of military art and each is very closely related to the other. We must practice a high degree of adherence to principle but must, at the same time, be very creative in application. In the field of tactics (methods of fighting), it is even more necessary that what we do always be a direct and concrete reflection of determination and thoroughness, of creativity and flexibility. This demands that our cadres correctly assess and deal with the contradictions that arise in practice. The requirement faced in battle is to win victory. The combined results of many victorious battles create combat efficiency and prove the effectiveness of strategy. Highly efficient, victorious combat is what reflects the fact that a basic unit is solid and strong.

The defense forces at bases and base complexes are the companies and battalions. The forces that can attack or launch counter-offensives (counter-attacks) the most quickly are the stationary regiments. Therefore, in defensive, offensive or counter-offensive (counter-attack) combat, the basic unit must directly engage and fight the enemy first and must also fight and win victory over enemy forces in the heaviest battles. The advantages and difficulties of a company, a battalion or a regiment (the basic units) are the advantages and difficulties of the entire division and relate to the entire defense zone.

In the case of a large-scale war of aggression breaking out, enemy forces can attack us from many different directions, which include airborne and seaborne attacks; however, they will first attack the defensive positions of the basic units. Whether or not we win victory in the initial battles on the frontlines

of the defense zones also depends, above everything else, upon the basic units.

Therefore, building and training basic units that are solid and strong in every respect and possess high fighting strength are of very important political and strategic significance.

At basic units, we must recognize that one matter of decisive significance in the successful completion of missions is the subjects in which training and maneuvers are conducted. This is the process by which cadres and soldiers learn to properly combine technology and fighting methods, recognize the requirements of actual combat and develop dependable fighting skills. It is necessary to guard against and correct the practices of separating training from combat and technology from tactics (methods of fighting). We must also guard against achievements in training that exceed requirements but are not truly consistent with the realities of combat.

Training and maneuver plans in technology and methods of fighting must be formulated for each individual, each component and the entire unit on the basis of correctly assessing the schemes and capabilities, especially the combat tactics, of the enemy, the terrain within the defense zone, related terrain and the unit's combat mission.

For basic units, it is even more necessary that maneuvers be closely tied to combat plans. The main requirements in offensive, defensive and counter-offensive (counter-attack) operations must be clearly defined. It is also necessary to define which key element of each method of fighting is of decisive significance to the whole. Training and maneuvers absolutely must not be separated from combat. We must resolutely oppose the kind of training and maneuvers which are evaluated as having achieved high results but because of which cadres and soldiers display a lack of bravery and resourcefulness in combat, are unable to use weapons and equipment skillfully and efficiently, even use them improperly, and are confused, unprepared and inflexible when it comes to dealing with specific situations. Therefore, when maneuvers are held, the situations presented within them must be difficult, complex situations that force cadres to think and apply their intelligence and energies. The practice of conducting maneuvers only for the purpose of recording a high score or earning praise must be stopped.

In order for training and maneuvers to be of high quality, the availability of time is a necessity; however, it is preparations that are the key, determining factor. Among the preparations that are made, the preparation of basic unit cadres, especially squad cadres, is the key factor. Basic units can only possess true fighting strength when training is consistent with reality, when cadres understand and can skillfully apply what they are being taught in training and when cadres instruct soldiers and the upper echelon instructs the lower echelon, thereby insuring quality in every area. The best and most effective use to which political-ideological exhortation can be put in training and maneuvers is to clearly define the specific combat mission and target and the specific nature of the fighting that will take place and reiterate them many times so that every member of the unit has a thorough understanding of how we intend to wipe out the enemy and maintains the

initiative at battle positions. All the difficulties and obstacles that will be encountered in combat must be clearly explained so that all cadres and soldiers develop a strong will and high determination and are ready to overcome each difficulty and severe condition in order to win victory over the enemy. It is incorrect to fear that correctly explaining all the difficulties that will be encountered will cause cadres on the lower echelon and soldiers to be afraid and waver. Concealing the truth is very harmful. It not only leads to the failure to win victory, but also adversely affects efforts to build the unit over the long range. Do not forget the saying: "Honesty is the best policy."

2. Forging the discipline of a regular force army and discipline in combat is a very important factor in guaranteeing victory in combat. In the education and management of units, command cadres and political cadres must attach full importance to forging the discipline of each military man. In conjunction with day to day education and management, full attention must be given to teaching and forging discipline in technical training, training in fighting methods and maneuvers. It is necessary to teach this many times and clearly point out the danger posed by undisciplined actions in combat.

Strictly complying with the lines and policies of the party, with the laws of the state and with the orders and regulations of the army is an important factor of fighting strength and brings victory to the basic unit as well as the entire army. You, too, have seen the heart-rending results of the weak, poor sense of organization and discipline on the part of some cadres and soldiers in certain units. Therefore, we want to state to you again that discipline in combat is directly related to success or failure in combat. What we must think about, what we must choose between are sacrifices of life by cadres and soldiers that bring glory to the fatherland, to the people and liberal, undisciplined actions that are the cause of crimes. Winning victory is an order of the fatherland. Everyone must strictly obey this order. When a person or unit takes liberties in the way a combat mission is to be performed, when a person or unit performs a combat mission in a manner that suits convenience the result is sure to be unnecessary casualties and sometimes even tragic defeat. Once a combat mission has been assigned to the unit and to individuals, the entire unit and each person must, of their own volition, perform the mission properly; at the same time, they must perform the mission unconditionally.

I repeat that combat discipline excludes no one and that no one may claim exemption from regulations. In combat, anyone who only acts to protect himself from danger, with the results that casualties are suffered by other members of the unit and combat efforts are unsuccessful, must assume his share of the responsibility, regardless of how much he has contributed to the revolution and how many achievements he has recorded.

Facts have shown us that command cadres and political cadres must be persons who, from the standpoint of discipline, set bright examples for all the cadres and soldiers of the unit, especially in difficult combat situations that involve heavy fighting. Only in this way is it possible to guarantee victory in combat. Only in this way is it possible for there to be trust in leaders and commanders.

3. It is necessary to build combat positions and battlefield equipment positions and help to build combat villages, the battlefield deployment of the people's war and the district military fortress in the people's war to defend the socialist fatherland. Of foremost importance are the need to thoroughly understand the strategy of taking the offensive and maintaining control, of maintaining control and taking the offensive, the need to fully comprehend the view that all the people fight the enemy, with the people's armed forces being the nucleus of this fight, and the need to express this strategy and this view in combat plans that combine defensive, offensive and counter-offensive (counter-attack) tactics and many other factors.

Combat, village, town and street battle positions, the district military fortress and so forth constitute a battlefield deployment that is established in advance and is constantly augmented and perfected. This battlefield deployment must constantly be strengthened and developed throughout the long course of the fight, throughout the course of tackling and surmounting each stern challenge, each increasingly complex situation until the enemy has been totally defeated.

Combat plans must take into full consideration the different combat situations and different scales of fighting that might occur as well as the different missions and fighting methods of the basic unit and must be fully reflected in the building of base complexes and independent bases and in the defense zones, both on the front and in the rear.

To organize and build a solid battlefield deployment of the people's war, it is necessary to firmly adhere to the following key and decisive points:

--How the enemy will attack must be correctly predicted, that is, will they gradually nibble away at one piece of land at a time and then expand their efforts to encroach upon and occupy an entire area or is a large-scale attack a possibility in the immediate or not too distant future, which forces will be sent by the enemy into combat, which tactics will they employ... These questions, and others as well, must be carefully analyzed and correctly answered from the perspective of the specific situation. We must predict what the enemy's greatest efforts will be and predict what the worst, most violent and most difficult situation might be in order to increase our ability to take the initiative. This does not, however, amount to overestimating the enemy nor is it an expression of fear of the enemy. To the contrary, if we underestimate the enemy, we easily find ourselves being caught unprepared in combat and being unprepared in combat unavoidably has an adverse effect upon the overall battlefield deployment and sometimes requires that it be turned around.

--The foremost political task of the basic unit is specifically expressed in the combat mission of each mobile infantry unit, each artillery unit or the various branches participating in combat at each base, at each base complex and within the defense zones. This political task must also be fully reflected in the determination and intentions of the commander. Here, everything has the objectives of wiping out the enemy, defeating each of their tactics, maintaining and gaining greater initiative and hitting the enemy hard, being resilient in battle, striking quickly and fighting for many days

while always winning victory, the key aspects of which are wiping out the enemy and destroying their means of war.

4. Providing timely, continuous and dependable rear service and technical support, thereby maintaining and increasing the unit's fighting strength and resiliency so that it can win victory, is very important work. The realities of combat during the past several years have always demanded that we, beginning with those of us in the basic units, realize this fact, possess a full sense of responsibility in this regard and perform this work very well in order to maintain and increase our ability to fight and win victory over enemy forces in the immediate future and over the long range.

In this area, we have made many efforts but are still committing shortcomings. One defense unit occupying a blocking position had to fight for days without food simply because the commander there did not comply with the regulations on troop messing when in a high state of combat readiness. Thus, how could the unit's fighting strength be maintained? This situation surely would not have occurred had the commander felt personal responsibility, had he looked after and supervised things thoroughly. More recently, a similar situation occurred. At defensive positions of ours that were shelled by the enemy for 20 days and nights in a row, how well were troops eating and sleeping, were they able to take a bath? Some command cadres and political cadres did not know the answers to these questions. This situation once again shows just what kind of spirit of responsibility some of our cadres possess. We must be determined to rectify this shortcoming; otherwise, we, ourselves, will reduce the fighting strength of troops.

Rear service work must insure that our troops are well fed and well clothed and that wounded and ill soldiers receive prompt medical care so that they can rapidly regain their health and return to their combat units. The grain and food rations stipulated by the state and distributed by the army must reach troops in the required quantity and quality. We must be determined not to allow rations to become lost, spoiled, wasted or reduced. This is necessary on normal days and even more necessary in combat.

Cadres must also encourage and have troops engage in productive labor to establish vegetable gardens, fish ponds, chicken coops...around their barracks and battle positions in order to produce additional grain and food and improve the unit's meals. Every product that is produced must be distributed in a fair and open manner under a strict policy. Only in this way is it possible to motivate everyone to engage in productive labor, make the material life of the unit more comfortable and heighten the trust in cadres.

Food and shelter for troops that are provided in a well organized manner are an expression of a cultured way of life. No cadre may cite any reason as an excuse to operate in the convenient fashion of "cooking up whatever is on hand." Disorder in troop messing, the sheltering of troops... not only adversely affects the living conditions and fighting strength of the unit but also develops within cadres and soldiers the very bad habit of living, fighting and working in a makeshift, day to day manner with no routine or discipline.

The technical support operations of a regular, modern army, especially in combat, are extremely important operations. In this area, too, we cannot close our eyes to actions that reflect the lack of a sense of responsibility. In past years, our army very strictly observed the slogan: "One round of ammunition, one enemy troop." Today, however, a very serious waste of ammunition has been seen within some units in recent battles. Some comrades have fired all of their ammunition within the space of one-half hour or so without knowing whether they killed any enemy or not. Some comrades maintain that we had to economize in prior years because we were poor but, today, we can "pour iron and steel down on the heads of the enemy" at will! This is an outlook that is contrary to the view that we must practice diligence and frugality in building the country, diligence and frugality in building the army. There are battles of strategic and political significance that require the use of many weapons and strong firepower but, even in these battles, we must achieve high efficiency and be assured of victory.

We must be determined to rectify the shortcomings described above. Our cadres and soldiers must be the masters of the equipment and technology with which they are equipped and which are constantly being improved. Our cadres and soldiers must obey the specific principles, regulations and rules regarding equipment and technology, must maintain them well, insure that they can be used for a long time, be proficient in their use and utilize them effectively in order to insure that we can hit the enemy hard, strike quickly or fight for many days while always winning victory.

Providing rear service support as well as providing technical support are the tasks of the entire army and unit and are the responsibility of the various professional organizations. The commanders and political cadres on the various echelons must know what their responsibilities to the unit and the upper echelon are and must, for the sake of victory in combat, wholeheartedly concern themselves with rear service and technical support and not leave this work up to the lower echelon, up to the functional organizations.

5. The present corps of command cadres and political cadres at basic units possesses basic strengths; at the same time, the realities of combat have shown that it is also weak in certain respects. Cadres on the upper echelon and the concerned party committee must correctly evaluate the special characteristics of the situation surrounding the corps of basic level cadres within the unit and adopt plans for guiding these comrades in making continued efforts to forge their stand, their will to fight, their spirit of responsibility and their sense of organization and discipline, improve their ability to organize, command and manage troops and cultivate their leadership and command style. These efforts must be constant, must be made even in the process of preparing for combat and in combat itself. The process of training, maneuvers, preparing for combat, building determination and formulating combat plans provides good conditions for basic level cadres to forge their qualities and fulfill their responsibilities well. However, the best and highest conditions for forging one's qualities come in combat. How well a person has forged himself must be measured by the results achieved in combat. When a combat mission is received, the commander and political cadre of the basic unit must gain a truly clear understanding of the intentions of the upper echelon, determine precisely what the unit's mission is and see the

very strict requirements that face their unit. On this basis, they must first develop an unshakeable determination on their own part to perform the mission and display a high degree of responsibility when performing it. The determination with which the basic unit goes into combat and its combat plan must fully and deeply reflect the spirit of actively wiping the enemy out with the aim of defeating each of their combat tactics. The combat plan must project all the different situations that might occur and contain ways to successfully deal with each. The commander must not close his eyes to but foresee all the difficulties that will be encountered in combat. In this way, he will be better able to take the initiative when complex situations develop. Anyone who closes his eyes to difficulties or is afraid that the mention of difficulties will cause cadres and soldiers to vacillate, has himself already vacillated. When the combat plan has been approved by the upper echelon, troops must be trained in this plan using mock-up models and on training grounds in a manner that simulates actual combat conditions. In situations in which basic level cadres are unfamiliar with combat and in key battles, cadres on the echelon above the basic unit must truly take a thorough approach, must maintain close contact with these cadres, closely observe what is being done and personally provide them with detailed assistance and training on the spot. There are also cases in which upper echelon cadres must go down two echelons in order to assist a lower echelon. Although this is painstaking and time consuming, it does help to insure victory, reduce casualties, reduce the consumption of ammunition and train the corps of cadres. It also displays a good command style.

In combat, especially at times of difficulty and times of bitter fighting, the trust that the masses have in their commander and the closeness between the upper and lower echelons, between cadres and soldiers have a decisive bearing upon the unit's fighting strength, upon the ability to assemble and maintain forces and upon the full execution of the orders of the upper echelon as well as the commander. Cadres and soldiers place their trust in commanders, political cadres and upper echelon personnel who, in normal times, are devoted to their work, lead a simple and exemplary life, are consistent in what they say and do and love and care for the lower echelon; who, in times of combat, display a proper, confident command and leadership style and issue precise and clear orders; and who, in the face of great difficulties, remain steadfast and confident, maintain their position and are determined to lead the unit forward, overcome difficulties and complete the mission. When cadres are forged and challenged in these directions, the lower echelon and soldiers of the unit are confident and determined to fight regardless of the difficulties encountered in combat. The assistance they provide to the lower echelon is effective and practical. A cadre who possesses a good command and leadership style has a profound influence upon efforts to strengthen the unity of his unit and its unity with friendly units. In organizing the implementation of the revolutionary line and task of the party, cadres always play the decisive role, regardless of the field. In the field of combat, especially in modern combat, the army must operate in a determined, urgent and closely coordinated manner. The commanders on the various echelons must take the initiative, be decisive and make accurate and timely decisions in order to win victory. To meet these objective requirements, the cadre must fully recognize the heavy responsibility that is his and display a high degree of responsibility in order to complete the mission at hand; however, this does not mean that he may

attach to this responsibility a sense of personal power and assert that he has the right to decide everything, thus exceeding the bounds of principles, regulations and his authority.

In the present corps of cadres, the cadres now at basic units are still young. More favorable conditions exist for them to develop their intelligence and talents than existed for those cadres who preceded them. In view of the fact that these cadres still have much time left in which to make contributions, it is even more necessary that the goal of their personal struggle, of their efforts to forge themselves be the cause of building and defending the socialist fatherland. In this way, they will surely become cadres who possess good virtues and talent and are able to undertake missions, become the worthy successors of those who preceded them, all for the cause of building and defending the socialist fatherland.

The realities of combat during the past several years, especially since the summer of 1984, have shown that in addition to the matters presented above, the party-political work conducted within the basic unit must meet the following specific requirements very well in order to make positive contributions to winning victory over the enemy and completing the unit's political task well.

1. Routine propaganda and educational work and every aspect of the daily activities of the basic unit must be oriented toward increasing the fighting strength and raising the level of combat readiness of troops. This, however, is not enough. When the unit receives a combat mission, educational and motivational efforts must be even more concerted, continuous and thorough in order to build strong determination to fight on the part of the cadres and soldiers and strengthen this determination.

It is necessary to thoroughly brief each person and unit on the mission, give them a full understanding of the significance and objective of the battle and build within them strong determination to fight and win and a tenacious, brave, resourceful and creative fighting spirit. The level of socialist awareness, love of the fatherland and the people, the working class character and glorious traditions of the army and the unit...must be combined and given expression by killing the forces, destroying the means of war and defeating the combat tactics as well as the other tactics of the enemy, by controlling battle positions and controlling the battlefield. Killing the enemy is the most decisive prerequisite to maintaining the territorial integrity of the fatherland within the unit's area of operation, protecting the people and protecting the gains of the revolution. The combat mission must pervade, must be deeply ingrained in the thinking and feelings of each person, must be reflected in the actions of each person, must become bravery and tenacity on the defensive and fierceness on the offensive and when engaged in a counter-offensive (counter-attack). The enemy forces committing aggression against our fatherland threaten the survival of the nation and are violating the most sacred sentiments of each person. Therefore, everyone must be prepared to give his life in the fight to defend the fatherland. All cadres and soldiers of the unit must be made to clearly and deeply understand: no patriotic citizen, no soldier in the people's armed forces can hesitate or be unwilling to give his life for the fatherland. If we waver or hesitate in the face of

this enemy that is encroaching upon and occupying land of our country, is sabotaging the life of our people, we will be crushed by enemy forces. To avoid combat or automatically withdraw from one's combat position are a crime, are contrary to the fine character of our army and will cause us to lose everything. Some persons enviously compare their sacrifices in combat to life in the rear and fail to see that they can take pride in and derive great happiness from the fact that the people are peacefully and happily working and producing. There are even some persons who compare the hard life and shortages on the frontline to the life of luxury being lived by corrupt elements of society. Such comparisons, regardless of their reason, are also expressions of weakness and deficiencies in one's viewpoint, of a decline in morale and demean the dignity of a revolutionary military man who is part of the corps of persons who are carrying on the cause of their fathers and elder brothers. We should also view these as indications of a decline in the will to fight, in love of the socialist fatherland, in the spirit of being the master of the country and as completely contrary to the character and traditions of our army, the traditions of our nation. It is incorrect to either sympathize with or close one's eyes to and not resolutely combat these attitudes and ways of thinking. We must speak frankly to these persons and tell them that if they do not study, if they do not forge themselves, they will, as time goes by, lose their sense of direction, the consequences of which will not be at all pleasant.

2. In conjunction with instructing everyone in the combat mission to be performed, there must be a thorough discussion of the methods of fighting to be employed. Briefing everyone on the mission, discussing the methods of fighting to be employed and building determination are closely interrelated. Giving everyone an understanding of the mission, high determination and confidence in the methods of fighting is a sure guarantee of victory. To insure that they are thoroughly understood, to insure a high degree of consensus, the intentions of the commander (except for those aspects that must be kept secret) must be formed by tapping the intelligence and the spirit of collective ownership of each person through a discussion of the methods of fighting to be employed by everyone concerned. In this way, cadres and soldiers have a more solid basis upon which to display initiative, flexibility and ingenuity in combat.

The combat plan of the basic unit must first clearly reflect the intentions of the upper echelon and the specific intentions and decisions of the immediate commander. These intentions and decisions must be clear and well-defined and not be ambiguous in any way, not be subject to varying interpretations and not be difficult to understand. The combat plan of the basic unit, regardless of which methods of fighting are being employed, must project the possibilities that exist for developments in the situation that are favorable as well as developments that will pose difficulties and complications in conjunction with presenting ways to deal with these situations so that the initiative can be seized. Do not be afraid of those persons who talk at great length about specific difficulties and complications. You should be aware of the fact that persons who boldly point out many difficulties and complications that might arise are not necessarily negative persons who fear difficulties. Many of them are persons who give matters deep thought, are highly responsible and are concerned about insuring that the unit completes its mission and wins victory.

On the other hand, it is also normal for some of these persons to think along lines that are indeed negative. Of greater importance, however, is the need for cadres to calmly and closely listen to what these persons have to say and select from what they say matters to be raised for discussion by everyone in order to tap the intelligence and strength of the collective and find the best ways to overcome difficulties and win victory. In this way, we can also change the mind of negative persons and make them persons who think along positive lines. If you fear negative thinking, if your efforts to educate persons who think negatively are cursory, if the conclusions you reach are vague and if the difficulties raised are not analyzed or thoroughly resolved, negative thinking will not be changed and more negative thinking will be fostered. There are also cases in which, because agreement has not been reached concerning the method of fighting due to objective and subjective conditions, time must be set aside to go out to training grounds and gain some practical experience so that fighting methods can be researched, analyzed and decided upon together, thus insuring a high degree of consensus, a solid consensus. Regardless of the situation, the commander and the political cadre must tap the initiative and creativity of cadres and soldiers and should not allow them to be subjective, unthinking or inflexible in combat.

Through the discussion of fighting methods, we must examine and correctly assess the strengths and weaknesses of each person and unit and support the efforts to provide detailed instruction in the mission and meet the requirement of achieving a high level of consciousness. For battles that are of key significance, even if they will only be small-scale battles, it is necessary to provide instruction in the mission and conduct inspections many times and necessary to fully perform the above mentioned jobs in a manner that reflects high quality in order to insure that victory is won.

In combat, the situation is always changing and developing. Objective circumstances always reflect and have an impact upon the attitudes and thinking of persons. Therefore, regardless of how thorough their preparations might be, cadres must never be satisfied with what they have achieved or lax in the area of leadership and command. It must be recognized that even if preparations are thorough and complete, they only guarantee one-half of the victory. The other half is determined by the dynamism of each person within the unit and by the energies of the commander and the political cadre.

Having the collective discuss fighting methods does not contradict nor infringe upon the right of the commander to make decisions. Anyone who views this as a contradiction between centralism and democracy, who thinks that only the commander has the right to decide anything in combat and that each member of the unit is to simply obey the commander and do what he is told to do and who does not attach importance to or tap the intelligence of the collective must re-examine his outlook and guard against exercising his authority in a manner that violates principles. The superior aspects of a revolutionary army are its high degree of political and moral consensus and the fact that it utilizes the intelligence and capabilities of each person. The principles of centralism and democracy go hand in hand. It must be recognized that the purpose of timely decisions by the commander is to achieve victory, not to exercise personal power. Exercising personal responsibility in order to achieve the successful performance of revolutionary tasks is totally different

in nature from the thinking of individualism and personal status. Resolutions of the party have clearly stated that the commander must take the initiative and make timely decisions in order to win victory. Please take note of the phrase "in order to win victory." To our way of thinking, the skilled commander on the battlefield, the commander who dares to be decisive and assume responsibility, is the person who respects the intelligence of the collective more than anyone else, is a person who respectfully listens to the opinions of the responsible persons around him. It is my sincere hope that you cadres who are still young, that you who are the bright hopes of the country and the army, will remember this: a commander, a leader who is responsible to the people and the army for a battle but allows that battle to end in defeat cannot compensate for the losses suffered or lessen his responsibility for this defeat regardless of how many contributions to the revolution he subsequently makes.

3. In the course of combat, it is also necessary to continuously and promptly inspire and encourage cadres and soldiers to display bravery, tenacity, resourcefulness and creativity. On the basis of combat developments, the commander and the political cadre must promptly deal with the situation while encouraging everyone to remain confident, heighten their determination and fight with enthusiasm, especially in key situations that have a decisive bearing upon victory in battle. To accomplish this, cadres must keep abreast of the state of the morale, the thinking and the attitudes of each person as developments in combat occur, beginning with the morale, thinking and attitudes of cadres, party members and outstanding youths, so that they can issue orders and directives, thoroughly analyze the situation and promptly motivate everyone to carry out the mission at hand. Performing educational work and building determination before going into battle are very important. However, in combat, in the face of real and immediate challenges, victory or defeat, advantages or difficulties and life or death are questions that directly face each person. The thinking and attitudes of persons change, even change very rapidly and sometimes in a very complicated manner, thus having an immediate impact upon the actions taken in combat. At such times, the efforts made by each person, even though they may be very strenuous efforts, are sometimes not enough to overcome these challenges. Thus, what are needed are very timely and effective encouragement and inspiration from the commander and the political cadre.

Experience has shown that in order to effectively motivate and encourage everyone to overcome difficulties and fight courageously, the commander and political cadre must keep abreast of rapid changes in the situation and must motivate themselves and determine the direction they are going to take first. A correct and calm style on the part of cadres in the face of complex situations is of utmost importance. If they do not keep abreast of the specific situation, command cadres and political cadres sometimes have their hands tied by complex developments in combat, which is precisely when leadership and command skills are most important. In discussions, we have called attention to this matter on many different occasions; however, some commanders and political officers have been unable to give detailed accounts of the situations that developed in the recent phase of combat, of how they dealt with these situations or what the basic situation was.

The very urgent developments that occur in combat demand that everyone be extremely alert, that everyone's attitude be clear and positive, that everyone take advantage of every second and minute and not allow the development of the situation to drift. Issuing precise orders and directives based on the results of a correct and timely analysis of the situation combined with strong and effective words of inspiration filled with firm confidence will have a very decisive influence upon the thinking and actions of the lower echelon. When issuing orders and directives, the commander and political cadre must do so in a very calm and poised manner. The worst thing they can do is to shout and scream. At times of heavy, fierce fighting, an irritable attitude and shouting on the part of the commander not only fail to motivate, but also instantly reduce the force of orders and directives and serve to make the situation more confusing. When persons on the lower echelon hear upper echelon commanders shouting, when they see that upper echelon commanders are short tempered, some of them remark: "They are more confused and panic-stricken than anyone else." This observation is correct. Cadres must learn from experience and not hastily find fault with subordinates.

In combat, an order from the commander demands unconditional compliance by everyone. However, experience has shown that the force of an order does not rest solely upon the authority of the person issuing it, but also depends upon the respect and trust that the masses have in their commander and their political cadre pervading the thinking and feelings of lower echelon cadres and all soldiers in combat, in work and in everyday life.

4. Rear service and technical support in combat are an important component of the fighting strength of the basic unit. Party-political work must be closely tied to technical support and rear service support work as well as to military work. Combat has been lasting for many days, has been continuous day and night and has been occurring at base complexes that lie at high altitudes in rugged, steep terrain where transportation is difficult and roads are blocked by enemy artillery, thus cutting the front off from the rear. Consequently, rear service and technical support work must involve many different methods to overcome these difficulties in order to insure that basic units can fight continuously and win victory.

In party-political work, it is necessary, on the basis of the nature of the combat mission, to adopt plans to provide specific ideological and organizational leadership and effectively assist the rear service and technical support sectors in completing their tasks well. With respect to basic units, the quartermaster and transport components are the components whose operations are the most difficult, are the components that work the hardest. Each day, the troops fighting at bases must be served two meals of hot rice and vegetable soup and they must be able to bathe, to wash and change their clothes once every several days in order to maintain their health and insure that they are able to fight for many days. The forces that transport weapons and ammunition up to combat positions and take wounded soldiers back to the rear within the range of enemy firepower must be well organized, their activities must be thoroughly planned and they must be trained and participate in maneuvers in order to develop the spirit and skills needed to perform their mission. Attention must also be given to providing the military medical stations in the rear with leadership, to cultivating their sense of

responsibility and love toward their comrades and the members of their unit so that they do their very best to provide wounded and ill soldiers with emergency medical care and quickly restore these soldiers to health so that they can return to their combat unit.

While it is impossible to mention all the specific details they involve, you should remember that rear service and technical support work is related to the fighting strength and the long-range buildup of troops. The command cadres and political cadres of basic units must be persons who directly and concretely express the views, the responsibility and the love of the party, of the people to cadres and soldiers.

5. While engaged in combat, every effort must be made to propagandize and proselytize enemy soldiers and shatter their ranks. Acts of aggression and annexation and unjust acts cannot deceive or be concealed from anyone. Sooner or later, the people and soldiers of China will come to see the nature of the reactionaries in power. Moreover, Chinese society is now being split between rich and poor and the interests of Chinese soldiers and their families are not being furthered in any way. Thus, they will come to understand that they, too, are being oppressed and have lost their freedom and, when they do, they will not readily allow the reactionary authorities to squander their lives to serve the political schemes and hegemonist designs of the reactionaries. Although Chinese soldiers have been indoctrinated in the very arrogant and presumptuous thinking of great Han chauvinism, the history of nations to survive and develop shows that once they have been dealt painful blows, all "horsemen," "supermen," "civilizers"...quickly give up and accept shameful defeat. Although the burning ambition of Chinese expansionism and hegemony is to rule the world, Chinese expansionism and hegemony bowed before the flag of Japanese militarism, forgetting all the hatred and shame that time cannot erase. The Chinese aggressor army is large and has many weapons but is not strong. The reasons for this are both political and historical. On the basis of these inherent traits and in view of the glorious cause of socialist Vietnam, we are firmly confident that we will awaken the soldiers and people of China.

When engaged in enemy proselyting, you should not think that you can begin in the morning and achieve results by the afternoon or evening. Facts have shown that only when enemy proselyting efforts are repeated many times is it possible to make gradual, permanent inroads and possible, at some point in time, to make an impact and cause an explosion. The expeditionary army of the colonialists and imperialists, armies bent on conquering and civilizing other nations, ultimately had to accept defeat at the hands of our armed forces and people. Painful blows and persuasion, persuasion and painful blows, our just cause and strength will bring us victory.

To perform this important work well, we must educate our cadres and soldiers so that they clearly understand that while we are persons that bear arms, we are also persons who have a just cause and truth on our side. Appealing to and persuading enemy soldiers exemplify the confidence, the just cause, the noble spirit of the Vietnamese.

6. On the battlefield and in combat, strictly complying with the policies of the party and state is an important requirement in increasing locally available combined strength and the ability to tenaciously fight for long periods of time. The ethnic minorities that have been living along our country's northern border for generations joined efforts with the entire country to achieve the glorious cause of the nation and are now working hard along with the rest of the country to build and defend the socialist Vietnamese fatherland. The ethnic minorities are patriotic and have been educated in socialism, consequently, they have made progress in many respects. However, their level of economic development, their standard of living and their cultural standards are, generally speaking, still low and the enemy is making every effort to use, divide and sabotage them; therefore, they still face many difficulties. In addition, unwholesome customs and habits still linger from the past. In the new stage of the revolution, the relations between the armed forces and civilians are relations of persons who are the masters of their country's destiny, the masters of politics, the economy and the national defense system, the masters of all efforts to build and defend the socialist fatherland. The aims of the nationalities policy of the party and state are to achieve a combined strength and bring a beautiful life to the ethnic minorities. Therefore, compliance with the nationalities policy by our cadres and soldiers on the battlefield is of important political significance. Their relations with the ethnic minorities must be relation of full equality and unity. They must fully respect and protect the property and life of the people and assist the people in combat, production and life because the happiness of the people is the basic combat objective of our party and the people's armed forces, is that which brings happiness and joy to the soldier. To do otherwise, even if only in something of minor importance, is to harm the revolution and serve the interests of the enemy.

As a result of the combat objective, of the character and traditions of the people's army, the spirit of comradeship and the relations among the members of the unit are, in normal times, the spirit and relations of true political-moral equality and love and respect for one another; in battle, they are standing shoulder to shoulder to fight and win victory over the enemy. In combat, every possible step is taken, every price is paid to bring wounded soldiers to the rear for emergency medical treatment and devoted care. Those comrades who are killed while performing their duty must be given a proper burial. This is not merely a spirit, a point of view, rather, it is truly a specific, detailed organizational job for which thorough preparations must be made prior to and in the course of combat on the frontline, in the rear and even behind enemy lines. We must educate the military medical personnel on the frontlines as well as in the rear so that they display a full sense of love and responsibility and care for and nurture wounded soldiers back to health on behalf of the party, the state and the people. Thorough compliance with the policy concerning soldiers who have been wounded or killed is a matter of principle, of duty and responsibility, absolutely not a matter of doing someone a favor. The commander and political cadre cannot talk about their position, their responsibility and prestige if they do not fully concern themselves with this work.

Our people and armed forces are determined to resist the aggressors. When they send forces across the border to attack our country, we must wipe them

out, capture them or force them to surrender. However, once they have been captured or have surrendered, we must comply with the policy on soldiers that have been taken prisoner or have surrendered. If this policy is implemented well, prisoners of war will, when released and sent back to their country, exert a good influence within their families, within their rear area, thus spreading the force of the just cause and the humanitarianism of Vietnam far and wide and exerting far reaching influence among the soldiers and people of China. A correct, positive action is more effective than thousands of pieces of paper. One good word spoken about us by an enemy soldier released by us is more powerful than weapons and ammunition. It is correct to fight hard but to violate the policy on prisoners of war and soldiers who surrender is to detract from the character and diminish the force of the just cause of our people's army.

7. Once a thorough understanding of the combat mission has been gained and the combat plan has been formed, deploying leadership forces to each unit and assigning a task to each party member are a necessary job in developing a sure guarantee of victory. These forces must be deployed in a manner that is consistent with the level and capabilities of each party member and Youth Union member and these forces should not be intermixed to any great extent.

What must be given attention is that regardless of whether the basic unit's corps of party members is large or small, it is still necessary to uphold the role of the Ho Chi Minh Communist Youth Union chapter and assign a task to each Youth Union member. Regardless of how rational the deployment of these forces might be, it is still necessary in the course of combat to motivate each person and remind each person of what they must do. Many comrades have correctly stated that it is very difficult for party members and Youth Union members who do not set a good example in their studies, training and everyday work to talk to troops. The same applies in combat. The leadership role of a party member in whom the masses have little trust is very limited. On the other hand, we must also realize that our cadres and soldiers are very fair and unbiased. If a party member has a weakness or deficiency but sees his shortcoming and sincerely rectifies it, he regains the trust of troops and, in addition, grows and matures with each passing day. This matter must be thoroughly analyzed in the activities of the party.

8. In the course of combat, basic units must promptly learn from experience so that they can apply what they learn in practice and immediately increase their fighting strength. After a battle, it is necessary to organize a thorough review of experience in order to provide the corps of cadres and party members with additional training. Through the reviews that are conducted, it is necessary to evaluate and accept new party members and Youth Union members in order to strengthen leadership and command capabilities.

A review of experience must be accurate in order to be of value. This fight will continue for a long time. Failing in one attempt, the enemy will try something else. Therefore, the experience gained in one battle must be augmented by fresh experience gained in the next battle. Only by reviewing the experiences gained in combat well is it possible to bolster and increase our real capabilities, possible to tie theory to practice so that cadres constantly develop their talents and grow and mature in every respect.

The above are some of the specific requirements in combat that the party-political work conducted within basic units must meet. A plan must be adopted for performing this work in all three stages: preparations for combat, the actual process of combat and the conclusion of combat. The political departments of the military regions and military corps must concentrate on combat missions even more, actively assist the corps of basic level cadres, provide them with more intensive and thorough training, put the party-political work of the basic units on a regular basis and constantly heighten its effectiveness, thereby helping to build basic units that possess high fighting strength and win victory.

7809

CSO: 4209/631

MILITARY AFFAIRS AND PUBLIC SECURITY

SENIOR GENERAL CHU HUY MAN ATTENDS MEETING

BK281313 Hanoi Domestic Service in Vietnamese 1400 GMT 27 Sep 85

[Summary] On the morning of 20 September 1985, the first all-army gala get-together of young propagandists was held at the conference of the B-50 Group in the 3d Military Region. Attending were more than 250 young propagandists belonging to 13 groups from various areas, such as the border province of Ha Tuyen and the far western part of Cambodia.

"Present at the gala get-together of young propagandists were Senior General Chu Huy Man, member of the party Central Committee Political Bureau and head of the VPA Political General Department; Colonel General Nguyen Quyet, member of the party Central Committee and commander of the 3d Military Region; Vu Mao, member of the party Central Committee and first secretary of the Ho Chi Minh Communist Youth Union Central Committee; Lieutenant General Dan Vu Hiep, member of the party Central Committee and deputy head of the VPA Political General Department; and many other delegates and officials in charge of youth affairs inside and outside the armed forces."

After the presentation of garlands to the delegates by members of the Ho Chi Minh Vanguard Teenagers Brigade, Colonel (Nguyen Van Thuoc), head of the Army Youth Department, delivered an opening speech, pointing out "the results obtained in the youth propaganda and education task," and saying that "this all-army gala get-together of young propagandists is aimed at reviewing leadership and guidance activities of various echelons, drawing on experiences, achieving a uniformity of views, and defining new operating procedures for propagandists groups to be applied permanently at the grass-roots level from now on."

Following the opening procedures, participating propagandists groups gave an art performance. A delegate from the Cuu Long military corps now operating in Cambodia expressed his opinion, saying that he was very impressed by the repertoires performed by various propagandists groups. A female member of the 7th Military Region Propagandists Group also said that her group's repertoire was highly welcomed by the audience.

"At this get-together, participating young propagandists were highly elated and deeply moved at having a cordial meeting with comrades Chu Huy Man,

Nguyen Quyet, Vu Mao, Dang Vu Hiep, and many officials in charge of youth affairs inside and outside of the armed forces."

After viewing a number of repertoires performed by the 1st, 4th, 7th Military Region Propagandists Groups, Comrade Vu Mao expressed his opinion. "He highly valued the quality of various repertoires," saying that "this shows a new, higher step of development, both in terms of substance and form."

On the closing day, after presenting prizes to various outstanding groups and individuals, Comrade Dang Vu Hiep also spoke, "stressing the great significance of the gala get-together" and saying that the get-together helped "augment the unity and mutual understanding among young members of the armed forces."

CSO: 4209/3

MILITARY AFFAIRS AND PUBLIC SECURITY

HOANG VAN THAI ARTICLE ON ARMY HEROISM, PART 1

BK261136 Hanoi NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 21 Aug 85 p 2

[First installment of article by Senior General Hoang Van Thai: "Heroic People, Heroic Army"]

[Text] Our entire country is jubilantly celebrating the 40th anniversary of the success of the general uprising staged by all our people to overthrow the rule of the feudalist imperialists and establish the Democratic Republic of Vietnam--the first worker-peasant state in Southeast Asia and the bastion of revolution in the Indochinese peninsula.

This occasion also highlights the stable existence and constant development of the revolutionary state and the new social system through 40 stormy years as well as the total triumph of Vietnamese revolutionary heroism over all ferocious and brutal enemy aggressors known for their cunning, numerical strength, and powerful force, over all types of modern weapons and war strategies, and over all difficulties, hardships, fierce trials, and sacrifices.

The Vietnamese nation--as clearly recorded in history--has developed a heroic spirit since the dawn of history when the kings of the Hung Dynasty founded the country. This heroic spirit, preserved and developed by the entire people through 4,000 years of national defense and construction, has become a precious tradition and an extraordinary source of strength. This tradition of heroism has reached its pinnacle, especially since our party was founded to undertake the historic mission of leading the Vietnamese revolution and enabling our nation to enter the era of independence, freedom, and socialism and to join the vanguard rank of nations in the worldwide struggle against imperialism.

This is Vietnamese revolutionary heroism in the Ho Chi Minh era--the crystallization of patriotism, the greatest spiritual strength of the Vietnamese nation, and Marxism-Leninism, the most progressive revolutionary ideology of our time.

Vietnamese revolutionary heroism is heroism upheld collectively by the whole nation. It is the heroic spirit displayed by all the compatriots and combatants who fight and make sacrifices for the interests of the collective; and it has caused the emergence of heroic collectives in an ever-increasing

number. It can be said that during the 4,000 years of national defense and construction, never before had the heroic quality, heroic tradition, and heroism of the Vietnamese people been developed to such a high level as they were during the Ho Chi Minh era; and never before had they taken on a very deep and broad popular character as they did during the anti-French and anti-U.S. wars.

The August Revolution was truly an epic of millions of people who dared to rise up with bare hands to knock down the enemy, rapidly smash the old system, and establish the new system, not allowing the reactionary forces both inside and outside the country to react in time. It was an event unprecedented in our country, where in a very short period of time--about 10 days--tens of millions of patriotic people in all the provinces, cities, districts, and villages from north to south who would not resign themselves to a life of slavery and who were armed chiefly with daggers and machettes stormed into the strongholds of the enemy and rapidly occupied all their positions. This general uprising in Vietnam, the only one that was successful in Southeast Asia following World War II, not only symbolizes our party's masterful leadership over armed uprisings but also clearly reflects the collective heroism displayed by the whole nation when a historic opportunity presented itself only once in 1,000 years.

When the French aggressors invaded our country again, our nation's collective heroism was developed to an even broader and higher extent. As the war spread throughout the country, the entire nation stood up to wage a war of national salvation and defense--a truly all-people war. Examples of combat and sacrifice emerged everywhere--from Viet Bac, the capital of the resistance movement, to the battlefield behind the enemy line in Central Vietnam; from the Red River Delta to the Mekong Delta; and so on. Under the leadership of the party and President Ho, our entire people resolutely fought the enemy for national salvation. Every village became a fortress; and every city street, a battlefield--with the people effectively checking the enemy's advance during the early days with virtually nothing but wooden staffs and their bravery. The French aggressors brazenly carried out the "3-destruction" policy of killing all, burning all, and levelling all; but throughout the 9 years of resistance, they could claim no provinces and cities and virtually no districts as "white zones." This was because in every part of our country, there were people who deeply loved the fatherland, valiant and stalwart combatants, and heroic children of the fatherland. And finally, our nation won a victory at Dien Bien which "shook the five continents," reaching the zenith of revolutionary heroism during the anti-French resistance.

During the anti-U.S. resistance struggle, the collective heroism of our nation developed a step further, both in breadth and depth. This was a great leap forward in Vietnam's revolutionary heroism during the special period of the historic clash between the Vietnamese nation and the U.S. imperialists, mankind's number one enemy. In both the southern and northern parts of our country, on the major frontline as well as in the great rear area, throughout the 20 years of fierce combat, there were 700 or more heroes and thousands of heroic collectives whose names will go down in history forever. How about the

countless unknown heroes and combatants who sacrificed themselves silently deep in the jungle, high on mountains, far off in the seas, and even within the enemy ranks. The number of these unknown heroes is not in the hundreds, but in the hundreds of thousands or more. In the millennial history of our nation, never before had there appeared so many great collectives of heroic people as during the anti-U.S. struggle. On the great southern frontline, besides the heroic liberation troops, there were the political forces, the force of "long-haired soldiers" which included millions of mothers and sisters who throughout 20 years confronted the enemy troops and although having no weapons in hand frightened the enemy to death. Meanwhile, in the great socialist northern rear area, besides millions of outstanding youths who cut through the Truong Son mountain range on the path to save the country, there were countless mothers and wives who enthusiastically saw off their most beloved relatives to the southern battlefield to fight the U.S. troops, save the country, and fulfill their international duties on the Lao and Cambodian battlefields. During the anti-U.S. struggle hundreds of thousands more combatants were courageously clinging to the roads day and night to fight the enemy and defend communications and transportation from the rear to the frontline in the spirit of "singing to drown the blast of bombs." All the people in the rear strived to "work twice as much," holding "a plow in one hand and a rifle in the other" or "a hammer in one hand and a rifle in the other" under the movements of "youth's three readiness" or "women's three responsibilities." All of them constituted very heroic forces for national salvation in the most glorious period of the nation. The largest developmental step of revolutionary heroism of the Vietnamese nation during that glorious period was the 1975 spring general offensive and uprising capped by the historic Ho Chi Minh campaign which totally liberated the south and regained independence and unification for the country.

In the past 40 years since the founding of the country, some 2,000 or more collectives and individuals in the people's armed forces have been cited by the state as heroes, the most glorious title of our country. This year, cadres and people in 40 provinces and cities countrywide have been awarded the gold star order--the highest award in our country--by the state.

So stated, in today's era, heroic character and acts can be seen not only in some individuals, units and scattered localities but also in many people and major and minor collectives and in the greatest collective that is the entire heroic Vietnamese nation.

Vietnam's revolutionary heroism is manifested by our courage, indomitableness, stalwartness, determination to fight and win, revolutionary offensive spirit, and determination to fight until the last minute to liberate the nation and defend the homeland. As a result of the objective, natural, and social conditions, the Vietnamese nation has for thousands of years had to cope with countless enemy threats and natural disasters. It is mainly due to this centuries-long struggle that our nation has become steady in the face of all stormy events and sinister enemy schemes. Can there be another such nation able to stand firmly and advance like this in the face of such great ordeals, serious events and at such dangerous times?

"During the thousand years of Chinese domination" the great Han Chinese feudalists sought every measures to exterminate or assimilate us. However, our people preserved their national character and finally chased the aggressors out, opening the era of independence for the great Veit nation.

The subsequent "1000 years of independence" of our nation was also a time for the northern feudalists and expansionists to constantly pursue their schemes of annexing and enslaving the Vietnamese nation by waging large-scale wars involving from 200,000 to 300,000 and up to 500,000 soldiers--as they did to annex and assimilate many other nations. However, the Vietnamese nation always remains steady and gloriously victorious. We defeated the Sung twice, the Ywan and Mong three times, and even the Ming and Qing.

Then, the "100 years of domination" by the French colonialists made the Vietnamese people's life miserable because they had to live like slaves and stage countless unsuccessful struggles. There seemed to be no way out. Finally, the vanguard party with its scientific and revolutionary Marxist-Leninist line took the lead. At a time when millions of people had died of starvation, tens of millions of others rose up to stage the victorious general uprising and win over the administration for the people.

When the French troops aggressively returned to invade our country with a professional army equipped with aircraft, tanks, and guns, our troops and people only had bamboo sticks, rifles, and grenades. Nevertheless, our troops and people were still able to check their advance and defeat them, forcing them to withdraw from the northern part of our country.

When hundreds of thousands of U.S. troops rushed to the south and used thousands of airplanes to attack the north, they thought they could "crush the southern liberation troops" and "push the north back to the stone age." However, our compatriots and combatants in both the north and the south remained indomitable with their revolutionary offensive spirit and, under the party's banner of national independence and socialism, resolved to heavily defeat the U.S. imperialists, frustrate their scheme of aggression, and finally force them to roll up their flag and totally withdraw from the southern part of our country.

During the years of resistance for national salvation, the thinking and action of all party members, people, and troops was to fight and sacrifice themselves for the fatherland's independence and freedom, to liberate the south and defend the north, and to unify the country with the slogan; "Everything for the frontline! Everything for victory!"

Faced with the serious ordeals of foreign aggression, speeches of pathos have echoed in our country since time immemorial. Recall, for example, Tran Hung Dao's appeal to the generals and troops the eloquent poems in Nguyen Trai's famous communique on the victory over Wu, Ly Thuong Kiet's poem "Make the enemy know that the heroic southern country has a master" and other poems by Quang Trung, all reflecting the profound aspiration and iron-like determination of all our people who not only have clearly manifested their national heroism at those junctures, but have also handed down to succeeding generations the sacred oath taken by each Vietnamese every time the country is in danger.

MILITARY AFFAIRS AND PUBLIC SECURITY

HOANG VAN THAI ON ARMY HEROISM, PART 2

BK271200 Hanoi NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 22 Aug 85 pp 1, 4

[Second installment of article by Senior General Hoang Van Thai: "Heroic People, Heroic Army"]

[Text] However, it was not until the Ho Chi Minh era that the Vietnamese people's revolutionary heroism, indomitable and undaunted strength, determination to fight and to win, revolutionary offensive spirit, and determination to fight until the end for national liberation and defense were demonstrated in the fullest, most profound, and most concise fashion through great President Ho Chi Minh's remarks, directives, and statements. Prior to the August Revolution, he said: "We must regain independence and freedom even if we have to burn down the whole Truong Son mountain range." When the French colonialists returned to invade our country, he again said: "We would rather sacrifice all than lose the country and be enslaved." When the U.S. imperialists were massively introducing hundreds of thousands of troops into southern Vietnam, he asserted: "Our people are determined to defeat the U.S. aggressors totally even if we have to fight for 5, 10, or 20 years." When the U.S. imperialists announced their troop withdrawal in a crafty and perfunctory manner, he pointed out: "So long as there remains a single aggressor in our country, we will have to continue to fight." In his testament made before his death and left behind for our entire party, people, and armed forces, he gave this advice: "We must be determined to fight the U.S. aggressors until total victory even if the anti-U.S. struggle for national salvation is prolonged and if our compatriots have to make more sacrifices in human lives and property. So long as the country and people still exist following our victory over the U.S. aggressors, we will rebuild our country 10 times more beautiful than it is now." As everyone knows, President Ho Chi Minh's unforgettable statement that "Nothing is more precious than independence and freedom" has become not only a *raison d'etre* for all the Vietnamese people and their nation but also a truth of our time, and the highest symbol of our nation's heroic bearing.

Vietnamese revolutionary heroism should be reflected not only through spirit and determination but also through talent, intelligence, creativity, and through the science and art of fighting all enemies no matter how large and strong they may be. Our forefathers' resourcefulness is fighting the enemy for national salvation in the old days continues to be an invaluable heritage

for their descendants today. This can be seen through the ideas of having all the country fight the enemy, relying chiefly on the people, using a great cause as a means to triumph over brutality, replacing violence with human kindness, regarding all the people as soldiers and having all garrison troops work as peasants, using villages as combat positions; and through the adoption of a highly flexible combat tactics of relying both on the people and on the labyrinthine mountain and river terrains, and keeping the enemy from developing their advantages while exploiting their weaknesses in fighting and defeating them.

During the August Revolution and the resistance against the French, the resourcefulness of the Vietnamese people and their art of fighting the enemy developed extensively. When the resistance against the Americans was underway, the people's intelligence, creativity, sharpness, and wisdom developed to the fullest. We always firmly grasped the concept of revolutionary violence together with the concepts of military and political forces. We also knew how to use all the forms and modes of struggle, including diplomatic struggle with the use of negotiations when necessary and of legal measures when conditions permit. We fully understood the decisive role of fighting on various battlefields, of the results of attacks designed to destroy the enemy, and of the balance of forces between our forces and the enemy's. We also attached great importance to the role of the struggle to win world public opinion and enlist the support of the world people, including the people inside enemy countries. We applied the strategy of launching resolute and repeated attacks and based ourselves on the factors of stature, strength, and timing to defeat the enemy gradually and foil the enemy's schemes one after another before proceeding toward achieving total victory.

During the revolutionary war in the south against the U.S. neocolonialist war of aggression, we understood about armed struggle--a typical form of war--and also attached great importance to the political struggle, a special form of the revolutionary struggle in the south. We succeeded in forming a political army comprising millions of people. This well organized political army, skilled in the art of struggle, became one of the two important strategic forces determining our victory in the war. During the war, we grasped the all-people concept as we motivated, organized, armed, and directed all the people to fight the enemy, thus forcing the enemy to spread out and split up to cope with the fierce resistance of a whole nation. We also knew how to use the people's armed forces and the people's army as a backbone. We paid particular attention to the role of the main force's "blow" as we quickly built and developed various armed services and combat branches, especially mobile strategic corps. We set up tactical-strategic armies which, with high mobility, were capable of launching lightning raids and large-scale destructive attacks, thus virtually changing the balance of power between the enemy and friendly forces and quickly leading to a conclusion of the war. The strategic Dien Bien Phu battle and the 1975 spring general offensive and uprising were a case in point. During the anti-U.S. war of resistance, we launched the "year of the monkey" Tet offensive to weaken the enemy's aggressive willpower and force them to wind down the war at a time when they were pushing the war to a climax. Afterward, we fought so cleverly that the

U.S. troops had to "withdraw completely" from the southern part of our country, thus tipping the balance of forces in our favor and finally causing the "complete downfall" of the puppet army and administration. We achieved our ultimate goals of liberating the south, unifying the country, and advancing the entire country toward socialism. As for the imperialist United States, it was forced to accept a heavy and bitter defeat unprecedented in its history. These victories over the French and the Americans will always be great epics of the Vietnamese nation in the Ho Chi Minh era.

The Vietnamese revolutionary heroism is a pinnacle of the Vietnamese heroism in the new era--the era of proletarian revolution led by a Marxist-Leninist party. It stems not only from national awareness but also from a class awareness that patriotism must be based on the working class' view and that patriotism must be linked with socialism and proletarian internationalism. This was aimed not only at liberating the nation from the aggressors' enslaving ruling yoke but also at liberating society and the laboring people and doing away with oppression, exploitation, backwardness, and poverty. Far from being motivated by existing concrete, and essential benefits, Vietnamese revolutionary heroism was directed at attaining basic and long-term objectives such as: after defeating the enemy, both externally and internally, efforts were to be made to radically discard the old social regime, build a new social system--and a collective mastery system--and build a modern, bountiful, and happy life in the independence and freedom of a socialist Vietnamese fatherland.

The Vietnamese revolutionary heroism of the Ho Chi Minh era calls on us to struggle and sacrifice not only for our own national interest but also for the common interests of other fraternal nations in the world. This is because the Vietnamese revolution is an important component of the world revolution. Every victory of the Vietnamese revolution is also a common victory of the world revolution, and every victory of each country in the world constitutes support for the Vietnamese revolution. The Vietnamese people regard every victory of their national revolution over their country's invading enemy as a contribution to weakening the common enemy of various nations in the world and to augmenting the offensive strength of the three revolutionary currents of our time and as a demonstration of our nation's efforts to fulfill its international obligations. Our party and people are united and bound together with the Soviet Union and other fraternal socialist countries as well as with the world communist and workers movement. We have wholeheartedly supported the national liberation movement of various Asian, African, and Latin American countries. With Laos and Cambodia in particular--the two fraternal and close neighboring nations which are in the same situation and which share the same goal of fighting the common enemy--our Vietnamese people have adopted a correct attitude when it comes to fulfilling their international obligations. We have always reserved our faithful and pure internationalism-oriented sentiments for them. For decades now, many of our cadres and combatants have been fighting and sacrificing in the fraternal countries of Laos and Cambodia, regarding what they are doing for Laos and Cambodia as being for their own country. In the struggle for this great cause, hundreds of our cadres and combatants and hundreds of our units have been awarded the hero title for

having outstandingly fulfilled their lofty international obligations. Tens of thousands of our international fighters from several generations operating in our friends' territories have left behind untold fine impressions of the heartfelt international sentiments of the Vietnamese people and their revolutionary heroism. Comrade Kaysone Phomvihane, general secretary of the LPRP Central Committee, said: "Those Vietnamese cadres, combatants, and people carrying out the Vietnam Workers Party's instructions and President Ho's advice about going to Laos to help the Lao revolution have upheld the spirit of proletarian internationalism and have shared weal and woe. They have kept the harder part of work for themselves while leaving the easier part for friends to do, have fought side by side with their friends, and have loved and cared for the Lao people like their own parents and brothers. Many of them have sacrificed their lives for the Lao people's revolutionary cause." (Footnote: Salutory speech at the fourth CPV Congress.) Comrade Heng Samrin, general secretary of the KPRP Central Committee, also said: "Our people have, for many succeeding generations now, noted that for the sake of the three Indochinese countries' revolutionary undertaking, the Vietnamese people have had to make untold sacrifices in an extremely hard and long struggle unprecedented in world history. No words can describe the feelings of Vietnamese mothers from various generations when they sent their beloved sons off to fight side by side with our compatriots. No words could describe the length of the silent steps that the communist combatants of the two countries have made while walking side by side, crossing numerous mountains, rivers, hills, and streams to defeat the common enemy and regain independence and freedom for the two nations. For our entire party and people, the name "Vietnam" is sacred, as Vietnam represents revolutionary heroism and is synonymous with proletarian internationalism. Vietnam stands for pure thinking, faithful love, close unity, and lofty sacrifice." (Footnote: Salutory speech at the fifth CPV Congress.)

Steeped in the three revolutionary currents and constantly attacking imperialism, during the years of the anti-U.S. resistance for national salvation our Vietnamese people "bore the brunt" of the heroic struggle of the whole of mankind against U.S. imperialism--the biggest, most aggressive, and most powerful enemy of our time. As Vietnam was regarded during the anti-U.S. war years as a symbol of the world revolutionary movement, Vietnamese revolutionary heroism now is also regarded by friends, near and far, as symbolizing the revolutionary heroism of various anti-imperialist nations in the world.

With these typical characteristics, the Vietnamese revolutionary heroism has been reflected generally in party military and political lines and in the guidelines for the revolution and the revolutionary war of the party Central Committee and its Political Bureau. Party lines and guidance from the center have demonstrated the heroic bearing of our people. Not only have they demonstrated our indomitable willpower, our revolutionary offensive zeal, and our determination to defeat all invading enemies but they also reflect the wonderful combination between our revolutionary enthusiasm and our revolutionary wisdom, between our resolute and daring characters and our calmness and clearheadedness, and between our persistence and endurance as shown in our nearly 50 years of carrying out the revolutionary struggle for national

liberation and of winning one victory after another. We made a quick decision to deal a final lightning blow to the enemy. Within only 50 days and nights, we succeeded in scoring a total victory for the nation, for the revolution, and for the present and future generations.

For the Vietnamese people, as already shown by history, revolutionary heroism is a great strength. It is not only an invincible moral strength but also a great material strength--the strength in talents, art, organization, and actions. Facts show that Vietnamese revolutionary heroism is an invincible strength--a basic factor for successfully implementing various strategic tasks arising during the revolution, the revolutionary war, the national democratic revolution, the socialist revolution, and the struggle for national liberation and defense as well as during the course of productive labor, economic construction, and national construction. The great strength of the Vietnamese revolutionary heroism has been time and again demonstrated, most prominently during the many turning points of the revolution and the revolutionary war, at the beginning and the end of a war, and especially at times when the national situation requires a great sacrifice for national salvation and defense or when there is a need to concentrate the greatest efforts on scoring a decisive and final victory.

Over the past 10 years, since the total victory of the liberation war, while the entire country was advancing toward socialism, the Vietnamese people have again had to experience new ordeals. Before the country had enough time to heal the wounds of war and overcome the severe consequences of colonialism, our people had to cope with a new, extremely cruel and malicious enemy--the Chinese expansionist-hegemonist clique--whose open and brazen betrayal is not fully predictable. They waged two large-scale wars of aggression at the two different ends of the country in the hope of subjugating us or, at least, forcing us to back down. Now they are waging a multifaceted war of sabotage and a land-grabbing war at the border. Despite this, the Vietnamese people are indomitable. We continue to stand firm. We will never back down but will continue to move forward.

Now that the Vietnamese people have emerged from their difficult ordeals, our national revolution will certainly be able to continue to make ever-steadier headway.

The enemy is still hatching many brutal and malicious schemes and tricks aimed at weakening, subjugating, and annexing our country despite the set backs they suffered in their wars of aggression and sabotage. Notwithstanding their continued stubbornness and their perfidious machinations, the current trend of development is inevitable: We will certainly be victorious and the enemy will certainly be defeated.

Our country is still beset with numerous difficulties, including unavoidable difficulties resulting from many decades of war and from the enemy's constant sabotage efforts to weaken and annex our country. Also prevalent are difficulties arising in the initial stage of transition as our country is advancing directly toward socialism from a mainly small production-based economy in an

unprecedented fashion. We must work while gaining experience and making constant improvements. There are also difficulties resulting from errors and shortcomings in socioeconomic and state management. The fourth and fifth party congresses held in the past few years chalked up many correct lines while the many party Central Committee's plenums and Political Bureau's meetings have concretized these lines into increasingly perfect policies. The resolution of the party Central Committee's eighth plenum held recently pointed out that one of the gravest errors and shortcomings committed recently was the prolonging of centralism, bureaucracy, and subsidization. This resolution also put forth correct policies and drastic measures aimed at overcoming these errors and shortcomings in order to move our national economy ahead. This is regarded as a daring and clear-sighted decision. This time the discarding of bureaucracy and subsidization has become a big issue of the socialist revolution in our country, a real revolution in economic management and a main goal of the revolution itself. This requires a high determination, revolutionary zeal, scientific methods, and a combined strength. It also requires that we develop our revolutionary heroism on the production and economic management fronts as well as on the national construction front in a comprehensive manner.

Today we enjoy many favorable conditions, both objectively and subjectively and both at home and abroad. We enjoy the close solidarity, all-round cooperation, and wholehearted assistance from the Soviet Union and other fraternal socialist countries. We enjoy the strategic and combat alliance with the two fraternal countries of Laos and Cambodia through our extraordinary relations with these two countries. Especially, we have correct revolutionary lines, a very heroic people and a very heroic army which has been tempered and tested through many years of revolutionary struggle, including the national democratic revolution and the socialist revolution; and has accumulated a great deal of rich and valuable experience in national construction and defense. Our people's socialist revolution will certainly be able to make gradual and still-steadier headway. This is an inevitable trend of our people in the present era.

Whatever the situation, revolutionary heroism will always continue to be an extraordinary strength of our people and an indispensable condition for implementing successfully the two strategic tasks of our national revolution, namely successfully building socialism and firmly defending the socialist Vietnamese fatherland. Our motto is "all for the socialist fatherland and for the people's happiness."

CSO: 4209/3

MILITARY AFFAIRS AND PUBLIC SECURITY

BRIEFS

KIEN GIANG TROOP RECRUITMENT--Kien Giang Province has completed the second phase of troop recruitment for 1985, fulfilling 103.6 percent of the planned target. Among the youths called up for induction into the army in this phase were 26 members of the CPV and 708 members of the Ho Chi Minh Communist Youth Union. Phu Quoc, Giong Rieng, Tan Hiep, Chau Thanh, and Ha Tien districts and Rach Gia City have fulfilled 105-4-133.3 percent of the planned target. Thus, this year Kien Giang made many welcome changes in calling up youths for military service. This is due to the close coordination among various sectors, branches, and mass organizations; to the youth union's constant efforts to educate youths in the union's traditions; and to the satisfactory implementation of the army's welfare policy. [Text] [Hanoi Domestic Service in Vietnamese 1430 GMT 17 Sep 85 BK]

QUANG NINH MILITIA FORCES--Military organs at various levels in Quang Ninh Province has paid attention to consolidating and developing the militia and self-defense forces. To date, inspection of quality has been conducted by 177 militia units of various villages, city wards, and towns and 433 self-defense units of various central and local sectors, organs, and enterprises in the province. [Summary] [Hanoi Domestic Service in Vietnamese 1430 GMT 22 Sep 85 BK]

CSO: 4209/3

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, TRADE, AND AID

HANOI SCORES 'DISTORTION' IN SHULTZ' UN ADDRESS

BK251658 Hanoi Domestic Service in Vietnamese 1430 GMT 25 Sep 85

[Radio editor's "article": "The United States Once Again Resorts to Distortion and Slander"]

[Text] In his 28-page address at the UN General Assembly, the U.S. secretary of state once again took advantage of this international forum to spread slander and distort the situation in Central America, Afghanistan, and Cambodia, the countries where the United States is [words indistinct].

To disguise this distortion, Shultz was compelled to talk about the South African people's current struggle for freedom, but he avoided condemning the South African racists, who are acting with U.S. connivance and protection. Shultz cunningly likened the objectives of the South African people's struggle against apartheid to the U.S. abetment and instigation of the reactionaries in Central America, Afghanistan, and Cambodia to oppose the peaceful life of the people in these countries. Shultz shamelessly called the activities of these reactionaries movements for national liberation and against dictatorship and hailed the U.S. henchmen in these countries as freedom fighters.

We all know that in these regions, the United States continues to collude closely with reactionary elements in a bid to eliminate the freedom and democracy recently won by the peoples of the various countries. In Nicaragua, the United States has made a show of force by sending its warships close to the territorial waters of that country. It has also joined with Honduras, Costa Rica, and El Salvador in staging war games as a means to gradually dispatch large U.S. armed forces units to the Nicaraguan border. Nicaraguan reactionaries have been rallied and trained by the United States on Honduran, Salvadoran, and Costa Rican soil for surreptitious incursions into Nicaragua to carry out sabotage and foment armed rebellions.

In reality, the United States continues to command Central American reactionaries to use military force to invade and overthrow the Sandinist revolutionary administration of Nicaragua while Washington steps up its political mud-slinging campaign against this country and undermines the Contadora group's plan to restore peace in Central America.

With regard to Afghanistan and Cambodia, the United States is also carrying out a scheme it calls a movement in support of freedom and democracy as it already does in Nicaragua. After openly giving the Afghan rebels \$5 million in aid in fiscal 1985-86, the United States has also increased its aid to the various Cambodian reactionary factions from \$3 to \$5 million.

The United States calls it non-military humanitarian aid. In reality, with this amount of money, the United States expects to feed the Afghan and Cambodian counterrevolutionaries for a little longer in the game of sabotaging the peaceful life of the peoples of these countries.

In addition the United States has comprehensively increased its support for the dictatorial military ruling circles of Pakistan in order to turn them into an effective tool to sabotage security and stability in South West Asia. The U.S. imperialists' hands are poking deep into these places to oppose the freedom and democracy of countries. However, U.S. Secretary of State Shultz brazenly said that this is a national liberation movement. Progressive mankind has more than once witnessed the U.S. setbacks in the gamble to eliminate the worker-peasant state in Poland through the use of the Solidarity trade union and the cruel plots of the United States and other international reactionaries in the current aggression against the People's Republic of Angola.

If, as Shultz said, the noble ideal of democracy and freedom is gaining superiority, then this ideal is not what the United States is trying to achieve in Central America, Afghanistan, Cambodia, Angola, and some other countries. On the contrary, the ideal of democracy and freedom which nations are pursuing is mainly the struggle against U.S. neocolonialist aggression in various countries and against the U.S. moves to support and maintain apartheid in South Africa.

The U.S. imperialists' hands are stained with the blood of nations in Central America, the Middle East, Africa, and Asia because of their aggression against Nicaragua and the troubles in Afghanistan, Lebanon, and Angola. The U.S. dreams of playing the role of international gendarme and in reality tramples on the principles, freedom, and democracy of the world people. The fact that the U.S. imperialists have used the UN forum to propagate distortion and incite their reactionary lackeys in various countries to oppose nations struggling to preserve their peace, stability, and security will only make progressive mankind more vigilant against the U.S. imperialists who are trying to use mankind as hostage for their star wars.

CSO: 4209/3

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, TRADE, AND AID

BRIEFS

AWARDS FOR HUNGARIANS--Empowered by the Council of State and Council of Ministers, on 19 September in Budapest, our Ambassador to Hungary Nguyen Lung presented the friendship orders and medals to various Hungarian universities, research institutes, professors, and lecturers. This was made in recognition of their contributions to the training of Vietnamese cadres. [Summary] [Hanoi Domestic Service in Vietnamese 1430 GMT 22 Sep 85 BK]

USSR FRIENDSHIP ORDER--According to the Soviet news agency TASS, the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet on 24 September issued a decree awarding the friendship order to the vice chairmen of the Vietnam-USSR Friendship Association, Nguyen Xien, Tran Dang Khoa, Nguyen Thi Thap, and Nguyen Ho. This is in recognition of their great contributions to the development and consolidation of friendship and cooperation between the peoples of Vietnam and the Soviet Union. [Text] [Hanoi Domestic Service in Vietnamese 1430 GMT 25 Sep 85 BK]

FOREIGN MEDICAL AID--In response to our request, Japan, Australia, and Sweden have sent 148,000 doses of antiencephalitis vaccination as aid to Vietnam. In addition, Australia has supplied us with 3,500 kg of mannitol. On 26 September, the Ministry of Public Health organized the first phase of antiencephalitis vaccination at two kindergartens in Dong Anh District, Hanoi. Present at the two kindergartens on this occasion were the Australian ambassador to Vietnam; representatives of the Swedish and Japanese Embassies; and representatives of WHO, UNICEF, and the Swedish International Development Agency in Hanoi. [Text] [Hanoi Domestic Service in Vietnamese 1430 GMT 28 Sep 85 BK]

DELEGATION TO WARSAW CONFERENCE--A delegation of the Vietnam Institute of Sciences headed by Prof Dr Nguyen Van Dao, deputy director and general secretary of the institute, attended the 14th conference of the scientific academies of the socialist countries held in Warsaw 23-27 September. The conference reviewed the implementation of the scientific cooperation program in the past 2 years with the participation for the first time of scientists from Vietnam, Cuba, Mongolia, and the DPRK. It also discussed and agreed on a program of scientific cooperation for the 1986-90 period. [Text] [Hanoi International Service in English 1000 GMT 29 Sep 85 BK]

CSO: 4209/3

PARTY ACTIVITIES AND GOVERNMENT

VO CHI CONG OPENING SPEECH AT SECURITY MEETING

BK261035 Hanoi NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 20 Aug 85 pp 1, 4

[Text] Today, in the joyous atmosphere in which our people throughout the country are celebrating the August revolution, and with encouragement and pride over the new achievements scored in socialist construction and in the defense of our socialist fatherland, our party, state, and people are organizing a solemn ceremony to mark the 40th founding anniversary of the Vietnamese People's Public Security Force.

On behalf of the CPV Central Committee, the Council of State, and the Council of Ministers, I cordially convey my best greetings to all cadres and combatants of the Vietnamese People's Public Security Force--combatants who are loyal to the fatherland, the party, and the people, and who are firmly defending national security and maintaining public order and safety throughout the country.

I warmly welcome the comrade leaders of our party, state, ministries, branches, sectors, and representatives of mass organizations who are attending this solemn commemorative ceremony. Your presence here manifests the profound concern of our party and state and the solidarity between sectors, mass organizations, people throughout the country, and the people's public security force in maintaining national security.

I warmly welcome the Cuban Interior Ministry delegation led by Comrade revolutionary commander Ramiro Valdes Menendez, member of the Cuban Communist Party Central Committee Political Bureau, vice chairman of the Councils of State and Ministers, and minister of interior.

I warmly welcome the Soviet state security committee led by Comrade Colonel General Pirozhkov, vice chairman of the said committee; and the Soviet Internal Affairs Ministry delegation led by Comrade Lieutenant General Demidov, deputy minister of this ministry.

I warmly welcome the LPDR Ministry of Interior delegation led by Comrade Senior General Sisavat Keobounphan, member of the LPRP Central Committee Secretariat and minister of interior.

I warmly welcome the PRK Ministry of Interior delegation led by Comrade Khang Sarin, member of the KPRP Central Committee Secretariat and minister of interior.

The presence of you comrades is a vivid manifestation of our friendship, militant solidarity, and multifaceted cooperation in maintaining security for the entire socialist community and in struggling for the lofty goal of the era, that is, peace, national independence, democracy, and socialism.

Coming into being at the time of the seething upsurge of the August Revolution, the Vietnamese People's Public Security Force--under the clear-sighted leadership of the glorious CPV and great President Ho Chi Minh and with the love, support, and assistance of the people--has overcome numerous difficulties and hardships, especially during its 40 years of activities, fighting and strengthening forces. It has faithfully and wholeheartedly served the party, the fatherland, and the people. It has set glorious examples in upholding revolutionary heroism. The contingent of the people's public security force is becoming increasingly mature, pure, firm, and strong. It has heightened its vigilance, bravery, and creativity, and has gradually foiled all the schemes and acts of the enemy's intelligence and espionage activities. It has, together with people throughout the country, effectively maintained the fatherland's security and order, thereby positively contributing to the struggle for national independence, freedom, and unification, while building and defending the socialist Vietnamese fatherland.

As we enter a new stage of the revolution, the requirements and tasks for the maintenance of public security and order are extremely weighty and urgent. Let the people's public security force develop its fine traditions and the glorious armed exploits it has scored over the past 40 years; strive to the best of its ability to score greater victories in firmly defending national security and maintaining public order and security under all circumstances, thereby contributing efficiently--along with the entire party, people, and army--to implementing the two strategic tasks of successfully building socialism and firmly defending the Vietnamese socialist fatherland.

With that firm conviction, I hereby declare the 40th founding anniversary of the Vietnamese People's Public Security Force open.

May I invite Comrade Pham Hung, member of the CPV Central Committee Political Bureau, vice chairman of the Council of Ministers, and minister of interior, to deliver a speech.

CSO: 4209/3

NGUYEN CO THACH INTERVIEWED

Hanoi VIETNAM COURIER in English Jul 85 pp 3-5

[Text]

Question 1: On the occasion of the 10th anniversary of the liberation of the South, hundreds of foreign correspondents visited Vietnam. They asked you hundreds of questions. What were their prime interests? And what were your answers to their questions?

Answer: In the first place, they put to me questions about Kampuchea. But their questions were not the same as in 1979-1980. The difference reflects the wonderful achievements recorded by the Kampuchean people in their revival which has changed the West's perception of Kampuchea. People no longer have any doubt about the irreversible character of the Kampuchean situation and very few are skeptical about the annual partial withdrawals of our troops from Kampuchea.

Question 2: What did their questions touch upon regarding the Kampuchean problem?

Answer: They asked whether Vietnam would unilaterally pull out its troops from Kampuchea in less than five to ten years? I made it clear that if Vietnamese volunteer troops were withdrawn from Kampuchea within 10 to 15 years of the overthrow of the Pol Pot genocidal clique in 1979, this fact would be something extraordinary when one considers the continued presence of US troops in the Federal Republic of Germany and in Japan 40 years after the defeat of German fascism and Japanese militarism.

The correspondents were of the view that Vietnam had committed a mistake when it failed to con-

demn the crime of genocide by the Pol Pot clique while the latter were in power from 1975 to 1979. True, Vietnam did not publicly condemn Pol Pot at that time. But when we realized that peaceful means would not prevent the continuation of his towering crimes against the Kampuchean and the Vietnamese peoples, we were obliged to overthrow him by military force, in order both to defend ourselves and save the Kampuchean people. The Western countries had voiced early condemnation of the Pol Pot clique's crime of genocide. This was good. However, what is unpardonable is the fact that although Pol Pot's crimes are well-known to them, they are still supporting him in opposing the Kampuchean people's revival and the Vietnamese people's legitimate right to self-defence.

The correspondents also asked me what made Vietnam decide unilaterally to withdraw part of its forces each year, with total withdrawal to be completed by 1995. I told them that we were prompted by our policy of respect for the Kampuchean people's independence and sovereignty; by the Kampuchean people's deep hatred for the Pol Pot genocidal regime which massacred millions of Kampucheans during the few years of its rule; by the Kampuchean people's iron determination not to allow the wicked Pol Pot clique to return; by their strong resolve to be the real masters of their rich country and to gradually shoulder the responsibility of defending their beautiful land. All these factors show the great vitality of the Kampuchean people, the creators of the

famous Angkor civilization. These factors have brought about conditions which make possible the gradual and eventually complete withdrawal of Vietnamese troops from Kampuchea.

Question 3: Did they ask you about the possibility of finding a political solution to the Kampuchean problem?

Answer: They did. At present, almost all countries, except only a few, have taken similar positions regarding the fundamental points of a political solution to the Kampuchean problem. The first and most essential point is the elimination of the Pol Pot genocidal clique and the withdrawal of Vietnamese volunteers from Kampuchea. The second, of great importance, is the respect of Kampuchean national rights by all countries, with almost all countries welcoming an arrangement between the People's Republic of Kampuchea and Sihanouk. The third is the peaceful coexistence and cooperation of Southeast Asian countries in the framework of a peaceful and stable Southeast Asia. The fourth is the respect of the national rights of Southeast Asian nations by all countries, which must refrain from aggression against and interference in the internal affairs of Southeast Asian nations. A common stand has also been taken regarding the necessity of some form of international guarantee and supervision of the agreements to be reached. However, there are differences of views regarding concrete questions, for instance the elimination of Pol Pot, the form of international control, etc. Regarding Pol Pot and his accomplices the Indochinese countries and their friends believe that they must be eliminated, that their troops must be disarmed, and their leaders punished. Other countries, however, want the Pol Pot clique to be eliminated through the holding of general elections. Regarding the form of international control, some favour the setting up of an international commission composed of a number of countries to control the implementation of the agreements; others think that peace-keeping forces should be brought in to replace the withdrawing Vietnamese volunteers, preserve order and security in Kampuchea, and control the implementation of the agreements. For our part, we believe that the parties now hold similar

positions regarding the foundations of a solution and that the time has come for all to sit down at the negotiating table and settle concrete questions.

Question 4: After the Kampuchean question, what were they interested in?

Answer: The relations between Vietnam and China. The correspondents expressed surprise at the fact that while previously Vietnam and China said they were bound to each other like "the lips to the teeth", now they have become enemies. Why? I replied: what happened between China and Vietnam was nothing extraordinary. Over the past 36 years, China has made many about-faces, both externally and domestically: foes have become friends, and friends foes.

I was also asked about the possibility of an improvement of relations between Vietnam and China. I said: Now all doors between the two countries are wide open; both those leading to peace and those leading to war. Vietnam is striving to restore friendly relations with China, while preparing to cope with the worse eventualities. Friendly relations between the two countries are in their own interests and in the interests of peace in Southeast Asia.

Question 5: What came after the question of Vietnam-China relations?

Answer: That of relations between Vietnam and the United States and Western countries. The correspondents asked whether it was true that Vietnam wanted to normalize relations with the US and other Western countries in order to get aid and overcome its economic difficulties. I said: Normalization of relations would be beneficial to both parties and to peace and stability in Southeast Asia. After 30 years of destructive war, it is only natural that Vietnam should need foreign aid for reconstruction. But it will only accept aid without political strings attached. Many Asian, African and Latin American countries have been receiving a great deal of aid from the US and the West, yet they are meeting with no fewer difficulties than Vietnam.

Question 6: Did they raise the questions of US conditions for the normalization of relations between the two countries?

Answer: I pointed out that while the United States required us to settle the M.I.A. question as a humanitarian problem it also regarded the settlement of this issue as a political condition for the normalization of relations between the two countries. This was a contradictory approach. If the US considered it a political condition, then Vietnam could not view it as a humanitarian question. I made it clear that the party that would be entitled to set conditions for the normalization of relations between the two countries was Vietnam, because the US had waged devastating war against it using three times the tonnage of bombs and shells used in World War Two, and because the US had undertaken to contribute to the healing of the war wounds in Vietnam.

In 1977, the US held talks on normalizing relations with Vietnam without any pre-condition. At that time Vietnam demanded as a condition that the US honour its commitment to contribute to the healing of war wounds in Vietnam. Then, in September 1978, Vietnam agreed to shelve the question of US contribution, which was to be discussed later. The two parties reached agreement on normalizing relations unconditionally, without the US signing the agreement as yet. In the meantime, the US and China also negotiated the normalization of relations between them. In December 1978, this was done, and the US declared that it would not sign the agreement reached with Vietnam. It was playing the China card. So it chose to normalize relations with China and to cancel the agreement on normalizing relations with Vietnam. Ever since then, it has posed conditions for this normalization. In November 1978, it considered the waves of people leaving Vietnam and the troop concentration at the Kampuchea-Vietnam border to be obstacles to normalization. From 1981 on ward, changing its conditions, it raised the M.I.A. question and the presence of Vietnamese troops in Kampuchea. The successive conditions posed by the US have been but a cover for the US playing the China card.

Question 7: Did they raise the question of human rights?

Answer: I told them about a conversation I had with an American at the Paris negotiations in 1972. A member of the US delegation told me: "You are communists, you believe in materialism; we are capitalists, we believe in idealism. Isn't it strange then that you don't believe that the force of arms can overwhelm the force of the spirit?" I said: "You are mistaken. We believe that the power of man can overwhelm the force of arms, while you think that weapons can subdue man. Man is a thinking creature while weapons are but inanimate things. Man makes weapons, and he can vanquish weapons. The Americans used weapons and dollars profusely in the hope of subduing the Vietnamese, but they failed. Only by relying on the noble qualities of man were the Vietnamese able to defeat the colossal US war machine and outpourings of dollars. The atrocious war waged by the US proves which side respects human rights, and which side tramples upon them. After the Vietnam war, there was no bloodbath in Vietnam. The two million and a half persons who had collaborated with the US forces were allowed to live freely. No one was executed. Only 7,000 persons remain in re-education camps, having committed serious crimes against the Vietnamese people. In Europe, after World War Two, hundreds of thousands of collaborators of the Hitlerite fascists were executed. In France alone, 140,000 such persons were executed. World War Two ended 40 years ago, but former collaborators of the Hitlerite fascists are still hunted down throughout the world and a number of them have been in jail for the past 40 years. What is crystal clear is that the invaders of Vietnam have ceaselessly condemned Vietnam as invaders, and the oppressors of the Vietnamese have been accusing the Vietnamese of violation of human rights.

Question 8: What else were they interested in?

Answer: The relations between Vietnam and the Soviet Union. They believed that Vietnam completely relied on Soviet aid and that therefore it was entirely

dependent on the Soviet Union. I replied: Over the past 40 years, many Western countries clearly did not want to see an independent Vietnam but a Vietnam dependent on the West. Also obvious is the fact that, formerly an enslaved nation, the Vietnamese have stood up, bare-handed, and fought for 40 years to win back their national independence and defend their homeland. No other country in the world has suffered so long and so much from foreign dominations; no other country has faced so many wars of aggression and shed so much blood to secure independence. No one on earth can have any doubt about the independence of Vietnam. During our struggle over the past 40 years, the Soviet Union has given us the greatest amount of aid and the strongest support. Without Soviet aid and support, Vietnam could not have won back and defended its independence. The Soviet Union helps Vietnam and respects its independence. It is the most reliable friend of Vietnam. Vietnam has strengthened its relations with the Soviet Union. At the same time, it is prepared to expand relations with all other countries in the world on the basis of mutual respect and mutual benefit. The present state of relations between many Western countries and Vietnam stems from the former's policy of playing the China card and opposing Vietnam.

Question 9: Did they ask you about the attitude of Vietnam in the face of the improvement of relations between the Soviet Union and China?

Answer: I said that Vietnam welcomed the improved relations between the Soviet Union and China. They contributed to reducing tension in the world and Southeast Asia. Those who want to make use of China to oppose the Soviet Union and Vietnam naturally do not like to see any improvement, however small, in relations between China and the Soviet Union.

Question 10: What was their last subject of interest?

Answer: They asked me about our achievements over the past ten

years. I told them: these achievements still fall short of our people's requirements and wishes. However, considering the schemes of our enemy to bleed Vietnam white and bring about its collapse as a result of the serious wounds suffered in 30 years of war and of their present multi-faceted war of sabotage, economic blockade, and military pressure on the three Indochinese countries, the achievements recorded by Vietnam over the past 10 years are truly miraculous ones while our enemy's failures have been quite serious considering that it took the European countries five years to rehabilitate their economic after World War Two, which had lasted 5 years and that Vietnam has had only 10 years to work for economic restoration when true peace has not yet been restored after 30 years of war in which the country was devastated by three times the tonnage of bombs and shells used in World War Two. These ten years are but a short period. While many countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America have enjoyed peace for the last 40 years they are facing no fewer economic difficulties than Vietnam, although Vietnam has gone through continuous war. It is also evident that while the economies of a number of Asian, African, and Latin American countries may be several times more developed than that of Vietnam, their general situation is far from stable and steady. Vietnam is poor, but the situation in our country is stable and steady, because here the exploitation of man by man, social injustices and class contradictions have been eradicated.

An outstanding fact in the past 10 years is that Vietnam, acting together with the Kampuchean people, has overthrown the Pol Pot clique, thus saving the Kampuchean people from genocide and eliminating a centre working for the sabotage of peace and stability in Southeast Asia.

Question 11: What significance is to be attached to the permission given to a large number of American journalists to visit Vietnam?

Answer: Not only American journalists. Journalists have come

from many other countries to attend the 10th anniversary of our victory.

The fact that many American journalists have requested permission to visit our country on this occasion proves that the US public is still very much interested in the past war and very sensitive to the policies being pursued by the US Administration with regard to Nicaragua and Vietnam. This concern is a legitimate one, because this is an opportunity for the US public to re-examine and re-evaluate the war that was waged by the US ruling circles for over two decades. It is clear that 10 years after the end of the war, the US is not yet free of the "Vietnam syndrome" and has not yet drawn the lessons of this tragic war. The fear of a second Vietnam is still haunting the American citizen's mind.

On the occasion of this anniversary the US press in general have written about Vietnam objectively. What they have seen in Vietnam is far different from what had been said in distorted reports. All realize that the Vietnam war still leaves grave consequences on various aspects of life in the US, and all call for a serious re-assessment of the war and the drawing of the necessary lessons in order to prevent a second Vietnam. Besides, the US public has clearly seen the correct and cooperative attitude, full of good will of our people.

Hanoi, 19 May 1985

* Published by the Nhan Dan daily.

CSO: 4200/1

DIRECTIVE ON MANAGING SMALL INDUSTRIES, HANDICRAFTS

Hanoi TIEU CONG NGHIEP THU CONG NGHIEP in Vietnamese 12 Jul 85 p 1

[Directive of the chairman of the Council of Ministers on strengthening production leadership and management in small industries and handicrafts (No 211-CT, 26 June 1985)]

[Text] Small industry and handicraft production has an important place in our national economy: it accounts for nearly half of our national industrial output, manufactures a large quantity of consumer goods, contributes valuable support for production sectors, provides many repair services, produces several export products and provides employment for millions of people.

The party and the state have always placed small industries and handicrafts in their duly important positions, and have defined and issued correct policies aiming at their production development.

In terms of organization and management, on 2 November 1978, the Council of Ministers issued Decree No 279-CP on organization and management of the Central Federation of Small Industry and Handicraft Enterprises, which determined the functions, missions, rights and responsibilities of the latter and meanwhile defined relationships in work distribution and coordination between related sectors at the central level in matters of production leadership and management.

In past years, because of lack of thorough understanding of certain sectors and localities and of the inability of the Central Federation of Enterprises to undertake heavy tasks entrusted upon it, there had been several limitations and slowness in the execution of Decree No 279-CP of the Council of Ministers.

To strengthen leadership and management in the area of small industry and handicraft production, in accordance with conclusions drawn by the Council of Ministers Standing Committee at its conference of 6 June 1985, the chairman of the Council of Ministers hereby directs:

1. That, in terms of the functions and responsibilities of the Central Federation of Small Industry and Handicraft Enterprises, implementation

measures shall be continued on the basis of Decree No 279-CP dated 2 November 1978 of the Council of Ministers.

2. That, in the framework of their responsibilities and authority, ministries managing industrial production, functional ministries, people's committees of provinces, cities and special zones directly under the jurisdiction of the central government and the Central Federation of Small Industry and Handicraft Enterprises shall make a thorough recapitulation, and in light of lessons learned from carrying out this decree in the past, shall formulate plans, take measures to step up the execution of this decree in a strict, homogenous and absolute manner.

3. That the Central Federation of Small Industry and Handicraft Enterprises shall be strengthened in its organization as well as with quality cadres professionally able to fulfill their responsibilities, primarily in matters of: awareness of the small industry and handicraft situation in the whole country; initiative in planning and developing small industries and handicrafts in conjunction with related sectors; and recommendation to the state appropriate policies and measures pertaining to small industry and handicraft production areas.

With regard to sectors, professions and products not falling under the jurisdiction of any central industrial management organization (as stipulated in Item 4, Article 2 of the regulations attached to Decree No 279-CP), the Central Federation of Small Industry and Handicraft Enterprises shall have the responsibility to research and recommend to the state what ministry shall supervise each of the above sectors, professions and products. Pending this determination, the state hereby entrusts the Federation of Small Industry and Handicraft Enterprises the temporary responsibility for the formulation of projects and development and management plans for those sectors, professions and products.

4. That ministries and general directorates in charge of industrial production management shall strive for proper discharge of their managerial functions for their related economic and technical sectors; shall formulate production plans and projects for the whole sector, to include the small industry and handicraft area; shall balance the allotment of specialized material supplies; shall determine and control the execution of economic, technical and product quality norms; and shall be responsible for the formation of cadres and technical workers for the whole sector, including small industry and handicraft collective units. In order to achieve the above, in each ministry and general directorate, a deputy minister or deputy directorate general shall be assigned.

5. That people's committees of provinces, cities, and special zones under the jurisdiction of the central government shall coordinate with ministries in charge of industrial production management and with the Central Federation of Small Industry and Handicraft Enterprises in the formulation of plans and projects for the development of small industries and handicrafts and on the basis of each projected economic and technical sector; and shall recommend to the central government appropriate policies and measures aimed

at using in the most appropriate way all sources of labor, restoring and developing traditional professions and fine arts goods production, and exploiting local resources in raw materials for small industry and handicraft development.

Ministries and organizations of ministerial level, people's committees of provinces, cities and special zones under the jurisdiction of the central government, and the Central Federation of Small Industry and Handicraft Enterprises shall be responsible for strictly carrying out this directive and for reporting results to the chairman of the Council of Ministers.

For the chairman of the Council of Ministers
the deputy chairman,
Signed: Do Muoi

9458

CSO: 4209/625

ECONOMIC PLANNING, TRADE, AND FINANCE

NHAN DAN URGES STEPPING UP OF PRODUCTION

BK260518 Hanoi Domestic Service in Vietnamese 2300 GMT 25 Sep 85

[NHAN DAN 26 September editorial: "Implementing the Party Central Committee's Eighth Plenum Resolution, Step Up Production With High Productivity, Quality, and Effectiveness"]

[Text] The implementation of the eighth plenum resolution requires us to combine the task of adjusting the system of prices and improving the system of wages closely with the very important task of vigorously accelerating production. This is the radical and decisive condition for satisfactorily developing the role of the policy of prices, wages, and money. This is also the main course for the state to control goods and money, manage market and prices, and stabilize and gradually improve the people's livelihood.

The policy of prices, wages, and money breaks through the system of red tape and subsidization, promotes production, and creates favorable conditions for shifting production to the new system of socialist economic accounting and business based on planning. This new management system requires that all production areas and installations--run either by the state or collectives in the fields of industry, agriculture, handicrafts, and artisan industry--vigorously accelerate production with high productivity, quality, and effectiveness in order to turn our products in abundance at reasonable prices so that costs can be covered, necessary capital can be accumulated for the state for industrialization purpose, and, at the same time, society can accept them.

This is a hard and complicated struggle which all sectors and production installations have realized when entering the new system. This struggle is very difficult because of economic imbalances; poor economic, technical, and managerial knowledge; red tape and subsidization ills; and heavy conservatism and sluggishness. Life demands us to overcome all problems no matter how difficult they are so that we can advance to really effective production in a new management system. This is an important change of direction and a great resolution of revolutionary significance in economic management.

Using the state plan as a center, every primary production installation should quickly rearrange and reorganize production, exploit all existing and latent

potentials, and formulate the best production project linking production to consumers' demands.

The new management system with the new policy of prices, wages, and money are encouraging cadres, workers, and primary production installations to apply technology so as to constantly advance industry, turn out good quality products, reduce material loss on each unit of product, make more profits every day, better fulfill obligations to the state, secure ever greater capital accumulation, and increase workers' income.

Our current production is the planned production of goods using business as a means and service as a goal. Service should be extended through business and not through subsidization. Our production takes the use value basis on which to set the goal of serving the people and meeting their demands. At the same time, we use value as one of the means to gauge and stimulate the results of production.

Under the new system, all primary installations, factories, and workers can really master production, actively calculate their business, become concerned with increasing productivity, quality, and effectiveness; pay attention to fully using the capacity of machinery and equipment; economize on materials and energy, and turn out many products.

The struggle to reduce production costs constitutes a very heavy task and a matter of survival for the primary production installations. It even decides their existence or disbandment. Production costs are the general norms which reflect the production and business activities of primary installations. They are effected by various steps in the managerial task and by several sectors involved but still most importantly and decisively by the head of the management system.

In view of the current situation, we can assert that the feasibility of reducing production costs is still very great and production costs can be achieved within a relatively short period of time provided that we have a correct management system under which all primary installations and factories can promote production and quickly shape up a new management system, and thus contribute to successfully implementing the resolutions of the party Central Committee's eighth plenum and the fifth party congress.

CSO: 4209/3

ECONOMIC PLANNING, TRADE, AND FINANCE

AN GIANG PROVINCE CONTROLS MARKET, PRICES

BK281321 Hanoi Domestic Service in Vietnamese 2300 GMT 27 Sep 85

[Text] An Giang Province is positively controlling the market, stabilizing production, and improving the people's daily life after the issuance of new bank notes. The market management committee has coordinated with the public security force in inspecting 674 production households and collectives. They discovered dozens of cases of illegal speculating in and hoarding of unregistered goods. Chau Phu, Cho Moi, Phu Tan, and Phu Chau districts have strengthened their inspection on various communications routes and discovered 36 cases of goods smugglings worth hundreds of thousands of dong. During the past few days prices of pork, fish, and rice at the Long Xuyen and Chau Doc markets increased by 5-10 percent.

An Giang has urged the trade sector and marketing cooperatives to store agricultural, food, and industrial products; provide tag prices; and sell goods at new set prices. The market management sector and various committees have regularly checked prices of goods at various localities. They have discovered that many private traders, production establishments, and joint private-state stores arbitrarily raised the prices of their goods. They have duly punished some of these establishments, thus bringing the prices situation back to normal.

CSO: 4209/3

ECONOMIC PLANNING, TRADE, AND FINANCE

IRREGULARITIES IN DONG THAP RETAIL SECTOR

BK271135 Hanoi Domestic Service in Vietnamese 1430 GMT 26 Sep 85

[Text] Since the beginning of August, the workers' control teams of the trade union in Dong Thap Province have checked the measuring instruments and retail prices, and the behavior of personnel in the state-owned trade shops, marketing cooperatives, and retail sales shops in Sa Dec and Cao Lanh towns.

The control teams have discovered that in nearly all the rice selling stores placed under the managerial control of the provincial food products company, the quality of rice sold is not as good as that of the sample rice because it is mixed with unhusked rice and sand. As a result, the amount of rice sold in August was lower than that of July by 2,000 metric tons. They further detected that some of the personnel of marketing cooperatives in Tan Phu Dong and Tan Qoi Dong villages, Sa Dec town; My Tra and Hoa An villages, Cao Lanh town, have siphoned off pork to private merchants, causing phoney shortages of pork in the first few days of August in both towns. Many of the joint private-state stores failed to post prices or sold at higher prices than the prescribed ones, or did not use the proper measuring units. They have been severely dealt with.

CSO: 4209/3

ECONOMIC PLANNING, TRADE, AND FINANCE

INITIAL RESULTS OF PRICE SUBSIDIES TO WAGES IN CUU LONG

Hanoi QUAN DOI NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 29 Jul 85 p 3

[Article by Tran Hoang: "Eliminate Bureaucratic System of Flat Allocations, Resolutely Switch to Economic Accounting, Socialist Business: Initial Results of Price Subsidies to Wages in Cuu Long"]

[Text] The price-wage-money triad now is a daily and hourly concern for the cadres and people in Cuu Long Province. Although it has just begun, the policy of adding price subsidies on all nine quota commodities to wages has achieved concrete results throughout the province.

According to Chin Nho, standing committee member and propaganda and training chief of the Cuu Long provincial VCP committee, in June the province began the experiment of adding price subsidies on five quota commodities to wages. Many places in the province were not able to stabilize market prices which, in some instances, shot up. For example, sugar cost even more than in Ho Chi Minh City. This was caused, not by short supply, but rather by the fact that these localities put poor-quality goods on sale and still laxly managed the market, creating conditions for private merchants to store up merchandise for speculation. Worse yet, due to inadequate awareness and insufficient education, some marketing cooperatives and state-run commercial stores even "retained" merchandise for price manipulation. That false commodity shortage triggered consumer worry. After reviewing the situation and drawing experiences from it, Cuu Long has taken steps to actively control monies and goods and manage the market, and effectively apply the policy of adding price subsidies on quota commodities to wages, having attained the proposed goals and requirements in the process.

The province could, on its own, ensure adequate supplies for seven quota commodities out of nine. Especially as regards cloth and monosodium glutamate, besides quotas supplied by the Level-II Corporation, the province has acquired additional quantities through association and barter with other friendly sectors and provinces. Hence, the decisive factor in implementing the policy of adding price subsidies to wages in Cuu Long is to organize commodity purchases and collection, and at the same time to strictly manage the market to prevent prices--especially those of quota goods--from fluctuating.

Carrying out Resolution 8 of the VCP Central Committee, the Cuu Long VCP provincial committee has decided that the movement to add price subsidies to wages should be conducted in a prompt, neat, steady, comprehensive and effective manner. According to a provincial regulation, each laborer can collect price subsidies for only one dependent. As for families with too many children, the province will examine individual cases for additional subsidies. Cuu Long has also granted price subsidies to cadres, workers and civil servants of central organs stationed in the province, and to the armed forces--a pay status similar to that of local wage earners. The province has strived to pay wages once a month at the latter's beginning, in response to a desire of cadres, workers and civil servants to balance their monthly pocketbooks and accumulate savings. Furthermore, each wage earner is given an additional 100 dong per month to compensate for unexpected minor price fluctuations.

As of now, Cuu Long Province has basically generated enough cash for price subsidies to wages and for summer-autumn rice purchases. The grain and trade sectors and other related sectors have stocked enough merchandise at former sales outlets and hundreds of newly opened outlets for continuous sale at regulated prices. Buyers are free to choose merchandise suitable to their needs at the most convenient sales outlets. Simultaneously with organizing grain purchases and creating and concentrating goods, Cuu Long has paid special attention to industrial and commercial transformation. The price-subsidy experiment in the province shows that prices of quota goods have not fluctuated in localities with good performances on industrial and commercial transformation, such as Tra Vinh Municipality and Tra Cu District, and that private merchants have hoarded goods and raised prices in localities with poor performances on industrial and commercial transformation. To redress the situation, the Cuu Long VCP provincial committee and people's committee have guided sectors and echelons to strengthen market management. Many energetic measures have been carried out with success. Localities in the province have closely coordinated with related sectors to control inventories and sources of supply of private merchants and some marketing cooperatives, instructing them to put merchandise on sale at regulated prices. Noncompliance was promptly met with drastic administrative measures. A movement of the entire people taking part in market management was launched by the VCP provincial committee, calling upon consumers--among other things--to resolutely refuse to buy merchandise at prices higher than those set by the province, and to instantly report noncompliant private merchants and stores to responsible organs for management.

Ho Minh Man, chairman of the Cuu Long provincial people's committee and chief of the committee for the guidance of price subsidies, asserted that although it has just begun, the movement to add price subsidies to wages has proceeded well. Nearly all wage earners, including the armed forces and national defense workers and civil servants, were in good spirits. The province has uncovered about 10,000 persons earning wages and subsidies for dependents not in line with regulations. Grain sales have decreased by nearly 50 percent. Work efficiency and labor productivity in organs and enterprises have especially gone up.

ECONOMIC PLANNING, TRADE, AND FINANCE

REAL REASONS BEHIND INCREASES OF RICE PRICES DISCUSSED

Hanoi NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 7 Aug 85 pp 1, 4

[Article by Hong Khanh and Bang Chau: "An Experience in Management of Rice Market -- Why Did Rice Prices Go up in the Southern Market? "]

[Text] Recently in the southern market, in a number of provinces and municipalities and even in some areas right in the heart of the Mekong River delta granary, there was a phenomenon of rice prices quickly rising, with increases ranging from nearly double to 15-20 percent of the rice prices in January 1985. The fact that while many localities had a good winter-spring rice crop; areas and productivity showed rather good achievements; the harvest was completed quickly, neatly and properly; some localities had to harvest their summer-autumn rice crop all at the same time; there were positive changes and obvious progress in the transformation of private industry and commerce and in market management; and the provinces of An Giang, Tien Giang and Dong Thap succeeded in gradually lowering grain prices, other localities in the region let prices of rice go up as they had shown made many people worry and think seriously. What were the reasons? Whether these were objective or subjective reasons, could we overcome them?

According to the people in charge of distribution and circulation in these provinces, the recent sudden increases of rice prices, which in some localities lasted for just a few days or half a month and were immediately followed by decreases, nevertheless constituted a practical lesson from which we should learn in order to move toward controlling goods and money and managing the market, for one of the reasons behind such increases of rice prices was some failure in leadership work. The failure was shown in the fact that there had been no coordination of simultaneous action among the jobs involved. Some localities were able to create good sources of goods; the provinces as a whole succeeded in controlling nearly 90 percent of grain and goods, but they had not expanded the retail network in time. In other localities, although goods from provincial and district storehouses were abundant and the retail network had been extended to all hamlets, they failed to organize a transportation system

to supply goods in a regular, steady and smooth manner from top to bottom, from wholesale units to retail units and from the network of state counters to the network of agents' counters. Still other localities did these jobs very well but somehow neglected and failed to continually step up the transformation of private business people and the strengthening of market management. This imbalance created false local tensions, worsened the lack of balance between supply and demand and pushed up rice prices on the market. And in some localities the increased rice prices led to higher prices of a number of other goods. Let us mention some localities as examples:

Minh Hai is the rice-growing province of the Mekong River delta. Although in the winter-spring and summer-autumn rice crops this year it suffered from a drought, the crops were not totally lost; it was doing quite a good job by mobilizing grain and buying additional quantities of paddy from farmers at agreed prices. The transformation of private commerce was being done quite well. But early last July, in the City of Ca Mau, due to a lack of timely leadership over shipping rice to retail stores quickly and in sufficient quantities, the state stores did not have enough rice to sell to workers and civil servants after the latter had received their first monthly pay (they are paid twice a month). Then in just a few days prices of rice on the market went up from the stable price of 26 dong a kilogram to 30, 35 and then 40 and 45 dong a kilogram. By the time the state stores in the city had enough rice to sell at a normal pace and to bring market prices down, not only had the real value of the wages of workers and civil servants here been considerably reduced but a rather large amount of cash had also slipped from the hands of the state and floated in the free market.

In Ho Chi Minh City, rice prices were relatively stable in the first half of July although from 1 July on the municipality put into effect the compensation of rice price in the wages of all workers and civil servants and their dependents. The differences between rice prices as compensated in wages and those in the municipality's market were minimal, just 2 or 3 dong. But the differences were increasing more and more toward the end of July; prices of the same kind of rice, with same quality and grade, in the market were 5-7 dong a kilogram higher (increases of about 20 percent) than prices compensated in wages. In the opinion of many residents of Ho Chi Minh City, the reason why rice prices in the market there had recently gone up was that there was no proper management of the privately-operated food and beverage stores and particularly the sources of raw materials these stores were using to run their business. These stores, the number of which did not go down but tended to increase instead, showed considerable consuming power: they used each day 54 tons of rice, 9 tons of glutinous rice, 9 tons of wheat flour, 20 tons of pork, 6.6 tons of beef, 11 tons of domestic fowls, 7 quintals of monosodium glutamate, and so on. When the compensation of rice price in wages was not yet adopted, workers and civil servants had been buying rice at the price of

.4 dong a kilogram; since they would lose if they did not buy their rice rations, a considerable quantity of the rice they had been buying became a source of supply for the privately-operated food and beverage stores in the municipality. Since the beginning of July, after the rice price compensation in wages was adopted, workers and civil servants have been buying rice in accordance with their consumption needs "within the quantities they can buy," i. e., if they need a lot of rice, they buy a lot; if they do not need much, they do not buy much; if they do not have a need yet, they do not buy yet. As a result, the privately-operated food and beverage stores have had a declining source of "supplied" raw materials, which used to be stable for quite some time. In order to make up for this shortage, quite a few private households doing food-and-beverage business and speculators have resorted to the only way that was economical and fast -- to spend more money to buy rice at higher prices, which would drive up market prices. A number of workers and civil servants who saw the quick money they could make, in spite of the fact that they still had enough rice to eat for the month, brought their ration books to grain stores to buy all of the rice they were entitled to buy at the compensated price and then sold it to dealers in order to pocket the price differential of 5-6 dong per kilogram. We listened to a lady who works at a state organ explain as she was buying rice at a counter near Tan Dinh Market: "At the beginning I did not intend to buy because we have at home enough rice to eat for the whole of July, but as I saw that rice prices on the market were increasing, I have then decided to buy the quantity of rice my family can buy and to sell it outside to make some money."

We should also mention the action of bad people who were spreading false rumors and enemy economic sabotage.

When we were at the 10th Precinct during a fact-finding visit, we heard the head of the precinct grain office mention the figure, 94 percent, and try to find some explanation for it. For since April, after the rice price had been compensated in wages, the monthly rice sales in the 10th Precinct never reached that high level until July. The 94 percent sales in July to workers and civil servants should have been a happy result in terms of providing services and collecting cash for the state. But what we should think about was whether the quickly increased rice sales truly reflected the consumption needs of families of cadres, workers and civil servants or the rising prices of rice on the market were a contributing factor that allowed part of the rice from state storehouses to go through workers and civil servants to the free market. If there really existed a situation of rice "running around" in such a manner, it would be really difficult to maintain good management of grain prices in particular, and the market in general.

Now it is obvious that the market is a unified entity that cannot be cut into pieces. And even within an area, a village or a town, whether market

activities are good or not depends on the activities that are coordinated in a synchronous, smooth, fitting, regular and continuous manner in all of the related jobs, first of all in the four jobs -- creating sources of goods, organizing widespread retail sales, planning a smooth transport system and managing private commerce. According to the experience of such localities as An Giang, Dong Thap, Quang Nam-Da Nang, etc., the fact that prices did not undergo great changes and actually decreased in some localities was due to a good, synchronous and coordinated leadership in these jobs.

5598

CSO: 4209/621

ECONOMIC PLANNING, TRADE, AND FINANCE

BRIEFS

NATIONAL SAVINGS RISE--As of 30 June, saving deposits nationwide amounted to more than 9,065,000,000 dong, an increase of nearly 2.5 billion over the beginning of the year, including an increase of more than 1,405,000,000 in short-term deposits and another increase of 1,068,000,000 in long-term 5-year deposits. Provinces and cities with substantial increases are Hanoi, 64 million; Dong Nai, 40 million; Quang Nam-Da Nang, 37 million; Ha Nam Ninh and Thanh Hoa, 27 million each; Hai Hung, 22 million; Nghe Tinh and Thai Binh, 18 million each; and Nghia Binh, 14 million, etc. As of now, socialist savings have exceeded 100 million in 23 provinces and cities nationwide; the highest figures are 1,075,000,000 and nearly 1.4 billion dong for Ho Chi Minh and Hanoi Cities, respectively; over 520 million for Ha Nam Ninh and Hai Hung; over 400 million for Thanh Hoa and Nghe Tinh, etc. Implementing the resolution of the Eighth Plenum of the VCP Central Committee, the state bank in provinces and cities has strengthened guidance over the savings fund network, sent cadres to the basic level to explain the new savings interest system and the importance of the state policy of controlling merchandise and money, improving customer relations and mobilizing the people to put their savings in the socialist savings fund. [Text] [Hanoi NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 26 Jul 85 p 1] 9213

CSO: 4209/604

AGRICULTURE

PAY RAISE FOR AGRICULTURAL MANAGEMENT CADRES

Hanoi NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 25 Jul 85 pp 1, 4

[Editorial: "Link Responsibilities of Management Cadres at Agricultural Installations with Benefits"]

[Text] Economic management in agricultural cooperatives has achieved notable progress while new production relationships in the rural areas have been further consolidated and strengthened. Currently, one of the extremely important tasks is to resolutely switch cooperative management to economic accounting and socialist business and to perfect product contracting with labor groups and laborers, and with building districts at the same time, reinforcing district echelons and modifying some policies toward cooperatives. Improving a management system requires a body of competent and virtuous management cadres.

The ranks of management cadres in socialist collective economic organizations represent members of cooperatives and collectives and their interests as well as the laborers' right to collective mastery. On behalf of the peasant class, they collectively manage tens of millions of laborers and millions of hectares of land and other means of production to make material wealth for society. Economic and technical management cadres in cooperatives and collectives play a key role in putting in shape and implementing with success the party and state strategy of economic growth and positions and policies toward the collective economic sector and the new management structure, aimed at unceasingly consolidating production relationships and comprehensively developing production with increasingly high yield, quality and efficiency.

In past years, various echelons and sectors have strived to select, provide elementary and advanced training to, and utilize effectively the ranks of management cadres in socialist collective economic organizations. As a result, the cooperativization movement has undergone active changes, moving little by little from low to high and from simplicity to complexity. New production relationships in the rural areas have been consolidated and strengthened further. Agricultural transformation has proceeded well in the provinces of Nam Bo. Agricultural production has gained ground. Peasant livelihood has stabilized, with improvement in some respects. The flow of grain, food and agricultural products toward the state and export has increased remarkably. Vanguard models symbolizing the new

production approach--eliminating the first place the bureaucratic system of flat allocations then gradually embracing economic accounting and socialist business--have appeared everywhere. The fine achievements in comprehensive economic development and in building a new countryside and a new man are a product of laborers engaged in collective mastery and with the great assistance of leadership cadres and economic management cadres at the grass-roots level.

Front-rank cooperatives and production collectives are units proficient in both production growth and management and capable of increasing volume of production and gross output value gradually, raising labor income and living standards, accumulating large amounts of capital necessary for expanded reproduction, and fulfilling their contributory obligations to society. As the collective economy grows, production relationships will be strengthened, leading to a close association between cooperatives and collectives and their members. In these vanguard collective economic units, there is a body of management cadres endowed with solid political perceptions, a knowledge of the science of management, an ability to organize and bring assigned tasks to completion and to acquire newness, a good morality, a wholesome and simple way of life and a deep commitment to serving the collective and respecting the laborers' right to collective mastery.

But the movement has developed unevenly. Many cooperatives and collectives have failed to create a rational production structure for highly effective specialized and intensive cultivation and consolidated business, to promptly switch to economic accounting and socialist business and to broadly apply the product-contracting system to all production sectors and professions. The managerial apparatus of many cooperatives and collectives is cumbersome, slowly responsive to changes and unsuitable to the new management approach. In these places, the ranks of management cadres have not measured up to their tasks. Some cadres have abused their functions and privileges, violating the right of cooperative and collective members to collective mastery, practicing corruption and seeking illicit gains. Quite a few cadres have overlooked common work, caring instead for private business and their families' own contract plots.

Along with selecting and providing comprehensive elementary and advanced training to management cadres we should have a compensation policy linking their responsibilities, prerogatives and benefits together. Management cadres are tied to the organization to which they belong. And the organization's production and business efficiency reflects the way they individually discharge their responsibilities. An appropriate pay system for managerial and technical cadres must aim at encouraging them to concentrate wisdom and capabilities on managing and coordinating common work at production installations. In the product-contracting system, cadre wages are computed on the basis of fulfillment of plans by cooperatives, production collectives and production units. Pay scales depend on the size of production and business and on the degree of completion of production and business plans. Larger production and business heavier management tasks call for higher wages for cadres and vice versa. This is aimed at achieving the goal of linking pay to fulfillment of assigned responsibilities. And to implement

that rational compensation method, each production unit must do its utmost to determine the duties and functions of each position, for which a corresponding wage level must be set. We must rely on the main norms of the plan relating to gross output value, volume of principal products and amounts of business profit, etc., for which individual cadres are responsible, to evaluate the extent of fulfillment of their responsibilities while giving them rewards for plan fulfillment and overfulfillment. We should assign work norms and extend end-product contracting to technical cadres having college and high school levels serving at production installations, cooperatives and collectives, and at the same time, give them supplemental pay (on top of their regular wages). Those performing well, attaining and exceeding plan, are entitled to higher wages in proportion to their achievements, and vice versa.

Holding firmly on to the new management system in the agricultural socialist economic sector, linking responsibilities, prerogatives and benefits together, tying management cadres to their installations, exploiting to the highest level existing local potentials, and making plenty of wealth for society are important demands which the ranks of management cadres at the grassroots level must unceasingly live up to.

9213

CSO: 4209/604

AGRICULTURE

RUBBER PLANTING EXPANDED BY 50,000 HECTARES

Hanoi QUAN DOI NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 21 Jul 85 p 1

[Article: "Rubber Sector Plants 50,000 More Hectares, Expands Economic Association"]

[Text] (VNA) Vu Dinh Lieu, member of the VCP Central Committee and vice chairman of the Council of Ministers, recently made a visit to the rubber corporations of Phuoc Hoa, Binh Long, Dong Phu, Phu Rieng, Dau Tieng and Loc Ninh (Song Be Province), noted for their cooperation with the Soviet Union and other socialist countries in rubber planting, and also to the rubber corporations of Tay Ninh and Dong Nai. During the trip, he visited rubber plantations and processing installations and talked with cadres and workers.

In recent days, these corporations have encountered difficulties in capital, labor, supplies and spare parts, but cadres and workers have made a big remedial effort, expanding economic association with the districts in order to open virgin land, nurse new plants, exploit and process latex, and gradually improve worker living standards. Implementing the 1981-1985 Vietnamese-Soviet cooperation program on planting 50,000 more hectares of rubber, the rubber corporations of Dau Tieng, Phu Rieng, Binh Long and Dong Phu have so far fulfilled over 90 percent of the plan with over 95 percent of living plants.

After assessing the great effort of the rubber sector, Do Van Nguyen, member of the VCP Central Committee and chief of the Rubber General Department, pointed out difficulties which need be addressed--discrepancies between investments and demands and weaknesses in management and organization.

On behalf of the Council of Ministers, Vu Dinh Lieu praised the rubber sector, mostly those corporations engaged in cooperation with the Soviet Union and other fraternal socialist countries in rubber planting, for overcoming difficulties, striving to achieve plans and maintaining good relations with the localities in utilizing labor and protecting rubber plants. He called upon the corporations to attentively practice intensive rubber planting, apply proper techniques to growing and nursing new plants, and exploiting and processing latex, to properly carry out the cooperation program with the Soviet Union and to expand economic association in rubber planting.

Currently, the rubber corporations should strictly implement the resolution of the Eighth Plenum of the VCP Central Committee on eliminating the concentrated bureaucratic system of flat allocations, resolutely switching to socialist business, developing production, contributing much more to the state and ameliorating worker living standards, to deserve being the nation's major economic sector.

9213

CS0: 4209/644

AGRICULTURE

INTENSIVE ANTIDROUGHT CAMPAIGN IN NORTHERN PROVINCES

Hanoi QUAN DOI NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 25 Jul 85 p 1

[Article] "The North Intensively Fights Drought, Protects Seedlings, Prepares Soil For Sowing, Transplanting 10th-Month Rice On Schedule"]

[Text] (VNA) On 24 July, the chairman of the Council of Ministers sent to provinces from Binh Tri Thien to the north and to sectors of electric power, water conservancy, agriculture, supplies, planning and meteorology-hydrology the following telegram:

Due to tardy ripeness of the 5th-month spring rice, slow harvesting and ongoing drought, soil preparation and 10th-month rice sowing and transplanting have been very slow, in order to sow and transplant the 10th-month rice on the entire area on schedule and ensure a bumper 10th-month crop, the chairman of the Council of Ministers requests that:

1. Localities and installations concentrate labor force, draft power and irrigation means on fighting drought, protecting seedlings and accelerating soil preparation and 10th-month rice sowing and transplanting, and postpone unnecessary meetings in order to sow and transplant 10th-month rice on schedule. Army units and organs stationed in the localities should devise plans for assisting cooperatives in preparing soil, battling drought and sowing and transplanting 10th-month rice on the entire area.
2. Localities and installations fully avail themselves of natural sources of water and rudimentary means to distribute water to cope with drought while properly devoting all supplies of electricity, gasoline and oil to the same purposes, refraining from using electricity for nonurgent needs and through illegal hookups.
3. The Ministry of Power and the Northern Electric Power Corporation promptly supply electricity and the Ministry of Supply promptly supply gasoline and oil to fight drought.

The ministries of power, water conservancy and agriculture and the meteorology-hydrology general department regularly exchange views on the situation and promptly supply electricity to localities to fight drought, and strictly and correctly control the use of electricity to fight drought in keeping with state regulations on electric consumption.

According to the Ministry of Water Conservancy, as of 24 July, 295,000 hectares--equal to one-third of the 10th-month rice area--in 10 provinces of

the northern paddy granary were affected by drought, including 270,000 hectares served by electric pumps; in addition, some 10th-month rice seedling areas were also short of water.

Between 30,000 and 48,000 hectares were hit in the provinces of Thanh Hoa, Hai Hung, Ha Nam Ninh, Thai Binh and Ha Bac and in Hanoi. Due to hot weather and lack of rain, nearly 50,000 hectares in Thanh Hao Province were scorched--equal to about 35 percent of the 10th-month rice area. In Ha Nam Ninh Province, up to 45 high-lying hectares needed water while 30,000 low-lying hectares suffered waterlogging, causing difficulties to the 10th-month crop.

On 24 July, the ministries of power, water conservancy and agriculture met to discuss and adopt pressing measures to help installations and peasants to acquire enough water for preparing soil and sowing and transplanting the 10th-month rice crop on schedule. The Ministry of Power has reserved to localities 65,000 kWh for use 20 hours per day and 20,000 kWh for use 24 hours per day. Supply of electricity to the hardest hit provinces of Thanh Hoa and Ha Nam Ninh has increased from 150 to 200 percent over the previous week.

Currently, it is imperative to sow and transplant the 10th-month rice. Transplanting pace has been very slow, covering about 15 percent of the expected crop area. Weather continues to be hot, with little precipitation. During same periods in past years, the drought area was about as large as it is now. Experiences show that to actively contribute to achieving a bumper 10th-month crop and the 1985 grain production plan we must, from the central echelon down to localities, intensively mobilize peasants to fully utilize and exploit all sources of water through power- and oil-operated pumps and manual irrigation means to ensure adequate quantities of water for preparing soil and sowing and transplanting transplanted rice from waterlogging that may be caused by forthcoming rainfalls.

9213

CSO: 4209/644

AGRICULTURE

PROBLEMS ABOUT IMPORT, USE OF INSECTICIDES DISCUSSED

Hanoi NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 7 Aug 85 pp 2, 4

[Article by Nguyen Phuong Chi and Vuong Phuong Linh: "Strict Management of Import and Use of Insecticides -- Insecticides of Insufficient Quantities and Types and of Poor Quality -- Management To Be Unified and Plant Protection Units of Cooperatives To Be Consolidated"]

[Text] Insecticides are important materials for maintaining crop yield and output and at the same time provide the means to save labor in agricultural production. In our country, they have been widely used since the 1960's and have brought about good results. Realities have proved that using insecticide along with plant protection measures would limit damages caused by insects in the fields and in storehouses. Many documents that affirm the effectiveness of insecticide used on rice crops indicate this value: for every dong spent on buying insecticide and using it properly, damages will be spared for a volume of agricultural products valued at 1-1.5 dong. For other types of crops, the results are greater. In the case of cotton, the yield of the crop will not be reduced for up to 70 percent; jute up to 30 percent. In many countries, insecticides are used to kill weeds for crops and save 39-53 percent of the labor put into crop growing.

In the past years, in addition to developing production, our state attached importance to protecting production. Although it had to invest in many economic sectors, it still put aside a large amount of foreign currency to purchase raw materials for the production of insecticides for agricultural production. An annual average of from 14,000 to 15,000 tons of insecticides of various kinds was supplied to agriculture for production installations and laborers to fight harmful insects and diseases, to effectively protect crops and to considerably reduce damages affecting crop outputs.

The effects of insecticides on agricultural production are obviously very necessary. But at the present time, insecticides raise problems that need to be resolved early and are related not only to serving production but also to users of insecticides and consumers of agricultural products.

In agriculture, as the level of intensive cultivation gets higher, more importance must be attached to protecting production. Although the many measures to prevent and control harmful insects and weeds (sanitary measures in the fields, crop-growing measures, catching moths with nets, catching insects, and so on) considerably reduce the degrees of appearing, growing and causing damages to crops, they cannot totally replace the chemical insecticides. And in certain cases, the latter still are the determining force that drives back the harmful effects of insects. In the past years, in spite of the interest in investing in insecticides, the quantities of insecticides were still too small and were used for only 20-30 percent of the cultivated areas. In average each hectare of crop land received only .3-.4 kilogram of active substances (in the developed countries, an average of 6.4 kilograms of active substances was used in each hectare of land). Furthermore, there was a serious lack of balance among the insecticides. In the last 7 years (1977-1983), in average insect killers accounted for 73.98 percent; chemicals used to treat diseases, 16.59 percent; and weed killers, only 7.3 percent. In many production installations, although they grew rice crops in 300-400 hectares, they had only 5-7 quintals of insecticides for each crop season. Many cooperative directors complained and wished that, with such large cultivated areas, if only they had a reserve of a few tons of insecticides, their cooperatives would have avoided the additional loss of tens of tons of paddy. But there is another thing we should worry about -- the very poor quality of insecticides of all kinds. At the time of their use, some insecticides contained too many unwanted substances, dirt, sand, and so on. Many kinds of insecticides had greatly reduced effectiveness. The results of tests done by the specialized sector of a number of water-diluted insecticides showed that the methylparathion 50% suspension (containing 50 percent of the insect-killing substance) had only 40 percent; the insecticide 666 having 6 percent of the insect-killing substance had only 2-4 percent, and so on. That did not include the kinds of insecticides that had to be used within certain time limits, but by the time they were applied in the fields they no longer had the insect-killing quality. The lack of insecticides, their poor quality, the fact that they were not supplied in time, and so on not only created difficulties for production but also led to bad consequences in terms of economic results.

The toxic types of insecticides that are used to kill insects are also harmful to crops. Today, the production of the kinds of insecticides that are greatly toxic for people and domestic animals has been stopped and replaced by the kinds of chemicals that dissolve more quickly in the environment and are thus less toxic. But in reality, there are quite a few cases of improper use of insecticides that contaminate the vegetables, fruits and farm products that have been sprayed and threaten the lives of consumers. This is a source of worries for both insecticide users and farm product consumers.

In spite of the above-mentioned problems, we are fully capable of preventing any adverse effects if the system of managing the use of insecticides is organized in a strict and unified manner, particularly in production installations. It is regrettable that as the minimal regulations about handling these toxic chemicals are ignored by production installations and users, they can cause bad consequences.

In production installations, particularly in the "food belt" areas of large municipalities, the rules for storage and use of insecticides are too simple. The toxic kinds of insecticides that are dangerous for people and domestic animals are given directly to families to keep. As they are scattered, they are not in large quantities and their containers may be bottles and jars; the place to store them may be any corners in a house, inside a cabinet and even near the places where foods and beverages are stored. This practice causes harmful effects in many aspects: the odor of insecticides causes irritation for people; what is dropped on floors may be eaten by domestic animals, which get poisoned; improper use of insecticides may endanger human lives. On the other hand, when insecticides are in the hands of laborers, their use is determined by them; in many cases of early infestation of rice crops and vegetables, in which manual destruction of insects or use of proper amounts of insecticide can be effective, the fact that the families of laborers just go ahead and apply insecticide to deal with them is costly and wasteful and yet does not bring about good economic results. We do not mention yet the case of insecticides becoming an item for circulation in the free market and thus creating opportunities for negative deeds.

The storage of insecticides by the common people has been the source of pollution that is harmful to the health of people, domestic animals, and so on. But when insecticides are used to destroy harmful insects, we have a lot more to worry about because no importance is attached to labor safety procedures. There are two things being involved in this matter. One, the organs in charge and the units directly involved in production both lack the concern and care to be extended to the people who do this heavy job. On the other hand, the laborers themselves do not strictly observe labor safety discipline.

The use of insecticides to protect plants must be able to satisfy the two closely related needs -- to help protect crops and to cause no or few adverse effects on people, useful living things and the environment. In order to fulfill the above goal, the plant protection sector has adopted practical regulations, such as "using the right insecticide, the proper concentration and amount, at the right time and in the right manner; keeping insecticides within the right time allowed." It is necessary to strictly manage the import of insecticides, to avoid the situation in which "people do things the way they like to do them," and thus to avoid troubles and difficulties for the management of this toxic product.

11 October 1985

AGRICULTURE

AGRICULTURE MINISTRY ADOPTS SEEDS SECURING POLICY

OW291254 Hanoi Domestic Service in Vietnamese 1100 GMT 27 Sep 85

[Text] The Ministry of Agriculture recently sent the following message to the provincial people's committees and agricultural services in various localities.

In order to secure, through preparations, sufficient seeds for vigorous production for the 1985-86 winter and winter-spring crops and the 1986 10th-month rice crop, the Agriculture Ministry urges fulfillment of the following requirements:

1. Seeds for the winter crop, especially for sweet potatoes, potatoes, vegetables, and legumes: Immediately conduct controls to assess the amounts localities can preserve and use really well; provide guidance on widespread use of the technique to separate potato sprouts for larger cultivation; mobilize those areas with surpluses to assist the areas suffering from shortages; launch a movement to get families, organs, schools, and troops in the areas not affected by waterlogging and flooding to provide more sweet potato vines to stricken areas; vigorously carry out production of sweet potatoes and corn for the winter and winter-spring crops; and send cadres to the Vegetables and Fruit Corporation, under the Ministry of Agriculture, to urgently solve vegetable seeds problems.
2. The 1985-86 winter-spring rice seeds: Organize the people in the areas struck by waterlogging and flooding to preserve seeds so that rice seed sowing will be carried out within the growing period; provincial and district authorities must assess the shortages and seek assistance from other areas, to ensure that cultivation will be done in all the planned acreage. Any further shortages must be immediately brought to the attention, through official requests, of the Council of Ministers and the agriculture minister for solution.
3. Rice seeds for the 1986 10th-month crop: Provincial and district authorities should assess the shortages for each type suffered by the flood-stricken areas, and assign the areas not affected by waterlogging and flooding with the task of providing seedlings to the stricken areas, and should adopt proper incentive policies. Only after this measure, the major one, has failed to secure all the necessary seeds, will any further shortages be reported, through official requests, to the Council of Ministers for solution.

CSO: 4209/3

AGRICULTURE

PEOPLE URGED TO STRIVE FOR WINTER CROP CULTIVATION

OW300058 Hanoi Domestic Service in Vietnamese 1100 GMT 27 Sep 85

[Article: "Cultivate the Winter Crop With the Highest Effort"]

[Text] Boosting winter crop production may be done by expanding the cultivated hectareage through multicropping, and also by carrying out intensive cultivation, so as to increase the output per cultivate unit and, thereby, augment the income of the producer, increase social products, and positively contribute to resolving food problems.

Under conditions in which the average per capita food production in our country is only about 300 kilos--the margin between food sufficiency and food shortage--the winter crop must be considered a main crop, and, despite difficult circumstances, we must strive to cultivate the winter crop in the largest possible hectareage, and with the highest yield.

Recent torrential rains have caused flooding and waterlogging in many areas, and will considerably lower the rice yield of the 10th-month rice crop. Therefore, this year's winter crop not only has a long-term impact--because it lays the foundation for development in the coming years--but contributes directly to resolving livelihood difficulties in the pre-harvest March days in the coming year.

This year's winter crop is being carried out under conditions in which the 10th-month rice was planted slowly, and the cultivation pattern of the early 10th-month rice, especially the very early 10th-month rice, was upset. This has complicated the growing of the winter crop. Most of the organic and nonorganic fertilizers and insecticides were invested in the two main rice crops, and their investment in the winter crop is consequently limited. Moreover, due to the fact that we have recorded four or five successive bumper crops, we are somewhat relaxed in preparing for and giving guidance on the winter crop. When the soil of high-ground paddies was still wet, and waters were receding slowly from the areas struck by flooding or waterlogging, the winter crop growing period had already begun.

We must clearly realize these difficulties and shortcomings so as to carry out the winter crop cultivation intensively and in the spirit of growing this year's crop while preparing seeds for the winter crops in the years to come.

Patches of the early 10th-month rice in high-ground paddies are being harvested, and waters are receding rapidly from the areas struck by flooding and waterlogging, exposing soil in many spots where the winter crop can be grown. It is necessary to race against time and mobilize forces and facilities to rapidly harvest the ripened rice and drain the excess water more rapidly in order to cultivate early-winter crops of corn, sweet potatoes, and garlic.

If the early-winter crop cannot be planted by 15 October, engineers from the Agriculture Ministry advise that the soil that will be available later should be used for planting such late-winter crop plants as potatoes and short-term vegetables. However, if seeds are available, seedlings can be grown in advance--in late September or early October--so that they can be grown in paddies in mid- or late-October whenever the soil is available. Different kinds of corn seeds, such as VM-1, TS-B2, and SB-49, can be used.

Potato plants are major winter crop plants, which give high yields and whose seasonability is pretty long--between mid-October and mid- or late-November. The greatest difficulties now, however, are seed shortages. Experiences that have been gained in past years and proven scientifically show that to overcome seed shortages, we can cut a seed potato into many parts, each with a sprout in it. In this manner, we can greatly increase the number of potato plants.

Regarding short-term vegetables, such as mustard greens and horse-radish of various types, we can grow them immediately in rice paddies from which flood waters have receded. In this manner, we will be able to make full use of the available soil while contributing to solving vegetable difficulties during the vegetable preharvest period.

Regarding cultivation measures, in the areas with large planned cultivated areas for winter crops, special attention must be paid to the problem of draft forces for soil preparation for this year's winter crop. This is especially true in the areas struck by flooding and waterlogging. It is anticipated that the bulk of the draft force will be provided by animals, because it is difficult for large tractors to operate in the paddies where waters cannot be drained soon enough. Therefore, caring well for the draft cattle and buffaloes and strictly coordinating and managing the draft forces are positive measures that contribute to meeting the winter crop's cultivated hectare targets.

Depending on actual conditions in each locality, production installations can further expand their forms of leasing land, with partial support in materials, seeds, and capital through loans, in order to create conditions for the cooperative members or collective units to carry out the winter crop production favorably right from the start. We must conduct controls to ensure that the planned cultivated hectare will be met, and take the initiative in getting assistance from areas with surpluses to areas suffering from shortages; organize and manage well the work force, materials, and technical means; and positively apply appropriate technological techniques to promptly overcome weather vagaries. With sufficient preparations we will certainly achieve an all-round successful winter crop, further boosting winter crop production in subsequent years and contributing to resolving the immediate difficulties resulting from the expected low-yield 10th-month rice crop.

AGRICULTURE

BRIEFS

FLOOD CONTROL MEASURES--The Standing Committee of the Council of Ministers recently heard reports by the ministers of agriculture and water conservancy and the chairman of the Central Committee for Flood and Typhoon Control on waterlogging and inundation caused by heavy rainfall in early September in the Bac Bo Delta provinces and Thanh Hoa Province. After hearing the reports, the Standing Committee decided on a number of immediate measures and instructed various localities, ministries, and central sectors to immediately carry out some urgent tasks to overcome the aftermath of the flash floods, restore production, and stabilize the people's lives. [Text] [Hanoi Domestic Service in Vietnamese 1430 GMT 27 Sep 85]

CSO: 4209/3

HEAVY INDUSTRY AND CONSTRUCTION

COAL SHORTAGE IN HEART OF COAL LAND

Hanoi NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 19 Jul 85 p 2

[Article by Trinh Ngoc Bao, Quang Ninh Coal Supply Corporation: "Coal Shortage Right At Heart of Coal Land!"]

[Text] Coal as fuel is one of the quota goods which have been sold to cadres, workers, civil servants and the armed forces at low prices as part of the policy of paying wages in kind.

But its supply in a number of places has been very erratic. Even municipalities in the coal areas, such as Uong Bi, Hon Gai and Cam Pha, have been inadequately supplied, let alone far away cities, municipalities and towns. Many cadres, workers and civil servants have not received a single kilogram of coal during a whole year while the distribution of ration stamps and coupons was nothing more than a formality patterned after the bureaucratic system of flat allocations regardless of productivity. Prices were not rational: the trade sector purchased Hon Gai No 5 powdered coal at 370 dong a ton--excluding costs for transportation, unloading, loading and warehouse and wharf storage, as well as wastes and losses--for which it could get only 35 dong at resale, thus making it more difficult to deal in the commodity.

The resolution of the Eighth Plenum of the VCP Central Committee on prices, wages and money has laid the groundwork for overcoming this situation. The sectors of finance, industry and communications and transportation should promptly help the trade sector produce coal briquettes, or bring powdered coal and peat right to where consumers live, open many more convenient sale spots, supply coal regularly, in sufficient quantities and of required quality, and sell at commercial business prices (after including price increases in wages as some localities have done). This also is a pressing measure aimed at contributing to properly implementing Resolution 8 of the VCP Central Committee on prices, wages and money, to resolutely eliminating the bureaucratic system of flat allocations and switching to economic accounting and socialist business.

9213

CSO: 4209/607

END TO COAL PRICE SUBSIDY SOUGHT

Hanoi NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 8 Jul 85 p 3

[Article by Pham Thanh and Tran Kham: "Coal Prices--As Coal Sells at Low Prices Far Below Production Cost, More Production Means More Losses; State Subsidies to Coal Sector in Compensation for Losses Are Too Great, Equal to 73 Percent of Total Profit of Light Industry Sectors; Coal Workers Are Paid Less than Workers of Other Production Sectors; We Should Immediately Conduct Economic Accounting To Include All Expenses in Production Cost and Set Rational Coal Prices"]

[Text] Coal is a precious resource of the nation and a source of energy and a basic material needed by various production sectors for development. Coal mining, as it goes deeper, is more difficult and more expensive; in order to collect, through sifting and selection, 1 ton of coal of the correct kind and quality according to consumer specifications, one must go through a handicraft production process with many complex technical stages. Coal is prized by everyone, so prized that it is called "black gold," nevertheless, it can sell only at the lowest price due to the system of flat allocations regardless of productivity. A chief reason for impeded coal production is that coal prices have been set very low, far below its real value. Because of these extremely low prices, coal has become a globetrotter with large quantities of the combustible being stolen during transportation and wasted by consumers. Each year, no fewer than 600,000 tons of coal are absorbed by brick kilns operated by cooperatives or private businesses alone; but the state has not been able to purchase a single piece of brick from them. For many years now, treating the coal sector as an economic spearhead, the state has made a big investment effort, opening new mines and acquiring additional vehicles and mining equipment. Quite a few policies and procedures have been issued, aimed at caring for the miners' living conditions; the coal sector also has strived to grow and measure up to the situation; and many installations have clearly shown dynamism in organizing production and livelihood. However, that common endeavor has failed to generate corresponding efficiency. If we continue to compute prices on the basis of the flat-allocation system--stubbornly maintaining coal prices to avoid repercussions--the coal sector will become a burden for national finances and also for localities having large numbers of coal workers--a burden because of the need for paying wages in cash and in kind.

In light of the resolution of the Eighth Plenum of the VCP Central Committee (Session V) on prices, wages and money, the coal sector must actively embrace economic accounting and socialist business in order to determine whether the entire sector, or any installation, is in the red or black. Not only the coal sector, but also other economic sectors believe it is necessary to raise coal prices, now trailing very far behind those in the domestic and international markets. Imported supplies account for about 85 percent of the production cost of 1 ton of coal sold to consumers. Especially, No 6 powdered coal (which can be exported) used as fuel and for baking lime, bricks and tiles, sells in Hanoi at prices lower than that of a pair of women's clogs.

Given these unchanged coal prices, the coal sector obviously needs subsidies to make up for losses. But these losses are fake. While the state and the coal sector incur great losses, many places resell coal at prices close to those in the free market, raking in money in the process. Many coal-using installations make a big profit because coal accounts for only a very low percentage of their production cost; many brick and tile kilns and privately run restaurants make a fortune buying cheap coal. Thus, coal prices have been arbitrarily restrained and prevented from reflecting coal's real value while prices of other coal-related commodities are free to fluctuate and go upward.

In the past, in fixing coal prices officials reasoned that since coal provides energy to production it should lose so that other sectors might gain. A coalpit miner receives a salary two to three times lower than that of a worker in a light industry installation, or of a salesclerk,

To increase coal production rapidly, we should promptly and resolutely get rid of the bureaucratic flat-allocation system and decisively switch to economic accounting and socialist business, along with rearranging production organization and expanding the active role of installations, particularly the right to master their own finances, including foreign currency. Prices must stay close to commodity values, and accordingly, we must add all actual production expenses to the manufacturing cost of 1 ton of coal, also including resource tax, the cost of imported supplies and additional expenses which may arise in the coming years. We suggest a halt to making compensatory subsidies to the coal-production sector from now on. Installations operating with poor efficiency and incurring real losses should be investigated to determine whether they should continue or close. Installations making a profit for doing business in keeping with Resolution 8 should be entitled--as well as their personnel--to enjoy appropriate profit-sharing, thus putting an end to the old-fashioned practices of confusing profit-sharing with bestowing favors on, or giving comfort to workers. The great and comprehensive restructuring of prices, wages and monies in line with Resolution 8 of the Central Committee will lead to an enthusiastic labor emulation movement aimed at accelerating coal production and pushing the coal sector ahead with new vitality and with the purpose of achieving high productivity, quality and efficiency.

9213

CSO: 4209/607

HEAVY INDUSTRY AND CONSTRUCTION

STRICTER BRICK, TILE PRODUCTION MANAGEMENT SOUGHT

Hanoi NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 2 Jul 85 p 3

[Article by Xuan Thuy: "Management of Baked Brick and Tile Production; More Than 3,000 Hectares of Cultivated Land Are Destroyed Each Year; More Than 600,000 Tons of Coal Are Lost Each Year During Transportation; Brick and Tile Production Can Be Managed Better"]

[Text] New advances in the building industry, including the prefab technique, are currently being applied. However, postwar needs continue to be huge and traditional building methods keep playing a key role in the rural areas. To meet these needs, production of baked bricks and tiles has unceasingly been on the rise. According to statistics issued by the Ministry of Building, the entire sector produced 2.5 billion bricks in 1983 and 3.1 billion in 1984--a 900-million-brick increase over 1981 (this figure, in fact, is lower than the real number of bricks produced each year). State production accounts for only 30 to 40 percent, leaving the rest to cooperatives and private producers. Failing to understand correctly the importance of brick and tile production management, some localities have allowed kilns to proliferate. Taking advantage of that situation, some people have hired laborers to dig and build subterranean kilns to fire bricks and tiles for sale. Lax management of brick and tile production has given rise to many problems which must be solved with diligence.

First, baking bricks and tiles requires the use of earth. According to the Ministry of Building, in order to have 2.5 billion of bricks we must use 6 million m³ of earth--an annual loss of more than 3,000 hectares of tillable land. It is impossible not to ponder a massive waste of arable land at a time when manpower and wealth are concentrated on opening virgin land and expanding cultivated areas.

Second, to have 2.5 billion bricks, we must burn 1.2 million tons of coal. Currently, due to difficulties, coal supply is still insufficient. Each year, the state sets aside from 700,000 to 800,000 tons of coal for brick and tile production; but installations receive only 30 to 35 percent of that quota. Where, then, does the remainder go? Owing to defects in management, and to the fact that installations are not able to directly handle and accurately weigh outgoing and incoming shipments, coal is openly stolen every day while being transported, mostly on waterways. More than 600,000 tons of coal are lost each year along transportation lines. Stolen coal

mostly finds its way into brick kilns operated by cooperatives and private business engaged in noncontract production. The state invests a rather great amount of money in producing 1 ton of coal. These losses are absorbed by consumer units by including them in manufacturing cost; by contrast, sales of stolen coal are pocketed by thieves and bricks and tiles are hauled to the free market.

Third, because of lax production management, brick and tile quality has gradually deteriorated. Nearly all bricks and tiles produced under contract have not met size and quality standards. Fishing in troubled waters, some management and supply officials have even resorted to product upgrading, sharing the illicitly earned profit among themselves. In the past several years, brick and tile quality has decreased to an alarming level, causing a great impact on building project longevity.

Fourth, in addition to losses, to waste of arable land, coal and firewood and to reduced quality--as described above--remiss brick and tile management has prevented the state from controlling products and managing construction. As a matter of fact, we have not yet been able to satisfy the people's need for construction development; but, if brick and tile production were under effective and total control, we would be able to some extent to curb such illegal building practices as building on a narrow space between two houses, building on the edges of a vacant lot, and building houses without permits in the cities, and building in a disorderly manner, without respect for planning and standards in the countryside, as we now see. Furthermore, each year the state would have additional billions of bricks and tiles on hand for exchange for agricultural products with peasants.

In light of these realities, a question has emerged, "Can we manage production of baked bricks and tiles better?" An inquiry shows that some localities have begun to do well. Look, for instance, at Thai Binh, a province with a small land mass, a large population, no mountains and a very low per capita arable land. Promptly aware of the people's building need, it has carried out planned rural transformation while building brick houses in the countryside. In past years, due to proper management and organization of earth digging and of brick and tile baking, tillable land has not been infringed upon, and there have been brick houses and yards for the people and an improved rural communication network, setting an example in rural communication expansion for the entire nation to follow.

Brick and tile production management in Dien Ban District (Quang Nam-Da Nang) also is an outstanding model. Officials there simply reason that land is owned by society but placed under unified state management. Use of land for residential and planting purposes is limited to a 30-cm depth; hence, exploitation of land below that line is subject to government authorization and payment of taxes. Since the state has not yet levied taxes on units and individuals involved in brick- and tile-making, Dien Ban District used the agricultural tax as a basis for tax assessment. Strict regulations have resulted in no brick kilns operating illegally and no chaotic earth digging; in addition, the district has had enough bricks and tiles to build public projects and houses for families of the war dead and families having meritoriously served the revolution in the locality.

Production of building materials is a matter of strategic significance requiring intensive examination and settlement at state level. Is it always necessary to build with baked bricks and tiles alone? What is the remedy? These problems should be promptly solved. The building sector has made a great effort at using hill earth for brick firing but without substantial results. In recent years, the mechanical building sector has manufactured special equipment, such as the R-53 earth mixer, to turn out nonbaked bricks; however, related agencies in charge of evaluating economic values and providing raw materials--stone, sand, cement, etc.--have not yet received systematic and tangible consideration. In some localities where conditions for lime burning exist, people have introduced the use of lime, or lime residue, mixed with debris of coal, earth and sand, to make Parpaign bricks. Also, research organs have not devoted sufficient attention to these initiatives. Consequently, there are neither appropriate technical standards and production regulations, nor specific guidance in making and using these products.

Above are only a few thoughts about the problem. The state should conduct in-depth and methodical symposia to find a strategy for producing building materials. At present, it is imperative to increase production capabilities of state-run installations. We should resolutely eliminate installations currently using arable land illegally to make bricks and tiles. We should reexamine the capabilities of areas where conditions for nonbaked brick production exist, with a view to assigning them appropriate production norms.

9213

CSO: 4209/607

PROBLEMS IN TRAINING HANDICRAFT WORKERS IN HA SON BINH

Hanoi TIEU CONG NGHIEP THU CONG NGHIEP in Vietnamese 28 Jun 85 p 7

[Article by Hoang Trong Dang, of the Ha Son Binh School of Fine Arts: "Why Are There Problems in the Training of Fine Arts Handicraft Workers in Ha Son Binh?"]

[Text] Ha Son Binh Province has over 150 small industry and handicraft professions, of which one-third falls in the categories of fine arts handicrafts. It is the cradle of many traditional skills with national and international reputed: Van Phuc silk, La Khe thin silk, Boi Village lacquerware, Chuyen My mother-of-shell inlaying, Quat Dong embroidery, Phu Vinh rattan weaving, Ninh Son bamboo weaving, etc. Fine arts handicraft workers number over 100,000. The provincial small industry and handicraft sector has its own training school which trains fine arts workers in five traditional skills: lacquer, mother-of-shell inlaying, wood sculpture, embroidery and lacemaking, and rattan and bamboo weaving. The school was created in 1973. From 1973 to 1979, it was in full development and annually graduated from 300 to 400 skilled workers who were assigned to professional cooperatives in the province. The largest numbers of graduates took embroidery, with lacquer second. However, from early 1980 to 1984, there was a visible decrease in the number of trainees although the school, in an effort to join forces with the state and the people and groups in providing on-the-spot training, had dispatched training cadres to this effect.

After 10 years of doing training work in Ha Son Binh, I think that we may learn from the following points:

--In its initial period, the Ha Son Binh training school traveled a fast pace in the formation of workers because production so required. Cooperatives then received large orders while they had few workers. Therefore, the need for increasing the latter was acute. On the other hand, many localities created new professional, fine arts handicraft cooperatives.

When the number of workers was sufficient to meet the demands of peak production, worker training came to a halt. At that point, I call the number of workers available the median number. After 6 months of training, although they needed more practice, the workers could nevertheless make export goods, being able to meet export goods requirements because of familiarization

with the work. Cooperatives felt no worry because for decades, they had made only a few products that needed no better technique and, therefore, improvement of worker skills had not been necessary.

In our common difficult living conditions, for a cooperative member who already had a skill, taking a training course at school was a difficult matter. The state gave only a 24-dong scholarship (later increased to 48 dong), and the trainee had to provide rice, other food items bought at free market prices, living expenses and firewood, on his own. As a consequence, not many students reported to training courses.

Later on, the school reverted to the method of on-the-spot training and could muster enough students. Nevertheless, after many courses were completed, there was not enough work for everybody because of insufficient orders. Many trainees had to change jobs. It is obvious that the worker who completes a training course expects a corresponding job and that is the prime condition for training development.

--There was not enough attention given by the state to the training of workers in the collective area. The state must consider a fine arts handicraft school as a technical school and as such, its policies and procedures must be enforced accordingly. On the other hand, to alleviate student material problems, the state must also treat a fine arts handicraft student the same way a technical student is treated during the whole training course (6 months, 9 months, or 1 year, etc.), according to the training length of each profession.

In the present situation, because of lack of planning (in a province area, for example), worker training has become passive and, hence, stalemated. In addition, another not less important reason that played a decisive role in the whole training context was the lack of clear-cut and concrete rules governing the incentives benefiting a worker having completed a training course, primarily with regard to fine arts handicraft cooperatives in agriculture which I call semitechnical cooperatives.

9458

CSO: 4209/625

11 October 1985

LABOR

DEFECTS IN FORMER LABOR, COMPENSATION POLICIES

Hanoi NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 25 Jul 85 p 2

[Article by Hoa Ngan, Phu Khanh, "Many Defects in Former Labor and Compensation Policies"]

[Text] Since the beginning of July, organs and enterprises in Phu Khanh Province have switched to paying wages in cash, creating a cheerful and invigorating labor spirit.

Looking back at the former method of paying wages mostly in kind, we now see many defects in past labor and compensation policies. Quite a few workers and civil servants received more ration stamps and coupons than permitted by standards relating to functions, sectors and professions. They worked at an organ or enterprise in one place but applied for household registration and for grain and food ration stamps and coupons in another place. Localities distributing ration stamps and coupons did not know well the functions, sectors and professions of cadres and workers in organs and enterprises. In turn, these organs and enterprises did not know well what kinds of stamps and coupons their cadres and workers received from the local administration, thinking that they had nothing to lose if distribution quotas were exceeded. However, when payment in kind was switched to payment in cash, it appeared that insincere registrants earned more than cadres and workers of the same or higher levels, some of whom were even making more than a director. Numerous skilled laborers, or those doing heavy manual labor have not readjusted their ration and stamp coupon quotas in keeping with requirements after they were transferred to administrative positions, or promoted to new jobs. Promotion to a higher wage level made them earn a small amount of money but lose 4 or 6 kg of rice (from 19 or 17 kg down to 13 kg)--a great loss of money. Referring to these instances, officials in charge of labor and wages in organs and enterprises reasoned that in commonsense, readjustment means increase and not reduction, and that reduction in grain and food quotas may cause people to wink at transfers and promotions. Dividing grain allotment standards into many levels is no longer rational. For instance, cadres receive D and E stamps while workers from Level 1 to Level 5 have up to 6 levels of grain--13, 15, 16, 17, 18 and 21 kg. No one can consume all 18 or 21 kg of rice a month, and people are continually allowed to receive it for resale, or animal husbandry purposes. Because of different methods of registration, cadres and workers belonging to the same level receive different amounts

of grain, some 13 kg, others 16 kg, and still others 18 kg. This has happened not at units far apart, but rather inside a single mechanical enterprise.

In that enterprise, a married couple with four children was able to receive grain quotas for only two of their children. But another family with three children and two parents was allowed to receive grain for all five dependents. Within a short period of time, we uncovered these objectionable facts. Everyone has come to realize the need for resolutely improving organizational work and rearranging organ and enterprise management in order to successfully apply the new payment method, which is more suitable to the principle of distribution according to labor quality and quantity.

9213

CSO: 4209/604

LABOR

MAIN POINTS OF REGULATIONS ON FORCED LABOR PUBLISHED

Hai Phong HAI PHONG in Vietnamese 31 May 85 pp 2, 4

[Article: "On the Forced Labor System"]

[Text] In response to requests of many readers, HAI PHONG publishes below some main points of interministerial Circular 12 TT/LB of the ministries of labor and interior guiding the implementation of the forced labor system.

I. Targets of Forced Labor: The administration at various levels is responsible for arranging employment for all able-bodied local residents, creating conditions for everyone to make a living while contributing to society. A few individuals who are lazy and vagrant and have stubbornly refused to work must be subject to forced labor.

Three categories of persons are subject to forced labor:

1. People currently residing in wards, subwards and villages (aged 18 and above) who are able-bodied but have refused to work--including those not engaged in production and building work, or engaged in fake employment designed to dodge labor (working 3 to 5 days a month), or in a business to which the state has denied registration eligibility--whom the administration at the basic level has asked to appear for work, or has assigned work to, but who have persistently shown noncompliance, although a third summons has been sent (summons are sent 15 days apart).

2. Graduates from colleges, middle vocational schools and vocational schools at home and abroad who have not complied with work assigned by the state, and whom authorized state organs (Ministry of Higher and Vocational Education, Ministry of Labor, ministries and sectors in charge, and provincial and municipal people's committees) have punished by withdrawing or withholding diplomas, and by referring to the administration of their places of residence for management and finding employment, but who have persistently refused to labor--some of whom have even engaged in work not authorized by the state--despite second summons having been sent by the administration at the basic level.

3. People formerly working at organs and state enterprises who have been compelled to resign from work as a disciplinary measure, and have been returned to their places of residence for management and finding employment, but have persistently refused to labor--some of whom have even engaged in businesses to which the state has denied registration eligibility, despite a second summons having been sent by the administration at the basic level.

Temporary deferments can be sought by the above persons if they are gravely ill and certified as such by a physician, or are pregnant women nursing a baby under 3 months of age, or are encountering special difficulties (fire, serious illnesses affecting husbands, fathers and mothers, or wives and children, etc.) and are certified by the administration at the basic level as being mainly responsible for their families' well-being.

II. Lengths and Forms of Forced Labor.

A. Forced labor lasts from 6 to 24 months and is divided into 3 levels:

1. Six months for those who have just reached the working age;
2. Twelve months for those who have been lazy and averse to labor; compelled to resign from enterprises and organs, or punished by state organs through withdrawing and withholding diplomas and sending back to the administration of their places of residence for management, but who have persistently refused to labor and accept assignments from the administration at the basic level--some of whom have even engaged in businesses not authorized by the state;
3. Those referred to in points a and b above who have obstinately defied the discipline of organs in charge of forced laborers, and have carried out activities detrimental to order and security and to the people's interests and lives, can be compelled to perform 6, 12 or 18 additional months of forced labor (with a total not exceeding 24 months).

B. Depending on each individual's health conditions and particular circumstances, either concentrated forced labor or on-the-spot forced labor is to be applied.

1. Concentrated forced labor for those who are healthy and capable of taking part in capital building, production, exploitation of building materials, transportation and new economic zones building. They must work and live at production installations.

Depending on the demands and nature of the work, a concentrated labor installation can accommodate from 100 to 300 persons. Cadres in charge of forced labor management are on state rolls.

2. On-the-spot forced labor for those having poor health and difficulties and very few helping hands in their families. They must be organized into units and groups for subsequent fusion with production units near by.

Chiefs of units utilizing forced laborers are bound to manage them in all respects, enforcing compliance with regulations and strict discipline and conducting periodic review and evaluations of each individual's labor results and progress.

III. Tasks of Forced Laborers.

--correctly observe lengths and schedules and ensure completion of set labor norms;

--correctly comply with labor laws and regulations.

Those regularly fulfilling their tasks and exceeding set norms and assigned labor productivity are eligible, after 6 months, for being considered for a reduction in forced labor time from 3 to 6 months, depending on individual progress.

Upon completion of their corvee, forced laborers are issued a certificate and sent back to their places of residence. The administration at the basic level is bound to mindfully find employment for them so that they can be useful to society.

The administration at the basic level or the labor management unit is required to take steps to send to reform camps those doing any of the following: resisting the forced labor order (escaping from their places of work more than two times) or seriously violating order and security and the people's interests and lives with acts of thievery and battery, or continuing to be slouthful upon completion of forced labor time (including additional periods).

9213
CSO: 4209/641

UNION DIRECTIVE ON IMPLEMENTING CPV CENTRAL COMMITTEE RESOLUTION

Hanoi LAO DONG in Vietnamese 25 Jul 85 pp 1,3

[Article: "Secretariat of the Confederation of Trade Unions Issues Directive for the Implementation of Resolution of the Eighth Plenum of the CPV Central Committee"]

[Text] On 10 July 1985, the secretariat of the Confederation of Trade Unions issued Directive No 18 pointing out the missions of the system of trade unions in the mobilization of workers and employees to successfully carry out the resolution of the Eighth Plenum of the CPV Central Committee on prices, wages and money. The directive indicated:

The resolution of the Central Committee illustrates radical changes in party policies and measures, not only in matters of prices, wages and money, but also in the areas of distribution and circulation and of structural planning and economic management, aiming at eliminating centralized, bureaucratic and overbearing structures, reverting entirely to socialist economic accounting and business, and creating favorable conditions for the economy to stride a new step forward.

The present total reform on prices and wages will make a decisive breakthrough in reverting to a socialist pattern in accounting and business and will profoundly affect the economy and society in the sense that it will shape our way of thinking, our morals and our politics, and that it will bring about a better situation.

The implementation of this vigorous and profound change of direction requires of each worker and cadre, each base unit, locality and sector a radical transformation in matters of perception, thought, and business and management patterns. We must strive to overcome dependency on others, irresponsibility and bureaucratic and overbearing habits that have encroached too long among cadres, workers, and employees. Workers and employees must be the vanguards and be a reliable bulwark of the party and the state in successfully implementing this strong and deep transformation. Trade unions will be responsible for propaganda and proselytizing activities aiming at making workers and employees fully aware of concepts and contents of the party resolution. They will try to launch movements appealing to workers to self-consciously contribute to the implementation of measures related

to prices, wages and money, in connection with the completion of the 1985 state plan. To this effect, worker organizations must make radical changes in perception, organization and work methods, thoroughly understand those changes in the new policies and measures of the state, strongly develop the right to collective ownership of workers and employees, and make everybody understand, warmly respond to, and actively and strictly carry out the resolution of the CPV Central Committee. All levels of the Confederation of Trade Unions must see to it that the above will be central tasks for now until the end of 1985. All leadership potential and cadre forces must be mustered for their good implementation. The execution of these tasks must be closely linked to the successful implementation of the 1985 state plan, to the improvement of management methods in industry and in capital construction, especially the renovation of planning structures that aim at the optimal exploitation of all potentialities in the formulation of the 1986 state plan as indicated by the fourth congress of the Executive Committee of the Confederation of Trade Unions. On the basis of the development of collective ownership by workers and employees, we must strive to fight conservatism and inertia, and ensure the pressing and resolute execution of new policies on prices, wages and money. In the meantime, we must uncover in a timely manner all deviation symptoms, carelessness in formulating projects and plans, and all other complex problems stemming from the execution of the resolution and report to the party and state for corrective measures.

In the framework of their responsibilities, organizations of the Confederation of Trade Unions must concentrate their capabilities and means to accomplish the following tasks:

We will conduct propaganda and proselytizing activities to make workers and employees fully cognizant of and resolutely willing to carry out new policies and measures pertaining to prices, wages and money, and to the structural changes in economic management. Attention must be focused on making cadres, workers and employees understand fundamental thoughts and concepts, contents, and reasons for policy changes, primarily price and wage policies.

Higher levels of the Confederation of Trade Unions must provide advanced training for key cadres at the basic level of the confederation in order that they get a good grasp of new policies and measures. They will dispatch training cadres to base units to this effect.

In the spirit of discussing together, working together, and taking responsibility together, we will coordinate with people's committees and with same-level related sectors in the formulation and provision of guidance for the implementation of plans pertaining to prices, wages, social subsidies and business activities, as directed by the resolution of the Eighth Plenum of the CPV Central Committee. We will recommend to people's committees and to higher echelons of base units that clear-cut determination, which will ensure the development of workers and employees' spirit of collective ownership, be made in rearranging production, setting standards, product unit prices, and price subsidy bonuses, and in measures geared toward financial autonomy of units.

In terms of concrete missions of the various levels of the Confederation of Trade Unions, after pointing out the missions of sector trade unions of the central level and of local federations of trade unions, the directive emphasized the following missions of basic trade unions:

On the basis of a thorough understanding of the need to eliminate bureaucratic and overbearing attitudes and to completely revert to the socialist accounting and business style, trade unions will coordinate with unit leaders in organizing meetings in which cadres and workers will discuss and recapitulate the production and business situation, pointing out residual phenomena of bureaucratic and overbearing style in planning and in managing material supplies, labor, wages, product cost and consumption, and in analyzing subjective causes as well as those stemming from higher levels. Trade unions will contribute ideas to unit leaders on planning improvement (including production and product consumption plans); on reorganizing production and labor; on improving labor, material supply and financial management in order to stabilize and develop production, increase work time, increase the equipment output ratio, strengthen labor management, and increase labor output, product quality and economic efficiency. By the same token, trade unions and enterprises will work together in the production of new products, arranging contract ordering of goods and other service contracts in order to provide employment for excess workers in a timely manner.

Trade unions will coordinate with enterprise directors in tailoring a wage system for cadres, workers and employees, in providing price subsidy bonuses and in carrying out the new wage policy. On the basis of the new wage level, they will redetermine the wage unit price and continue to expand the forms of contracting, piece rate wages, product wages, awards, and giving the contract wage fund to shops, teams, and production groups. They will coordinate with experts in recomputing product cost. They will mobilize cadres and workers in checking economic and technical standards and cost factors, and in recommending measures to eliminate inappropriate expenses that raise production cost. They will enforce workers' and employees' rights to inspection and control, trade union rights, and efficiently fight negative acts to ensure a successful implementation of new party measures pertaining to prices, wages and money. They will organize worker teams that will make sure that correct types of merchandise are sold, and inspect the application of regulated prices and product quality at state-operated stores, marketing cooperative stores and private stores. They will uncover, recommend penalties, and immediately prohibit illegal price hikes (higher than regulated by central and local governments). They will allow workers and employees to participate in material supply, goods, property and equipment inventories, uncover concealments, coverups, substitutions, and illegal transfers.

In order to fulfill the Confederation of Trade Unions' responsibility in advocating workers and employees to successfully carry out the resolution of the Eighth Plenum of the CPV Central Committee, trade unions at all echelons must actually make radical changes in perception, thinking, organization and work methods.

From now until the end of 1985, all activities of trade unions of various levels must concentrate on encouraging workers and employees in the execution of the new policies pertaining to prices, wages and money, and in connection with management improvement in industrial enterprises and in capital construction. All forms of activities in relation to propaganda, education, cadre management, organization of emulation movements, etc., must be linked to and address this central task. We must resolutely eliminate all impractical deeds and methods that are not compatible with economic management improvement measures and with the enhancement of economic and business effectiveness.

The Directive concluded:

The resolution of the Eighth Plenum of the CPV Central Committee has overwhelming importance. Let all workers and employees and all trade union organizations develop their sense of responsibility and contribute to successful implementation of the resolution in order to bring about further change, stimulate production development, stabilize the economy, and stabilize and gradually improve the people's lives.

9458

CSO: 4209/625

HANOI'S CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS FROM 15 MAY-15 JUN 1985

Hanoi VIETNAM COURIER in English Jul 85 p 32

[Text]

(15 May — 15 June)

MAY

16 — 22: A delegation of the Foreign Ministry of Finland, headed by Ambassador David Johansson, pays a visit to Vietnam and holds working sessions with the Hanoi People's Committee on Finland's assistance to Hanoi for improving its water supply system. This aid is worth 30 million dollars.

17 — 21: Ho Chi Minh City: Holding of the 29th regular meeting of leaders of the Sports and Physical Culture Organizations of the Friendly Armies (SKDA).

17 — 31: A delegation of the Soviet Academy of Sciences, headed by its Vice-President C.V. Frolov, pays a visit to Vietnam and holds working sessions in Hanoi.

— Vietnamese cultural performances are organized in Turin, one of the larger cities of Italy. Two weeks of such activities have gained great success. Cultural performances will be organized in other Italian cities at the request of city administrations.

18. The CPV Central Committee, the Council of State, the Council of Ministers, the Central Committee of the Vietnam Fatherland Front and the Hanoi People's Committee hold a grand meeting to mark the 95th birth anniversary of the late President Ho Chi Minh in Ba Dinh Hall. Truong-Chinh, President of the Council of State, delivered an important speech. Large excerpts of the speech are published in this issue of Vietnam Courier.

18 — 30. Hoang Tung, Secretary of the Communist Party of Vietnam Central Committee, and a delegation of the Ministry of Culture, headed by Minister Nguyen Van Hieu, attend Vietnamese Culture Days held for the first time in the Soviet Union.

21. Hanoi: The Vietnam Social Sciences Committee, the Institute of Literature, the Vietnam Writers' Association and Hanoi University hold a ceremony to celebrate the centenary of the death of the great French writer Victor Hugo and a seminar on his life and work. It is attended by many professors, researchers, writers, poets and French representatives in Hanoi.

22 — 27. A high-level Vietnamese Party and State delegation, headed by Truong-Chinh, Political Bureau

member of the Communist Party of Vietnam Central Committee, and President of the Council of State, pays an official friendship visit to the Lao People's Democratic Republic.

24 — 29. A. Lewis Burridge, Business Council President, American Chamber of Commerce in the Philippines, and Regional Chairman of the Republicans Abroad, pays a visit to Vietnam.

27 May — 1 June. A Swedish economic delegation, headed by Tom Tscherning, director of the Department for International Development Cooperation of the Swedish Foreign Ministry, pays a visit to Vietnam and signs various agreements and other documents between Vietnam and the Swedish Government.

29. The Ministry of Agriculture and other departments hold a ceremony to receive vegetable seeds and insecticide supplied as aid to Vietnam by the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO).

— Hanoi: Signing of a protocol on cooperation in 1985 between Vietnam's Ministry of Education, Ministry of Higher Education and Secondary Vocational Education and General Department of Job-Training on the one hand and Laos's Ministry of Education on the other.

31 May — 8 June. Minister of Education Nguyen Thi Binh pays an official friendship visit to France.

31. B.N. Diah, Editor of the Indonesian paper *Merdeka* and his wife, together with S. Supeno, Editor of the weekly *Topic* and his wife, pay a friendship visit to Vietnam at the invitation of Tran Lam, Chairman of the Vietnam Radio and Television Commission and Vice-President of the Vietnam Journalists' Association.

JUNE

3. Ulan Bator: A grand ceremony to inaugurate the first Vietnamese Culture Days in Mongolia is held at the Central Culture Palace of Mongolian Trade Unions.

3 — 8. A high-level Vietnamese Party and State delegation, led by Truong-Chinh, Political Bureau member of the Communist Party of Vietnam Central Committee, and President of the Council of State, pays an official friendship visit to Kampuchea.

6. New Delhi: Minister of Engineering and Metallurgy of Vietnam Nguyen Van Kha and Minister of Iron and Mine Industry of India Vasant Sathe reach agreement on several issues for cooperation in metallurgy.

7. Vientiane: Vietnamese Ambassador to Laos Nguyen Xuan, on behalf of the Ministry of Public Health, signs documents on medical cooperation between Vietnam and Laos with Laos's Vice-Minister of Public Health Vannareth Lasopho.

8. The SRV Council of State issues decrees on the award of Ho Chi Minh and State prizes of honours to artists, teachers and physicians.

— A spokesman of the SRV Foreign Ministry issues a statement in support of the goodwill position of the Lao People's Democratic Republic on the holding of bilateral talks at government level between Laos and Thailand to solve outstanding issues between the two countries.

14. The SRV Council of Ministers decides to set up the Vietnam Committee for the International Year of Peace with Phan Anh, President of the Vietnam Peace Committee, as its President.

15. The SRV Council of State confers the Order of Friendship on nine outstanding activists of the Italian People's Movement for Solidarity with Vietnam and for the Promotion of Friendship between the Two Countries.